





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THE CONTINUITY OF THE KYRIOS-TITLE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

In one sense or another the title *Kyrios* is applied to Christ throughout the New Testament. It occurs in all the documents with the exception of the Epistle to Titus.¹ And this literary phenomenon means to be expressive of a true historical continuity. It claims to exist not merely in the minds of the various writers, but to reflect the actual usage of the successive periods of our Lord's life and of New Testament history. It has been commonly assumed that this claim is in accord with the facts, that from the beginning onward and uninterruptedly ever after Jesus called Himself or was called *Kyrios*. Besides this it has also been commonly believed that the continuity observable was more than a mere chronological one. The usage in the days of our Lord's flesh was taken to have prepared the way for the usage in the mother-church after the resurrection, and this again to have given rise to the Pauline usage. An unbroken line of development according to the generally accepted view connects the earliest with the latest use made of the title within the New Testament period.

Bousset in his recent book entitled *Kyrios Christos* calls this continuity in question.² Though not the first one to take this view,³ Bousset for the first time has made the

¹ Its absence here seems to be due to the pointed preference for *Soter* as a title of Christ, i. 4; ii. 13; iii. 6.

² Cp. the notice of Bousset's book in this *Review*, 1914 (xii), pp. 636-645.

³ Predecessors of Bousset in this assumption were Heitmüller, *Zum Problem Paulus und Jesus* in ZNTW, 1912 (xiii), pp. 320-327, and Böhlig, *Zum Begriff Kyrios bei Paulus* in ZNTW, 1913 (xiv), pp. 23-37; cp. also the review of Bousset's work by Brückner in *Theol. Rundschau*, 1914 (xvii), pp. 169-182.

attempt to carry it through consistently as the basis for a broad construction of the origin and development of New Testament Christology and the early Christian faith in general. According to him the title is pre-Pauline. But it did not originate in the Palestinian mother-church, much less during the historical life of Jesus. It is one of the products of that intermediate Hellenistic stage of development, which he and others would insert between the earliest Palestinian Christianity and Paul, and which is believed to have had its center at Antioch. From this development Paul derived several important elements in his teaching, which formerly were considered either specifically Pauline or primitively Palestinian in their origin.

Paul after his conversion simply accepted the type of Christianity that had grown up in this Hellenistic *milieu*. The Hellenistic element in his teaching is to a far smaller extent than was once believed the result of the Apostle's own Hellenizing tendency. Much of it was taken over from the circle of Christians with whom he first associated. Chief among the elements thus adopted was the Kyrios-title. The early Syrian Christians came to give this title to Jesus because in the pagan cults of Syria with which they were familiar the deity or cult-heros was so designated, as was also the custom in Asia Minor and Egypt. It was in analogy with this that the Christians in that region spoke of Jesus, their cult-heros, as "the Lord". He was to them what the Dea Syria, Atargatis and other divinities or semi-divinities were to their worshippers. The elevation of Jesus to this rank did not, however, take place as a conscious deliberate act, but as a result of unconscious assimilation to a paganistic custom on the part of the church. Paul found it existing, made it his own and further developed it in harmony with his own peculiar (pneumatic) Christology.

This hypothesis carries with it certain important assumptions as to the occurrence of Kyrios in the Gospels and in the earlier chapters of Acts. With regard to Acts Bousset's

position is comparatively simple and plain. It is one of unhesitating denial of the historicity of the accounts in question. When Luke makes the early Palestinian Christians speak of Jesus as Kyrios or address Him as Kyrios, this is nothing else but an anachronism, a dating back into the first days of the Church of what later originated at Antioch. In fact in an article published subsequently to the appearance of *Kyrios Christos* Bousset endeavors to show that Kyrios occurs in Acts in such contexts as are non-Palestinian in origin, or in Palestinian contexts only where the author has worked over the material and through his redaction introduced it.⁴ He even thinks that on this principle the absence or presence of Kyrios in a piece can be used as a secondary, confirmatory test for the conclusions of the source-criticism of Acts.

In this Bousset treats the sources of Acts not as giving information relative to the time with which they deal, but as reflecting conditions and usages in existence at the time when they (the sources) were produced. The straightforward principle of hearing a document as a historical witness for the facts it professes to report, entirely gives way to the indirect procedure of making a document betray information involuntarily and as it were unconsciously. Bousset applies the same method to the Gospels. He examines and cross-examines them not to ascertain what took place during the life of Jesus on earth, but in order to elicit what were the practice and belief of the church at the time when the shaping or production of the Gospel-tradition was going on. As Acts becomes a source of knowledge not for the early-Palestinian period, but for the later Hellenistic days, so the Gospels become a mine of information not for the Gospel-history, but for the early-Palestinian development. Believing that the older portions of the Gospel-material in Mark (Ur-Markus) and the Logia are of early-Palestinian

⁴ *Der Gebrauch des Kyriostitels als Kriterium für die Quellenscheidung in der ersten Hälfte der Apostelgeschichte*, ZNTW, 1914 (xv), pp. 141-163.

provenience, he proceeds to point out that in them the title Kyrios for Jesus does not occur. Thus in Mark there is only one instance of Kyrie in the vocative and only one case of Kyrios objectively used. In the Logia the address Kyrie occurs only once, and the objective Kyrios nowhere. These three isolated cases of occurrence afford no actual instance against the hypothesis, because in Bousset's opinion they can be accounted for on special grounds, apart from any prevailing usage of Kyrios as a title for Jesus. To this argument from the practical absence of the title in the older tradition is added next the argument from its increasing intrusion into what are believed to be elements in the Gospels of later origin. Matthew, to be sure, has the objective Kyrios only once, but he introduces the vocative Kyrie quite a number of times. In Luke both Kyrie and Kyrios stream in quite freely, and therefore with Luke the period of the later usage must be supposed to begin. The history of the tradition, therefore, shows that the mother-church in Palestine did not at first call Jesus Kyrios. But on the same principle that this oldest material can be made to disclose what the first disciples did *not* call Jesus, it can be also positively made to disclose what they *did* call Him. Although Bousset believes that in our present Gospels the title Son-of-Man was subsequently introduced in numerous places, where originally the tradition did not contain it, nevertheless he believes that in a number of passages it is old enough and of sufficiently secure position to afford a reliable index of its prevalence as a name for Jesus when the earliest tradition circulated. This then, Son-of-Man, and not Kyrios, was what the mother-church called Jesus. Here again, it will be observed, the Gospel record is not used as a source of knowledge for the actual life of Jesus, but only as a source of information concerning the belief of the primitive Palestinian Christians. In regard to the question whether Jesus actually employed Son-of-Man as a self-designation Bousset is quite non-committal in harmony with his general sceptical attitude regarding the facts

of the life of Jesus, although he is not prepared to call in doubt the historicity of Jesus as such.

Besides the argument derived from the increasing frequency of the title in the growth of the Gospel tradition, Bousset adduces a linguistic argument in support of his view that Jesus during His lifetime was not addressed as Kyrios. It has been suggested that the Aramaeic word *Mar*, "Lord", was used as an honorific title of Rabbis, and that as a synonym of *Rab* it may have been applied to Jesus, which would furnish a substantial foundation for the Kyrios of the Greek Gospels in distinction from the other titles there found. Particularly Jno. xiii. 13 has been quoted in favor of this, inasmuch as here κύριος and διδάσκαλος seem to be used as synonyms. Bousset denies that such a usage ever existed. If it had been known to Jesus or the tradition, then in Matt. xxiii. 8 ff., where the possible honorific titles addressed by disciples to teachers are enumerated, *Mar* ought to have been given as distinct from *Rab* and "father". Also the absolute Kyrie, Kyrios, without suffix, in the Gospel-literature creates difficulty to this view. The Aramaeic *Mar* could never have been used without a suffix. If Jesus had been addressed or designated by means of it, the form would have been *Mari* or *Maran* "my Lord" or "our Lord", not "Lord" or "the Lord" absolutely. As to Jno. xiii. 13 ff., Bousset takes issue with the interpretation of κύριος and διδάσκαλος as synonyms. The passage according to him implies that the two titles have different import, and he seeks to prove this from its dependence on Matt. x. 24 where the correlate of διδάσκαλος is given as μαθητής, that of κύριος as δούλος.⁵

It is evidently not Bousset's opinion that Kyrie and Kyrios in the Gospels are wherever they occur pure additions by the tradition or the Evangelists. His real view, although not stated in so many words, seems to be, that Kyrie and Kyrios are later unwarranted renderings of an original *Rab*, *Rabbi*, *Rabbian*. To the mind of the tradition or the

⁵ *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 79, 98.

Evangelist Kyrie and Kyrios possessed the higher meaning with which they were familiar from the usage in their own time, and which anachronistically they carry back into the time of Jesus. They do not mean that the disciples and others used *Mari* as a variation of *Rabbi*, but ascribe to them a higher conception of Jesus to express which they felt *Rabbi* to be inadequate. Kyrios in the Gospels has the full pregnant sense of the later period, but for this very reason it cannot be historical.⁶

We wish to enquire whether Bousset's arguments have actually endangered the older view of a pre-Hellenistic use of the title "Lord" with reference to Jesus. Let us begin with the alleged absence of Kyrios from the Logia. Bousset declares: "In the Logia the title *ὁ κύριος* occurs nowhere. The address *κύριε* Lk. vi. 46, "Why call ye me, Lord (= Master) and do not what I say?", which fully explains itself from the context, has no evidential value whatever. Whether *κύριε* in Matt. viii. 8 = Lk. vii. 6, can

* There would seem to be some inconsistency between Bousset's statement on p. 95 in regard to the distinction between the vocative *κύριε* and the full title *ὁ κύριος*, and his interpretation of the Gospel-phenomena on the next page. On p. 95 he observes that in regard to the vocative a wider and looser usage can be traced in the New Testament, since not only God and Christ, but other heavenly beings and men of superior position receive the title from inferiors. Consequently in the investigation he proposes to leave the vocative out of account. On p. 96 on the other hand he appeals not merely to the increasing frequency of *ὁ κύριος* but also to the increasing vocative usage in Matthew and Luke as evidence for the influence exerted by the later custom to call Christ Kyrios in a specific and unique sense. If a wider and looser usage existed, then the vocative cases should not have been quoted as symptomatic of the feeling of the later period. It would have been more consistent to stake the whole argument on the objective use of the title. Bousset also leaves us in uncertainty as to whether the wider, looser, untechnical usage recognized by him for the vocative existed only on Greek soil or could have existed also on Palestinian, Aramaeic soil, either during the life of Jesus or in the mother-church. What he positively rejects as unhistorical is the employment of *Mar* as a Rabbinical title. But this leaves undecided the question whether with an un-Rabbinical connotation the address by means of *Mar* may not have been Palestinian or even existent and applied to Jesus in His own time.

be traced back to the Logia must remain in doubt, since the derivation of the entire pericope (the centurion of Capernaum) from the Logia continues a disputed point."⁷

The first of these statements "that the title *κύριος* occurs nowhere in the Logia" is correct only, if the technical meaning of "title" is unduly insisted upon. Of a strictly titular use of Kyrios the Logia furnishes no instance. But this is not pertinent to the question at issue. Bousset's position involves that the *conception* of Jesus as Lord was unfamiliar to the early Palestinian circles, and that it is this unfamiliarity which reflects itself in the absence of the *title* from the Logia. The absence of the title in order to be exponential of a Christological stage of development must rest on the background of the absence of the conception which pointedly expresses itself in the titular usage. If the conception appears to have been present, the absence of the title need not be anything more than pure accident. The rule cannot be laid down *á priori*, that, if the title was known in a certain circle, it must of necessity have entered into a document proceeding from that circle. Perhaps good reasons can be assigned why, in passages where it might have been employed, other ways of speaking were preferred. But, even though this should not be so, mere absence of the title in the face of familiarity with the conception proves nothing. Now as a matter of fact the Logia plainly show that the idea of the Lordship of Jesus was current where the Logia are supposed to have been collected and to have circulated. In Matt. xxiv. 43-51 = Lk. xii. 39, 40, 42-46 we meet with the representation of Jesus as *οἰκοδεσπότης* and as *κύριος* with reference to the disciples.⁸ That the representation is parabolic does not in the least detract from its significance. The householder and the slave in the parable illustrate a corresponding spiritual relationship between Jesus and the disciple and it would be difficult to say how

⁷ *Kyrios Christos*, p. 96.

⁸ See Harnack's reconstruction of the Logia in *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, pp. 26-28, 98, 187.

this could possibly have been conceived in any form different from that of lordship. One need not unduly allegorize the parable to see that this conception shines through at every point. Its meaning is not adequately rendered by saying that, in view of the absence and expected return of Jesus, watchfulness and faithfulness must be practised by the disciple in like manner as watchfulness and faithfulness are demanded of a house servant under similar circumstances with reference to the master of the house. It is distinctly implied that in both cases the duty springs from the relation of lordship. Especially towards the close the parabolic form of speaking perceptibly glides over into a semi-direct description of the spiritual reality, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day when he expecteth not, and in an hour when he knoweth not, and shall cut him asunder, and appoint his portion with the hypocrites; there shall be the weeping and gnashing of teeth."⁹ Here there can be no doubt but the returning one is Jesus and He is called "Lord", and that certainly not merely in virtue of the parabolic setting in what precedes but also because of His possessing the dignity on His own account. It may even be questioned whether in verse 45 of Matthew = verse 42 of Luke in the absolute *ὁ κύριος* we have not a reflex of the full titular use itself. The question, "who then is the faithful and wise servant whom *the lord* has set over his household, etc.?" certainly sounds as if "the Lord" as a title of Jesus was familiar to the mind that so phrased it.

A similar case of the parabolic designation of Jesus as Kyrios is found in Matt. x. 24, 25: "A disciple is not above his master, nor a servant above his lord. It is enough for the disciple that he be as his master, and the servant as his lord. If they have called the master of the house (*οἶκο-*

⁹The reference to "the weeping and gnashing of teeth" as well as the term "hypocrites" fall outside of the frame of the parable, and in so far also favor the direct reference of "lord" to Jesus. But "the weeping and gnashing of teeth" does not occur in Luke and for "hypocrites" Luke has "unfaithful" which remains true to the parable. Harnack thinks that the Logia had "hypocrites".

δεσπότην) Beelzebub, how much more them of his household?" Here again what starts out as a mere comparison of Jesus to a teacher or owner of slaves in his relation to the disciples ends with a direct formal designation of Him as "the master of the house", so as to imply familiarity with Jesus' lordship as a current conception. It is true Luke here (vi. 40) has only the figure of teacher and disciple; that of the lord and servant is lacking both in verse 40_a and verse 40_b, and also the question of verse 25_c in Matthew. But, if we may believe Harnack, the fuller form of the double comparison was original in the Logia, and the case is a case of conscious omission on the part of Luke. We may, therefore, put this passage by the side of the other as evidence that the lordship of Jesus, at least as a conception, was known in the Palestinian environment where the Logia first were handed down.¹⁰

And not merely in regard to the objective use of Kyrios, but also in regard to its vocative use Bousset's appeal to the Logia fails to convince. There is but one instance of this, he claims, and it lacks all evidential value because explainable from the context. This is Lk. vi. 46 "And why call ye me, Lord, and do not what I say?" He assumes that this saying belonged to the Logia in its Lucan form, and that the version in which it occurs in Matthew represents a subsequent stage of development. It is the later invocation of the Kyrios-name in the cult which Matt. vii. 21 carries back into the mouth of Jesus.¹¹ This assumption is evidently the reason why from the Lucan form the second Kyrie is dropped, although the text, without variants, gives Kyrie, Kyrie. Evidently the duplication of the name appears to Bousset reminiscent of the cult, and carries with it the technical high sense of Kyrios, and therefore in his opinion cannot have been original in the Logia. This, however, is a mere assumption. We may fairly insist upon

¹⁰*Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 58: "In Matt. x. 24, f. Luke seems to me to have omitted the lord and the slave because by the side of teacher and disciple they sounded superfluous and almost trivial."

¹¹*Kyrios Christos*, p. 103, note 5.

it that the Lucan version, if it be assigned to the Logia, shall be put there in the form which it actually bears, i.e., with the double Kyrie. And if this be done, it will be seen that the appeal to the connection as sufficiently explaining the case without recourse to a Kyrios-title is unavailing. The contrast between calling Jesus "Lord, Lord", and doing the things he says cannot mean a contrast between the recognition of Jesus as a teacher and the putting of his teaching into practice. The solemnly repeated "Lord" shows that the pretended reverence with which the practical disobedience conflicts is the reverence for Jesus as sovereign lawgiver and not as a mere teacher. For "the things which I say", the "I say unto you" of the earlier part of the discourse may be compared. Now, if such is the actual import of the saying, and if bearing this import it had its place in the Logia, then this proves at least that the *milieu* in which the Logia were first collected was not unacquainted with the conception of the sovereign lordship of Jesus as the basis of his legislative authority and as recognized in the address by means of Kyrie. When Matthew in verse 22 makes Jesus add that the same words "Kyrie, Kyrie" will be addressed to him by many in the day of judgment, there is really no great difference between this and the "Kyrie, Kyrie" he puts upon the lips of some of His followers during His lifetime. It goes without saying that the address to which people will resort in the day of judgment takes "Kyrie" in a very specific sense. Although verse 22 does not occur in Luke and for this reason is not included in the Logia, there is nothing to indicate that, so far as the sense of Kyrie is concerned, it goes beyond Lk. vi. 46.¹²

¹² Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, pp. 52, 177, feels doubtful about the appurtenance of the saying to the Logia, and surmises that the common source from which Matthew and Luke drew it lies farther back. If, however, a reconstruction of Q be attempted, he would prefer the λέγων μοι κύριε of Matthew to the τί δέ με καλεῖτε κύριε of Luke, and also gives preference to the words "he who does the will of my Father in heaven" in the second clause above the Lucan "and do not

In the story about the centurion of Capernaum Matt. viii. 5-10, 13 = Lk. vii. 1-10 Kyrie occurs in Matthew verse 8 = Lk. verse 6: "Lord I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof." Matthew alone has it also in verse 6: "Lord my servant lies in the house sick."¹³ It is usually assumed that the text of Matthew reproduces the account of the Logia in a more original form than that of Luke.¹⁴ As we have seen Bousset sets aside the evidence in this case on the ground that the inclusion of the story in the Logia remains in dispute. Probably this has reference to the view of Wernle who considers the pericope a later addition to Q because in the high opinion expressed about the faith of the centurion it conflicts with the Judaistic character of Q.¹⁵ But the Judaistic character of Q in such a sense as would preclude the recognition of exceptional faith in a Gentile, is not an accepted conclusion in Gospel-criticism. Harnack denies its existence with a reference to the saying (also contained in the Logia) that God can out of stones raise up children to Abraham Matt. iii. 9=Lk. iii. 8, and to the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman contained in Mark, in which the same judgment is expressed concerning Gentile

what I say". His preference in the former respect we do not understand. Perhaps it is due to the feeling that *καλεῖν* implies a formal invocation. The preference for "the will of my Father in heaven" seems to rest on a disinclination to believe that Jesus proclaimed His own word as law. In our view the mention of the Father in heaven does not exclude but rather includes the authoritative, sovereign position of Jesus in virtue of which he is addressed "Kyrie, Kyrie". The implication in Matthew is that Jesus represents God, so that His commands are the commands of God. And He represents God not as a teacher, but as Son, hence: "The will of my Father which is in heaven". It will be noted that Harnack retains the double Kyrie as original.

¹³The omission of *κύριε* in Luke verse 4 is due to the indirect discourse and the condensed character of the statement.

¹⁴Cp. Harnack, *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 56: "That Matthew has altered the text transmitted in Q cannot be shown." This does not apply to verse 13, which Harnack does not believe stood in Q because he thinks that not the healing of the servant but the saying about the centurion's faith formed the point of the original story (p. 147).

¹⁵*Synoptische Frage*, p. 232.

faith.¹⁶ We may therefore confidently count this another instance of the use of Kyrie in the Logia.

That no more than these two instances of the vocative Kyrie occur can create no wonder. The Logia, as most of the critics conceive of this document, is made up of sayings or discourses of Jesus. It offered little occasion, therefore, for describing a meeting with or an approach of people to Jesus such as would call for any formula of address. Where the character of the contents changes to the narrative or the parabolic form, the Kyrie, as we have seen, immediately emerges. If Kyrie is rare, other forms of address such as *διδάσκαλε* or *ῥαββεί* or *ἐπιστάτα* are entirely absent. This shows how little reliance can be placed on the non-occurrence of Kyrie, as a proof of the unfamiliarity of the time and circle in question with its use as a title of Christ. Nor could one expect to meet with Kyrios objectively in reflections or statements of Jesus with reference to Himself. While passages of this character are by no means wanting in the Logia, the title Kyrios would have been out of place, for the twofold reason that from its very nature it does not lend itself for use as a self-designation, and because none of the passages particularly calls for the expression of that aspect of Jesus' position or function, which the Kyrios-name connotes.¹⁷

The character of the Logia as a collection of sayings and not a narrative of events, will have to be kept in mind also in noting the absence of *ὁ κύριος* as a designation of Jesus by the author or collector of the documents. Such designation could occur only where, by way of exception, the narrative style is adopted. This happens in the account of the temptation, in the centurion pericope, in the episode of the inquiry sent by the Baptist.¹⁸ In these cases, so far as the

¹⁶ *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 147.

¹⁷ Cp. "Son-of-Man" Matt. viii. 20 = Lk. viii. 58; Matt. x. 32 = Lk. xii. 8; Matt. xii. 32 = Lk. xii. 10; Matt. xi. 19 = Lk. vii. 34; Matt. xii. 39 = Lk. xi. 30; Matt. xxiv. 27 = Lk. xvii. 24.

¹⁸ Cp. also Matt. xii. 22 ff. = Lk. xi. 14 ff. and Matt. xii. 38 ff. = Lk. xi. 16 ff.

simple pronoun is not employed, the name Jesus (temptation) or the title Christ (John's inquiry)¹⁹ are brought into use. This, however, is entirely in keeping with the preponderant Gospel usage throughout and proves, of course, nothing as to existence or non-existence of the conception of Jesus' lordship. In none of these cases has Matthew or Luke found occasion to introduce *ὁ κύριος* into the corresponding sections. The preference of the Gospel-narrative for the simple "Jesus" is a phenomenon remarkable enough in itself, but one which has nothing to do with the currency of *ὁ κύριος* in other connections.

We pass on to Mark which, like the Logia, Bousset thinks it possible to place, so far as its traditional material is concerned, within the pre-Kyrios stage of the Christological development. Here the situation is in so far different from the Logia as we are on narrative ground, and occasions for the introduction of either the vocative Kyrie or the objective Kyrios cannot be said to have been wanting. In fact Mark makes various people address Jesus no less than ten times by means of *διδάσκαλε*²⁰ and three times with a transliterated *ῥαββεί*.²¹ Besides there is one instance of *ῥαββουνί* with *κύριε ῥαββεί* and *ῥαββεί* as variants.²² Twice *ὁ διδάσκαλος* is used of Jesus in the third person.²³ In a number of these cases Kyrie and Kyrios would have seemed quite appropriate, although in some the use of *διδάσκαλε* explains itself and *κύριε* would have been out of place. Here therefore Bousset's contention that the absence of Kyrie and Kyrios from Mark is historically significant can be urged with a far greater semblance of plausibility than in connection with the Logia, because the absence is offset by the rather frequent introduction of other terms in connections where Kyrios or Kyrie might have been expected.²⁴

¹⁹ In Matt. xi. 2 D al read *Ἰησοῦ* instead of *Χριστοῦ*.

²⁰ iv. 38; ix. 17, 38; x. 17, 20, 35; xii. 14, 19, 32; xiii. 1.

²¹ ix. 5; xi. 21; xiv. 45.

²² x. 51.

²³ v. 35; xiv. 14.

²⁴ In view of the above statistics it is not clear what Dalman means

Nevertheless we think that even here the conclusion which Bousset would draw from the phenomena is unwarranted. First of all it should be observed that there is in Mark the same parabolic evidence of familiarity with the Kyrios conception that we found in the Logia. In Mk. xiii. 35 the man in the parable is called the *κύριος τῆς οἰκίας*. Here again it matters little that in the figure this *κύριος* is a common enough designation of a house-owner or house-ruler and has nothing specific about it. The specific character of the word is none the less implied because the house of which Christ is owner and ruler is the circle of disciples, the church or whatever name be given to it. One who owns and rules over this sphere is *κύριος* in a peculiar religious sense. The same conception of lordship meets us in a direct unparabolic form in ii. 28 where Jesus declares that the Son-of-Man is Kyrios *καὶ τοῦ σαββάτου*. This involves the right to make sovereign disposal of the institution of the Sabbath. No matter whether the *καί* be rendered "even" or "also", in either case the implication is that besides the Sabbath many other things fall under the jurisdiction of the Son-of-Man. A comprehensive Messianic lordship is implied from which the highest is not exempt. This *καί* also forbids the un-Messianic, generic interpretation of Son-of-Man, as if to man as such the right of disposing of the Sabbath were accorded. To say that man is lord *also* or *even* of the Sabbath yields no sense, whereas it yields excellent sense when meant to emphasize the wide range of the lordship of the Messianic Son-of-Man.²⁵ Still another instance

when (*Die Worte Jesu*, p. 269) he seeks to explain the uniqueness of Kyrie in Mark vii. 28 with the observation that Mark "in general is sparing with the recording of such terms of address". Mark has *διδάσκαλε* ten times, *ῥαββεί* 3 times, *ῥαββονί* once, *κύριε* once. This makes 15 instances in all. Matthew has a total of 25 and Luke a total of 19 not taking into account the parabolic cases. This disproportion is not great, and it disappears entirely, if the material which Matthew and Luke have beyond Mark is taken into account.

²⁵ If for Mark the generic sense of "Son-of-Man" cannot be defended, then there is, of course, no plausibility in ascribing it to Matthew, although his text does not contain the *καί*. Luke's text has *καί*.

of the formal ascription of lordship to the Christ (and to Jesus indirectly) is furnished by our Lord's reasoning against the Scribes concerning the question whether the Messiah be David's son or lord (Mk. xii. 35-37). Bousset is more eager here to call attention to the restricted scope of the idea, the Messiah being represented not as lord in general, but only as David's lord, than he appears to be in connection with the Sabbath-passages to do justice to the generalizing touch introduced by *καί*. We fail to see what force can be allowed to this consideration. The import of the argument is surely not this alone, that the Messiah is superior to David in rank, but that he rules over David as sovereign lord, and that such lordship could not belong to him in the capacity of a descendant and heir of David. Now lordship over David cannot be conceived except against the larger background of a general wide-reaching Messianic sovereignty. Instead of saying with Bousset: "lord over David only," it is much more pertinent to say: "lord even over David, and therefore lord over all that ranks lower than David." The question may even be raised whether the thought of lordship over David can be carried through without including in it authority over the dead as well as the living, for at the time of the Messiah's rule David no longer lives. But this is not essential to the argument. Bousset considers the entire episode unhistorical and explains it as the precipitate of the dogmatizing of the early church.²⁶ The question now before us is not, however, affected by this. Adjusting ourselves to Bousset's line of reasoning, we are examining Mark not as a direct historical witness to the life of Jesus but as an indirect reflector of the belief that prevailed in the early Palestinian Church. Though we may discount the episode in the former respect, yet the fact remains that when this story was pre-

It is fortunate that the *καί* stands in Mark; if it were lacking in Mark and found in both Matthew and Luke, the charge could be brought with far greater show of reason that the later two Evangelists had changed a generic into a Messianic "Son-of-Man."

²⁶ *Kyrios Christos*, p. 51.

precipitated there must have been a belief in the lordship of Jesus capable of precipitating it. And still another inference may be drawn from the episode, no matter whether interpreted as historical or as dogmatic precipitate. Bousset suggests that it not merely reflects the church's belief, but also reflects the controversies waged in regard to this belief between the Jewish Scribes and the Christians. Now it ought not to be overlooked that the point at issue either between Jesus and the Scribes or between the early Christians and the Scribes is not whether the Messiah is lord of David. The recognition of this, on the basis of the Psalm, furnishes the common ground on which the real point at issue is argued. The real point at issue is, whether being by common consent David's lord, the Messiah can be at the same time David's son.²⁷ And this issue presupposes that the attribute of lordship was associated by the Scribes with the character of the Messiah no less than by the Christians with the Person of Jesus. If this was so at the time when the controversies about the divine sonship of Jesus were going on, it would be rash to assume that the conception of the Messiah as Lord was unknown to the Judaism of the slightly earlier period.

The only actual instance of the designation of Jesus as

²⁷ Bousset thinks the argument implies that in the circle where the episode originated the descent of Jesus from David was denied (*Kyrios Christos*, p. 5). This view of the matter is perhaps more easily reconcilable with the uniform affirmation of the Davidic descent, than the same interpretation of the pericope where the latter is accepted as historical. If Jesus had explicitly denied His Davidic descent, then the later persistent belief in it becomes difficult to account for. If only the early church had made the denial the opposite belief could perhaps assert and maintain itself. In our opinion no denial of bodily descent is implied in the argument. "David's son" is equivalent to "David's heir". The question is not whether lordship over David and descent from David can go together, but whether inheritance of the lordship from David and exercise of lordship over David are compatible. All this, however, and also the further question, whether a higher sonship than the Davidic one, viz., sonship from God, stands in the background of the argumentation, as seems to be the case in Matthew ("What think ye concerning the Christ? Whose Son is he?"), can be left to one side as irrelevant to the present argument.

Kyrios in a technical sense acknowledged by Bousset in Mark is that of xi. 3, where the disciples are instructed to reply with reference to the colt used for the entry into Jerusalem "the Kyrios has need of him." Referring to Heitmüller's attempt to strip the term even here of its sacred technical meaning, Bousset observes that for this secondary passage an exception may safely be made.²⁸ Of course, if good reasons could be given for declaring the passage secondary, we should have to regard this a safe concession on Bousset's part. In reality the two reasons adduced are such as ought to be ruled out in any fair court of criticism. The one is based on the ascription of supernatural knowledge to Jesus.²⁹ From such as do not *à priori* deny the supernatural in the consciousness of Jesus this argument can claim no consideration, even where the historicity of the account is the direct point at issue. But it appears altogether irrelevant even from Bousset's own anti-supernaturalistic standpoint, because the supernaturalism involved may with absolute certainty be declared to have been attainable by the earliest stage in the formation of the Gospel-tradition. There surely never was a time in the early Church when the faith of its members in regard to the Person of Jesus fell short of the power of investing Him with such a moderate degree of supernaturalism as is here described. As a criterion for the original or secondary character of a passage in Mark, and more particularly as a criterion for judging of the antiquity of the Kyrios-title contained in that passage, the feature is wholly worthless. The second reason why Bousset considers the passage secondary need not detain us because it rests on the occurrence in it of the Kyrios-title itself³⁰ To argue first from the Kyrios-title that the account is secondary, and then from the secondary character of the account, that the Kyrios-title is not early-Palestinian would be a *petitio principii*, with which we do not mean to charge Bousset.

²⁸ *Kyrios Christos*, p. 96, note 1.

²⁹ *Kyrios Christos*, p. 71, note 1. The same judgment is applied to Mk. xiv. 13 ff.

³⁰ *Kyrios Christos*, p. 52.

A feature to be carefully noticed in connection with this last passage is the absolute form in which it employs the conception of *ὁ κύριος* without any qualifying genitive. In this an indication might be found of the presence of the later usage which designated the exalted Christ as *ὁ κύριος* absolutely. We do not think that suspicion against it on this score would be well-grounded. In order to avert it, however, it is not necessary to supply the qualifying genitive and take *ὁ κύριος* in the sense of the owner, viz., of the colt, as some have proposed. Of course the right to the use of the animal is implied, but it is implied in the whole situation, not in the term *Kyrios* as such. That this is so can be best perceived by comparing the case with the analogous case Mk. xiv. 14. Here the disciples are told to say to the goodman of the house: "The Master says, where is my guest-chamber, where I shall eat the passover with my disciples?" If here *ὁ κύριος* were read, instead of *ὁ διδάσκαλος* the inference would lie near that Jesus was called "lord" on account of his sovereign right to claim the use of the guest-chamber, and the words "my guest-chamber" might seem to favor this. As it is, the title *ὁ διδάσκαλος* cannot have been intended to justify the claim in question. Neither then will *ὁ κύριος* in the closely parallel passage have any such associations. In both cases we plainly have before us evidences of the passing over into a formal objective title of what had before been a mode of addressing Jesus in the vocative. The persons to whom the message is sent will know who is meant by *ὁ κύριος* and *ὁ διδάσκαλος* because in the circle of the disciples the custom of speaking to Jesus by means of *κύριε* and *διδάσκαλε* had already given rise to such objectivation of the terms. *Ὁ κύριος* in the first instance meant the one whom we are accustomed to address as *κύριε*, just as *ὁ διδάσκαλος* meant, the one whom we are wont to address as *διδάσκαλε*. It is not necessary to assume that a formal objective usage of *ὁ κύριος*, either in the later sense or as a standing title of the Messiah underlies the passage. The non-titular concept of the lordship of the

Messiah would reflect itself in the vocative usage and this would of itself unconsciously and inevitably give rise to the designation of Jesus as *ὁ κύριος* just as we find it here.³¹

If this is actually the background of the absolute *ὁ κύριος* it proves at the same time that the vocative Kyrie is not so utterly unknown to the Marcan tradition as Bousset would have us believe. The occurrence of it in the case of the Syro-Phoenician woman (Mk. vii. 28) he seeks to explain from the nationality of the woman in such a way as to avoid the assumption of a similar usage among the disciples. From the point of view of the tradition this would involve that the term *κύριε* was felt either as a pagan-Syrian or at least as a Syrian-Christian way of addressing Jesus, something that appeared to the early-Palestinian bearers or receivers of the tradition as an exotic custom. And the same construction might be put upon the fact that in the Logia also the one person who addresses Jesus by means of Kyrie is the non-Jewish centurion. Both the uniqueness of the case in each of the two documents and the coincidence of the Gentile nationality of the speakers lend a degree of plausibility to this hypothesis. It should be observed, however, that the two cases are not strictly analogous, for the centurion is only Gentile by descent; religiously he appears closely associated with Judaism. It therefore seems doubtful whether pur-

³¹ Mk. v. 19 is a doubtful instance of *ὁ κύριος* for Jesus. Jesus instructs the Gerasene demoniac, "Go to thy house unto thy friends, and tell them how great things *ὁ κύριος* has done for thee". It must remain uncertain whether *ὁ κύριος* here refers to God or to Jesus. The only other passage in Mark, outside of Old Testament quotations, where God is so designated is xiii. 20. In xi. 10 *κύριος* is lacking in the best manuscripts and seems to be a duplication from the preceding verse where it occurs in a quotation. Perhaps the statement to the demoniac might be considered a quotation or at least a reminiscence from Psa. cxxvi. 3. The parallel passage in Luke (viii. 39) has *ὅσα σοι ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός* and therefore takes the *ὁ κύριος* found in Mark as equivalent to *ὁ θεός*. On the other hand, if Mark be interpreted by itself, the recurrence of the same form of statement in verse 20, "he began to publish how great things Jesus had done for him" favors the reference of *ὁ κύριος* to Jesus." Cp. Sven Herner, *Die Anwendung des Wortes Kyrios im Neuen Testament*, pp. 7, 8.

poseful assimilation to a heathen mode of speech can be made responsible for the Kyrie in his case. But there is another feature in regard to which the two pericopes are strictly parallel and with which the simultaneous appearance of Kyrie in each may therefore be much more plausibly connected. Both accounts emphasize the astounding greatness of faith in the person who appealed to Jesus for help, and the declaration of Jesus appended shows how in the case of the centurion the pagan character is reflected upon only insofar as it brings out in strong relief this marvellous faith. It will be further observed that in the narrative of the centurion his extraordinary faith is brought into close connection with the lordship over the powers of healing which he ascribes to Jesus and which he compares to his own relation to the powers above and under him. Thus the story itself leads us to explain the singular mode of address by means of Kyrie from the vivid and strong conviction as to the supernatural power of Jesus implied in the faith of him who used it. And this explanation can be applied with equal plausibility to the account of Jesus' encounter with the Syro-Phoenician woman. It does not favor the assumption that by addressing Jesus as Kyrie the woman classified Him from a specifically pagan or non-Jewish-Christian point of view. The Kyrie introduces a sentence in which the possibility of receiving help from Jesus is suspended on association with Jesus' ministry for Israel: "Yea, Lord: even the little dogs under the table eat of the children's crumbs."²² This points distinctly to the Messianic interpretation of the Kyrie. Matthew certainly has so understood it for he introduces Kyrie not only in verse 25 in the appeal "Lord, help me" but as early as in the woman's first cry: "Have mercy on me, O Lord, thou Son of David", verse 22. The title Lord which she applies to Jesus belongs to Him as the Son

²² The *vaí* which precedes Kyrie is neither confirmation of Jesus' preceding statement, nor protest against it, but confirms the last word of the woman herself, verse 26 in Mk., verse 22 in Matthew (xv).

of David, the Messiah.³³ The favorite homiletical motif—as if the woman had first appealed to the Son of David, that is to Jesus in his Messianic capacity, and only after the fruitlessness of this became apparent from Jesus' answer, had appealed to Him in His higher capacity as Kyrios in the universalistic sense—is not warranted by the account even of Matthew, and certainly in Mark cannot find the least semblance of support. There is no reason to interpret this Kyrie on such a high plane as would make it practically equivalent to the Kyrie of the post-resurrection period. The Messianic reference is made probable also by further comparison with the centurion-pericope. Our Lord's declaration in regard to the centurion "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel", implies that what rendered this man's faith unique was the ability to believe what God was doing for Israel without the support derived from Israel's long preparation for such faith in the past.

In a class by themselves stand the passages i. 3; xvi. 19, 20. They are cases of the application of the title *κύριος* to Jesus not by speakers within the frame of the Gospel-history, but by the writer of the Gospel. They reflect plainly the later well-established usage. The two verses in Chapter xvi can remain out of consideration here because they occur in what is regarded by many as the later unauthentic conclusion to the Gospel. The other passage, however, is important for our purpose. It occurs in a quotation from Isa. xl. 3, "Prepare ye the way of the Lord." In the prophet the *κύριος* for whom the way is to be prepared is Jehovah. But there can be no doubt that, so far as the writer of the Gospel is concerned, we have here a case of the substitution of the *κύριος*-Jesus for the *κύριος*-Jehovah, of which there are so many other instances in the New Testament. For in the immediately preceding quotation from Mal. iii. 1, which also in the original represents Jehovah as the coming one,

³³ The mere non-repetition of *υἱὸς Δαυεὶδ* in verse 25 of Matthew cannot, of course, prove that Kyrie is the second time meant in a higher sense than the first time.

the form has been so changed as to make it refer to Jesus, "I send my messenger before *thy face*, who shall prepare *thy way*" being substituted for "I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me." The question whether this substitution was possible on the basis of the Hebrew or Aramaeic idiom can be neglected for the present since the Gospel was written in Greek and the possibilities in the matter were determined not by the Hebrew but by the Greek Old Testament. The writer of i. 3, therefore, is familiar with the designation of Jesus as *ὁ κύριος* in a sense sufficiently high and unique as not to preclude the transfer to Him of what the Old Testament affirms of the *κύριος*-Jehovah. Bousset finds in verse 2 evidence of the progressive embellishment of the history of Jesus with traits supplied by Old Testament prophecy.³⁴ On this principle the equation of Jesus with *ὁ κύριος* would afford no proof of the existence of the *κύριος*-title during the earlier stage of the tradition in Palestinian circles. We shall not, therefore, press it as an argument in the present connection. But the discounting of it by Bousset on the plea that it belongs to a later stratum of the tradition raises the interesting question, what bearing Bousset's view on this whole subject of the gradual growth of the Gospel-tradition and the evidence he discovers of it in Mark has on the argument derived from the almost total absence of the *κύριος*-title from the Marcan material. Bousset believes that in our present Mark much later material has gathered around the nucleus of actual primitive tradition. The single story and the single logion constituted the first form in which the tradition was handed down. The next stage was the stage of agglutination of the single pieces into groups from the point of view of similarity of content. Of such groups he counts at least eight in Mark. But to this original body were added in course of time a number of secondary pieces. All this applies to the oral tradition. On the question whether the literary composition of Mark passed through several stages

³⁴ *Kyrios Christos*, p. 85.

Bousset does not commit himself.³⁵ In the main he places the process of agglutination and accretion within the thirty years of oral tradition that preceded the fixing of the Gospel in written form. Now the observation can be made that in this body of later material the Kyrios-title is scarcely more in evidence than in the tradition-stratum assumed to be of earlier origin. Many instances are specified by Bousset of such later increment or of the touching up in a later spirit of older pieces.³⁶ In connection with three of these the conception of Jesus' lordship appears viz., the Sabbath-controversy, in the account of the entry into Jerusalem, and in the polemic against the Scribes about the Messiah's being David's son or Lord. Over against these we may place the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman and the parable of the lord of the house, possibly also the story of the Gerasene demoniac. Why is it that the introduction of this later material or the working over of the earlier tradition in a later spirit has not resulted in a far greater frequency of the Kyrios-conception or the Kyrios-title? Are we to assume that all this secondary growth was made in Palestinian circles before the Kyrios-title had had time to work its way from the Syrian-Hellenistic Church

³⁵ An exception, in regard to the mode of origin, is made for the passion-narrative. This existed, so far as its origin can be traced back, in coherent form and possibly assumed literary shape at an earlier point than the other material. This original passion-narrative, however, is not identical with the present passion-story in Mark. In the latter also later elements are discovered. *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 42-44.

³⁶ *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 47-57; 65-82. Bousset brings under this head, the authority claimed for the Son-of-Man to forgive sin, the parable of the bridegroom concerning fasting, the Sabbath-controversy connected with the plucking of ears of corn, the parable of the binding of the strong one; the logion about the gaining and losing of life, the *ὄνομα*-passages (ix. 37-41), the parable of the wicked husbandmen, the Son- or Lord-of-David pericope, the saying about the passing away of earth and heaven before Jesus' words pass away, the story of the entry into Jerusalem, of the passover-meal, of the trial of Jesus, the inscription on the cross, the accounts of the baptism and the temptation. It is not, of course, assumed that in each of these cases the material as a body is of late origin, but in all cases at least later ideas have been introduced into it.

into the Jewish-Christian community and gain a firm hold upon the tradition there? There would be two difficulties in the way of assuming this. In the first place Bousset himself locates much of this development on Greek soil, as appears from the fact that he regards the title Son-of-God and the dominating rôle it plays in Mark as a Hellenistic product.³⁷ And in the second place, although the time of a whole generation may be allowed for the growth of the tradition before it became fixed in literary form, this entire period cannot be supposed to have elapsed before the Kyrios-title found an entrance into the Palestinian Church. For at the time of the writing of the First Epistle to the Corinthians Paul already characterizes the Christians (1. Cor. 1. 2) as οἱ ἐπικαλούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν and in view of the added words ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡμῶν this cannot possibly be restricted to the Greek Churches, but must include the Palestinian Christians as well.³⁸ At that time, therefore, from 50 to 58 A. D., according to the chronology adopted, the custom of the invocation of Jesus as Lord was already firmly established among the Christians in Palestine. And since it will be necessary to go back several years of this date, to allow for a required period of gradual adoption of the custom, it seems safe to affirm that not a little of the tradition-material in Mark must on Bousset's own hypothesis have received its present form while the Kyrios-title was generally current in the circle where this took place. In the face of this it becomes precarious to make of the uniform absence of the title from Mark an argument for the non-acquaintance of the early church with this designation. If the later currency of the title could leave the

³⁷ *Kyrios Christos*, pp. 65-70. Bousset now retracts his earlier view (*Religion des Judenthums*², pp. 261 ff.) and accepts Dalman's conclusion (*Worte Jesu*, I, p. 219), that in the apocalyptic literature "Son-of-God" does not occur as a Messianic title. The passages in 4 Ezra originally had not υἱὸς θεοῦ but παῖς θεοῦ.

³⁸ Bousset (p. 100 note 1) does not share the suspicion of Joh. Weiss against this statement of Paul. He suggests that the words καὶ ἡμῶν might be removed from the text. This does not affect the force of the remaining words ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ αὐτῶν.

subsequent development of the tradition unaffected, then the quiescence of the title in the earlier stage need not be in any way indicative of its non-currency at that time. The fact also that the Gospel of Mark as such is a Greek product and that it embodies all the tradition that has flowed into it, the alleged earlier no less than the alleged later elements, in Greek form should give us pause before drawing over-hasty conclusions in this matter. However much respect the writer of the Gospel may have had for the tradition as he found it, he can hardly have confined his task to that of a mere collector. No punctilious regard for the literal retention of the transmitted form need have prevented him from introducing where he speaks in his own person the designation of Jesus as *ὁ κύριος*. This was sufficiently familiar to him, as we have seen, to induce the application of Isa. xl. 3 to Jesus. And yet, apart from the "unauthentic" conclusion of the Gospel, he nowhere refers to Jesus objectively as *ὁ κύριος*. The same applies, with one exception, to the author of the First Gospel. The difference between them and Luke, who on his own account speaks no less than sixteen times of *ὁ κύριος*, is not due to a difference in familiarity with the usage. Why then should such an explanation be given where the similar phenomenon of relative absence or avoidance of the *κύριος*-title within the frame of the narrative comes under consideration?

Before dismissing the subject of the relative infrequency of *κύριος* or *κύριε* in Mark attention may be called to the parallel phenomenon of the rare occurrence of *ὁ κύριος* as a name for God in the same document. Apart from Old Testament quotations, where the use of *ὁ κύριος* could not be avoided,³⁹ there is but a single passage, xiii. 20, "except the Lord shortened the days," where God is so designated. No one would care to suggest that there is anything significant in this; it must be purely accidental. If it occurred in a later document, where *ὁ κύριος* was the standing title of

³⁹ Cp. xi. 9; xii. 11, 29, 30, 36; for v. 19 and xi. 10, see note 31.

Christ, it might be attributed to the extrusion of the former by the latter. But in Mark this is not to be thought of. And yet if Mark be compared with Matthew and Luke we find that there appears in the two last-named Gospels a very frequent use of *ὁ κύριος* for God outside of Old Testament quotations.⁴⁰ The facts, therefore, run strikingly parallel to those observable in connection with the Kyrios-designation of Jesus. And yet it is absolutely excluded in this case that the infrequency in Mark should reflect any unfamiliarity with the name *ὁ κύριος* for God or rather with the circumlocutions such as *Shema* and *Hasshem* of which *ὁ κύριος* was the substitute from the Greek Bible.

A similar observation can be made with reference to the title "The Christ". Bousset himself tells us that in the Logia this nowhere occurs as a self-designation of Jesus and in Mark only four times altogether, viz., viii. 29; ix. 41; xiv. 61; xv. 32. Of these four passages ix. 41 appears to him suspicious on account of Matt. x. 42, where instead of *ἐν ὀνόματι ὅτι Χριστοῦ ἔστε* is read *εἰς ὄνομα μαθητοῦ*. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that Jesus was currently designated "the Christ" in early Palestinian circles. This follows not merely from the abundant testimony in Acts, which Bousset suggests might perhaps be set down as a literary peculiarity of the writer of that book, but it follows also from the fact that the few passages where it does occur in Mark belong to the best accredited parts of the Gospel-tradition (the episode of Caesarea-Philippi and the trial of Jesus). Bousset admits that the latter circumstance speaks in favor of the credibility of the representation in Acts according to which *ὁ Χριστός* was current, not as a proper name but as an appellative title, in the earliest church. If this be so the fact results that there is a great disproportion

⁴⁰ For Matthew Cp. i. 20, 22, 24; ii. 13, 15, 19; ix. 38; xi. 25; xxviii. 2; for Luke i. 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 25, 28, 32, 38, 45, 58, 66; ii. 9, 15, 22, 23, 24, (26), (38); iv. 8, 12; x. 2, 21; xx. 37. The remarkable increase in both Gospels, as compared with Mark, may be due to the peculiar complexion of the accounts of the nativity, in which most of the instances occur.

between the frequency in actual use and the rareness of introduction of the title in the Marcan tradition. How then can we feel sure that the rareness of Kyrios or Kyrie in Mark is an accurate gauge of the familiarity or unfamiliarity of the earliest disciples with these terms?

We now come to the examination of the evidence from Matthew and Luke. It cannot be denied that a great increase in the use of *κύριος* for Jesus along certain lines is perceptible in these Gospels. The vocative *κύριε* as addressed to Jesus occurs twenty-five times in Matthew, not counting the four times of parabolic use with probable indirect reference to Jesus. In Luke it is found nineteen times directly and four times parabolically. This relation of preponderance of the direct over the parabolic use is reversed in regard to the objective *ὁ κύριος* for Jesus within the frame of the Gospel-history. Here Matthew and Luke have each four cases of direct reference, whereas the more or less plain allusions to Jesus as *ὁ κύριος* in parabolic contexts are twelve in Matthew and seven in Luke. As to the use of *ὁ κύριος* by the Evangelists, of this there is but one instance in Matthew, whereas in Luke there are no less than fourteen. In weighing this evidence it ought to be observed that it depends for its force as confirming Bousset's hypothesis on the correctness of his findings in regard to the Logia and Mark. The salient point of the hypothesis is that to the early Palestinian Church Jesus was not yet *ὁ κύριος*. The proof of this cannot be furnished by pointing to a relative increase however great in Matthew over the Logia and Mark; it must from the nature of the case consist in this, that over against *the total absence of the conception and the terms* in the Logia and Mark, a frequent use can be observed in Matthew and Luke. Now we have already shown that on a basis of objective criticism the presence of the conception and the terms in the earliest accessible strata of tradition both in the Logia and Mark must be admitted. It follows, therefore, that the relative increase in Matthew and Luke cannot be utilized to demonstrate the origin of the Kyrios-title in the interval

that lies between the crystallizing of the Logia-Marcan form of the tradition and its Matthaean-Lucan form. It would be possible, of course, so to modify the hypothesis as to place the introduction of the Kyrios-title into Palestinian circles before the definite fixing of the tradition in the Logia and Mark and to maintain that it had originated previously in the Hellenistic Church. In that case the increasing entrance of it into the Gospels would become significant of the growing popularity of a term in principle known from the beginning. But on such a view the extra-Palestinian, Hellenistic origin could only be assumed, no longer proven by induction from the Gospel phenomena. If the title lies back even of the Logia and Mark, there is no telling how old it may be nor what may have been its origin. It may well have come down from the earliest days of the mother-church or for that matter from the time of the ministry of Jesus.

Though, therefore, the examination of this part of the evidence cannot essentially modify our judgment as to Bousset's hypothesis, yet it need not on that account be without value for our further purpose. So far we have confined ourselves strictly to the question what light the Gospel-tradition throws on the existence or non-existence of the Kyrios-title for Jesus in the early Palestinian Church. But back of this lies the more fundamental question, how in view of the Gospel-data we are to judge of the currency or non-currency and further of the possible import of such a title as applied to Jesus during the Gospel-ministry itself. Bousset's denial of the usage in the early church, of course, includes the denial of everything corresponding to it or preparatory for it during the lifetime of Jesus. It is in view of this reaching back of the problem into the life and teaching of Jesus that the phenomena in Matthew and Luke become important. For it will be remembered that, according to Bousset, both Matthew and Luke, the former more sparingly, the latter with great freedom, introduced or substituted Kyrie and Kyrios where

historically there was no basis for this or where some other title of a different kind was given in the original tradition. The change was made under the influence of the later custom to call Jesus "the Lord" in the technical sense and address Him as such.

The question before us is not directly how the increasing use of Kyrios and Kyrie in Matthew and Luke⁴¹ can be explained, but whether it furnishes evidence of a desire or tendency to carry the later technical sense of these terms back into the life of Jesus. In seeking to answer this question we obviously must distinguish between the cases where Matthew and Luke present material not contained in the Logia and Mark and the cases in which they are assumed to have taken their material from the Logia and Mark. It is plain that in cases of the latter kind the introduction of Kyrios and Kyrie or its substitution for another title will be more significant than the emergence of Kyrios and Kyrie in new material. Where the title is added or substituted a definite cause will have to be assumed for this procedure on the part of the later Evangelists; and it may appear possible, perhaps even at first sight plausible, to find this in their familiarity with the technical designation of Christ as Kyrios in their own day. On the other hand where the new material comes under consideration no such definite cause for the appearance of the terms need be looked for, since the possibility exists that in these cases the tradition as it came to the Evangelists already contained them and may even have contained them from the beginning.

With this distinction in mind we shall be prepared to consider in detail the facts presented by Matthew and Luke in a subsequent article.

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⁴¹For convenience' sake we say Matthew and Luke. It is not, of course, necessary *ex hypothesi* to assume that the Evangelists effected the change described. It may have preëxisted in the later form of the tradition incorporated by them in their Gospels.

CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION¹

In developing his system, Calvin proceeds at once from the doctrine of God to an exposition of His works of creation and providence (I. xiv-xv, and xvi-xviii).² That he passes over the divine Purpose or Decree at this point, though it would logically claim attention before its execution in creation and providence, is only another indication of the intensely practical spirit of Calvin and the simplicity of his method in this work. He carries his readers at once over from what God is to what God does, reserving the abstruser discussions of the relation of His will to occurrences for a later point in the treatise, when the reader's mind, by a contemplation of the divine works, will be better prepared to read off the underlying purpose from the actual event. The practical end which has determined this sequence of topics governs also the manner in which the subject of creation, now taken up (chs. xiv-xv), is dealt with. There is no discussion of it from a formal point of view: the treatment is wholly material and is devoted rather to the nature of the created universe than to the mode of the Divine activity in creating it. Even in dealing with the created universe, there is no attempt at completeness of treatment. The spiritual universe is permitted to absorb the attention; and what is said about the lower creation is reduced to a mere hint or two introduced chiefly, it appears, to recommend the contemplation of it as a means of quickening in the heart a sense of God's greatness and goodness (xiv. §§20-22).

It is quite obvious, in fact, from the beginning, that Calvin's mind is set in this whole discussion of creation primarily on expounding the nature of man as a creature of God; and all else that he incorporates into it is subsidiary to this.

¹ This article continues articles on *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God*, *Calvin's Doctrine of God*, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity*, published in this REVIEW for April, July and October 1909 respectively.

² References by numerals alone are to the *Institutes*.

He is writing for men and bends all he is writing to what he conceives to be their practical interests. He does not reach the actual discussion of man as creature, to be sure (ch. xv), until after he has interposed a long exposition of the nature of angels and demons (xiv. 3-12, and 13-19). But this whole exposition is cast in a form which shows that angels and demons are interesting to Calvin only because of the high estimate he places upon the topic for the practical life of man; and it is introduced by a remark which betrays that his thought was already on man as the real subject of his exposition and all he had to say about other spiritual creatures was conceived as only preliminary to that more direct object of interest. "But before I begin to speak more fully concerning the nature of man," he says quite gratuitously at the opening of the discussion (xiv. 3 *ad init.*), "something should be inserted (*inserere*) about angels." What he actually says about angels, good and bad, in the amount of space occupied by it, is more than what he says about man: but it stood before his mind, we observe, as only "something," and as something, be it noted, "inserted," before the real subject of his discourse was reached. In his own consciousness what Calvin undertakes in these chapters is to make man aware of his own nature as a creature of God, and to place him as a creature of God in his environment, the most important elements of which he conceives to be the rest of the intelligent creation.

It is not to be inferred, of course, from the lightness with which Calvin passes over the doctrine of creation itself in this discussion that he took little interest in it or deemed it a matter of no great significance. That he does not dwell more fully on it is due, as we have said, to the practical nature of his undertaking, and was rendered possible by the circumstance that this doctrine was not in dispute.³

³ Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, pp. 50-41: "Although the importance of the doctrine of creation is felt by the two reformers, yet we seek in vain in Zwingli as well as in Calvin for a definite theory of creation. . . . The reason why the doctrine of creation was not developed by them in the same degree as that of

All men in the circles which he was addressing were of one mind on it, and there were sources of information within the reach of all which rendered it unnecessary for him to enlarge on it.⁴ That he had a clear and firm conception of the nature of the creative act and attributed importance to its proper apprehension is made abundantly plain; and is emphasized by his consecration of the few remarks he gives professedly to the topic to repelling assaults upon its credibility drawn from the nature of the Divine Being (xiv. 1-2).

In his conception of creation Calvin definitely separated himself from all dualistic,⁵ and especially from all pantheistic⁶ elements of thought by sharply asserting that all substantial existence outside of God owes its being to God, that it was created by God out of nothing, and that it came from God's hand very good. His crispest definition of creation he lets fall incidentally in repelling the pantheistic notion that, as he scornfully describes it, "the essence of the Creator is rent into fragments that each may have a part of it." "Creation," he says, "is not the transfusion, but the origination out of nothing, of essence."⁷ "God," says he again, "by the power of His Word and Spirit created out of

providence, must no doubt be sought in the fact that this dogma did not at the time give occasion to any polemic." Also, *De Godsleer van Calvin*, p. 57: "We cannot think it strange that Calvin, as a Biblical theologian, will know nothing of any other theory of creation than that which is given us in the Scriptures."

⁴I. xiv. 20: He refers his readers to Moses, as expounded particularly by Basil and Ambrose, "since it is not my design to treat at large of the creation of the world."

⁵Cf. I. xiv. 3, where he inveighs against "Manichaeus and his sect," who attributed to God the origin of good things only, but referred evil natures to the devil. The sole foundation of this heresy, he remarks, is that it is nefarious to ascribe to the good God the creation of any evil thing: but this is inoperative as "there is nothing in the universe which has an evil nature,"—"since neither the pravity nor the malice of either man or devil, or the sins that are born from them, are of nature, but rather of corruption of nature."

⁶Cf. I. xvi. 5: "To rend the essence of the Creator so that everything should possess a part, is the extremity of madness."

⁷I. xv. 5, *med*: creatio autem non transfusio est, sed essentiae ex nihilo exordium.

nothing, the heavens and the earth," that is to say, all that exists, whether celestial or terrestrial.⁸ Firmly stated as this doctrine of creation is, however, so as to leave us in no doubt as to Calvin's conception,⁹ the elements of it are little elaborated. There is no attempt for example to validate the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* whether on biblical¹⁰ or on such rational grounds as we find appealed to by Zwingli, who argues that creation *ex materia* implies an infinite series whether the material out of which the creation is made be conceived as like or unlike in kind to that which is made from it.¹¹ As we have seen, Calvin does argue, however,

⁸ I. xiv. 20: Deum verbi ac Spiritus sui potentia ex nihilo creasse coelum et terram. Cf. Genevan Catechism, 1545, *Opp.* VI. 15, 16: Per coelum et terram an non quidquid praeterea creaturarum extat, intelligis? Imo vero; sed his duobus nominibus continentur omnes. quod aut coelestes omnes aut terrenae.

⁹ Cp. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer von Calvijn*, p. 53: "Calvin's doctrine of creation is in brief, this: God created the world out of nothing in six days through His Word, *i.e.* through His Son."

¹⁰ In the Argument to the Commentary on Gen. I, however, he does argue that the Bible teaches that creation is *ex nihilo*, the weight of the argument being made to rest on the use of ברא, which he sharply discriminates from עשה. Cf. Baumgartner, *Calvin Hebraïsant*, 1889, pp. 50, 51: "Richard Simon has pointed, as a proof that Calvin was not strong in Hebrew, to the fact that he understands the בָּרָא of Gen. i. 1 in the sense of 'creation *ex nihilo*.' But here again R. Simon has been misled by his party-spirit. for the modern lexicographers are far from pronouncing Calvin's interpretation wrong" (*e.g.* Gesenius, *Thesaurus*, I. p. 236). The most recent view will scarcely allow that the specific idea of creation *ex nihilo* is expressed in ברא but recognizes that the ideas of novelty, extraordinariness, effortlessness are expressed in it, and that thus it may be said to lay a basis for the doctrine in question: cf. Franz Böhl, *Alttestamentliche Studien Rudolf Kittel zum 60 Geburtstag dargelegt*, 1913, pp. 42-60, and Skinner, *Genesis*, pp. 14, 15. Calvin does not understand Heb. xi. 3 of creation *ex nihilo*, but interprets it as the manifestation of the Invisible God in the visible works of His hands, "that we have in this visible world a conspicuous image of God"; "thus the same truth is taught here as in Rom. i. 20, where it is said that the invisible things of God are made known to us by the creation of the world, they being seen by His works." This is the burden of the Argument to the Commentary on Gen. I, and its echoes are heard in *Inst.* I. xv. 1.

¹¹ *Works*, IV. 86 seq.: Zwingli argues that, if the preëxisting stuff is the same in kind as the thing created, we have an infinite series of worlds: if

(like Zwingli), that creation in its very nature is "origination of essence", so that he would have subscribed Zwingli's declaration: "This is the definition of creation: to be out of nothing."¹² He does not even dwell upon the part which the Son takes in the creating, although he does not leave this important matter unmentioned, but declares that "the worlds were created by the Son",¹³ and that God created the heavens and earth "by the power of His Word and Spirit",¹⁴ thus setting the act of creation in its Trinitarian relation. It is, however, rather in the preceding chapter where he adduces the share they took in creation in proof of the deity of the Son and the Spirit that Calvin develops this fact. There he urges that the power to create and the authority to command were "common to the Father, Son and Spirit", as is shown, he says, by the words "Let us make man in our image" of Genesis i. 26; and argues at length from the creation-narrative of Genesis and the Wisdom passage in Proverbs, no less than from Heb. i. 2, 3, that it was through the Son that God made the worlds.¹⁵ On one thing, however, he manages

of a different kind, we have an infinite series of materials. Hence the world is not *ex materia*, but *ex causa*, which is as much as to say *ex nihilo*.

¹² *Works*, IV. 87: he defines creation as "esse e nihilo; vel, esse quod prius non fuit, attamen non ex alio tamquam ex materia."

¹³ I. xiii. 7.

¹⁴ I. xiii. 24 near end.

¹⁵ I. xiii. 7; cf. *Comment.* on Heb. i. 2: "By Him . . . the world was created, since He is the eternal Wisdom of God, which was the director of all His works from the beginning. Hence too we gather that Christ is eternal, for He must needs be before the world has been made by Him." Cf. also *Comment.* on Gen. i. 3: "Since He is the Word of God, all things have been created by Him." And see especially the passage in the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536), at the beginning of the comment on the "second part of the Symbol" (*Opp.* I. p. 64), where, after declaring on the basis of Heb. i. that "since God the Son is the same God with the Father" He is "the creator of the heavens and the earth," he proceeds to explain that the habit of alluding to the Father nevertheless peculiarly as the "creator of the heavens and the earth" is due to "that distinction of properties, already stated, by which there is referred to the Father the principium agendi," so that He Himself is indeed properly said to act (*agere*), yet through His Word and Wisdom—yet in His Power." "But," he adds, "that the action in the creation

to insist despite the sketchiness with which he treats the whole subject. This is that whatever came from the divine hands came from them good. "It is monstrous," he declares,¹⁶ "to ascribe to the good God the creation of any evil thing," and we may not admit that there is in the whole world anything evil in its nature,¹⁷ but must perceive that in all that He has made God has displayed His wisdom and justice. Wherever evil has appeared, then, whether in man or devil, it is not *ex natura*, but *ex naturae corruptione*,¹⁸ not *ex creatione* but *ex depravatione*.¹⁹ We must beware, therefore, lest in speaking of evil as natural to man, we should seem to refer it to the author of nature, whether we more coarsely conceive it as in some measure proceeding from God Himself, or, with more appearance of piety, ascribe it only to "nature". We cannot attribute to God what is in the most absolute sense alien to His very nature, and it is equally dishonoring to Him to ascribe any intrinsic depravity to the "nature" which comes from His hands.²⁰

Calvin expressly disclaims the intention of expounding in detail the story of the creation of the world,²¹ and judges it sufficient to refer his readers to the account given by Moses, along with the comments perhaps of Basil and Ambrose, for instruction in the particulars of its history.²² He lets fall, however, a few remarks by the way, which enable us to

of the world was common to the three Persons is made clear by that word (Gen. i): 'Let us make man in our image and likeness' by which there is not expressed a deliberation with angels, nor a colloquy with Himself, but a summoning of His Wisdom and Power." Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Calvijn*, p. 51-2; *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, p. 53.

¹⁶ I. xiv. 3 *med.*: nefas esse adscribi bono Deo ullius rei malae creationem.

¹⁷ Do.: aliquam esse in mundi universitate malam naturam.

¹⁸ I. xiv. 3.

¹⁹ I. xiv. 16 *ad init.*

²⁰ I. xv. 1. and I. xiv. 16: "Quidquid damnable . . . est a Deo alienissimum": "Cujus in contumeliam recideret, si quid vitii inesse naturae probantur.

²¹ I. xiv. 20 *ad fin.*: *creationem enarrare*.

²² I. xiv. 20 *ad init.*: cf. I. xiv. 1.

perceive his attitude towards the narrative of Genesis. Needless to say he takes it just as he finds it written. The six days he, naturally, understands as six literal days; and, accepting the *prima facie* chronology of the Biblical narrative, he dates the creation of the world something less than six thousand years in the past. He does not suppose, however, that Moses has included in his story anything like an exhaustive account of all that was created. The instance of angels, of whose origin Moses gives no history, is conclusive to the contrary. Moses, writing to meet the needs of men at large, accommodated himself to their grade of intellectual preparation, and confines himself to what meets their eyes.²³ On the other hand Calvin will not admit that the created universe can be properly spoken of as infinite. God alone is infinite; and, "however wide the circuit of the heavens may be, it nevertheless has some dimension".²⁴ He frankly conceives of the created universe as geocentric,²⁵ or more properly as anthropocentric. "God Himself," he declares, "has demonstrated by the very order of creation, that He made all things for the sake of man."²⁶ For, before making man, "He prepared everything which He foresaw would be useful or salutary for him."²⁷ It was "for human use that He disposed the motions of the sun and stars, that He filled the earth, the waters, the air with living creatures, that He produced an abundance of all kinds of fruits which might be sufficient for food,"—thus acting the part of a provident and sedulous father and showing his wonderful goodness towards us."²⁸

Two difficulties which arise out of the consideration of

²³ I. xiv. 3, *ad init*: vulgi ruditate se accommodans . . . populariter loquens.

²⁴ I. xiv. 1: certe quantumvis late pateat coelorum circuitus, est tamen aliqua ejus dimensio.

²⁵ Cf. the Arg. to the *Comm.* on Gen. 1: "The circle of the heavens is finite, and the earth, like a little globe, is placed in the center."

²⁶ I. xiv. 22: omnia se hominis causa condere. Cf. *Com.* on Gen. iii. 1: "the whole world which had been created for the sake of man."

²⁷ *Do.*

²⁸ I. xiv. 2.

the infinitude of God in connection with His creative work, Calvin finds sufficiently important to pause even in so rapid a sketch to deal with. These concern the relation of the idea of creation to that of eternity on the one hand, and the description of the creation as a process on the other. Both of these also, however, he treats rather from a practical than a theoretical point of view.

He does not even hint at the metaphysical difficulty which has been perennially derived from the Divine eternity and immutability, that a definite creation implies a change in God, —the difficulty which Wollebius so neatly turns by the remark that "creation is not the creator's but the creature's passage from potentiality to actuality."²⁹ The difficulty to which he addresses himself is the purely popular one, which, with a view to rendering the idea of a definite act of creation on God's part incredible, asks what God was doing all those ages before He created the world.³⁰ His response proceeds in general on the principle of answering a fool according to his folly, although it is directed to the serious purpose of recalling men's minds, from fruitless attempts to fathom the mysteries of infinity, to a profitable use of the creation-narrative as a mirror in which is exhibited a lively image of God.³¹ The gist of this response seems to be summed up in a sentence which occurs in the Argument to his Commentary on the first chapter of Genesis—which runs very much parallel to the discussion here. "God," he says, "being wholly sufficient for Himself, did not create a world of which He had no need, until it pleased Him to do so." He does not disdain, however, before closing to advert, under the leading of Augustine,³² even to the metaphysical consideration that there is no place for a question of "time when" in our thought of that act of God by which time began to be. We might as well inquire, Augustine had reasoned,

²⁹ *Compendium Theologiae Christ.* Oxford, 1657, p. 36 (I. V.).

³⁰ I. xiv. 1.

³¹ This point is very fully elaborated in the Argument to the Commentary on Gen. i. and in the comment on Heb. i. 13.

³² *City of God*, xi. 5.

why God created the world *where* He did, as why He created it only *when* He did. We may puzzle ourselves with the notion that there is room in infinite space for an infinite number of finite universes as readily as with the parallel notion that there was opportunity in eternal time for the creation of an infinite series of worlds before ours was reached. The truth is, of course, that, as there is no space outside of that material world the dimensions of which when abstractly considered constitute what we call "space"; so there is no time outside that world of mutable existence from which we abstract the notion of succession and call it time. "If they say," reasons Augustine, "that the thoughts of men are idle, when they conceive of infinite places, since there is no place beside the world, we reply that, by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of past times of God's rest, since there is no time before the world." Utilizing Augustine's remarks Calvin warns his readers against vainly striving to press "outside of the world" (*extra mundum*) by "the boundaries of which we are circumscribed", and exhorts them to seek in "the ample circumference of heaven and earth" and the certainly sufficient space of "six thousand years" material for meditating on the glory of God who has made them all. The primary matter for us to observe in this discussion is the persistence with which Calvin clings to the practical purpose of his treatise, so as even in connection with such abstruse subjects to confine himself to the "practical use" of them. But it is not illegitimate to observe also the hints the discussion supplies of his metaphysical opinions. His doctrines of "space" and "time" are here suggested to us. Clearly, he holds that what we call "space" is only an abstraction from the concrete dimensions of extended substance; and what we call "time," an abstraction from the concrete successions of mutable being. "Space" and "time," therefore, were to him qualities of finite being, and have come into existence and will pass out of existence with finite being. To speak of "infinite" space or "infinite" time contains accordingly a *contradictio in adjecto*.

Perhaps it may not be improper to pause here a moment to observe in passing the employment of humor by Calvin in his discussions. It is rather a mordant bit of humor which appears here, it is true,—this story of the “pious old man” who when a “scoffer” demanded of him what God had been doing before He created the world, replied, “Making hell for inquisitive people” (*fabricasse inferos curiosis*); and moreover it is borrowed,—ultimately—from Augustine.^{32a} But though borrowing a story of Augustine’s, Calvin does not follow Augustine in his attitude towards it. Augustine declines to commend such a response, because, says he, he would shrink from making a laughing-stock of anyone who brings forward a profound question; while Calvin approves it as a fit answer to a scoffer who raises frivolous objections.³³ And mordant though it is, it provides an instance of that use of humor in argument which was a marked trait of Calvin’s manner,—and which reveals to us an element of his character not always fully recognized. As this humor manifests itself in his writings—which are predominantly controversial in tone,—it is sufficiently pungent. The instance before us is a fair sample of it; and we have already had occasion to note another characteristic instance—his rallying

^{32a} *Confessions*, XI. xii. 14: “Behold, I answer to him who asks ‘What was God doing before He made heaven and earth’—I answer not, as a certain person is reported to have done facetiously (avoiding the pressure of the question). ‘He was preparing hell,’ saith he, ‘for those who pry into mysteries.’ It is one thing to perceive, another to laugh—these things I answer not. Far more willingly I would have answered, ‘I know not,’ than I should make him a laughing-stock who asks deep things, and gain praise as one who answers false things.” The Argument to the *Commentary* on Genesis i. runs parallel to the opening paragraphs of this chapter in the *Institutes*; and we are there told that Calvin borrows this anecdote immediately, not from Augustine, but from “The Tripartite History,”—that is to say, the *Historiae Ecclesiasticae Tripartitae Epitome*, Cassiodorus’ revision of the translation made at his instance of the histories of Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret by Epiphanius Scholasticus (for whom see Smith and Wace, *Dict. of Christ. Biography*, ii, p. 159). This book supplied the mediaeval church with its knowledge of post-Eusebian church history.

³³ *Ac scite pius ille senex . . . quum posterius quispiam . . . per ludibrium quaeriret.*

of Caroli in the matter of the ancient creeds.³⁴ His *"Very useful Notice of the great profit which would accrue to Christianity if there should be made an inventory of all the holy bodies and relics which are to be found in Italy, France, Germany, Spain and other kingdoms and nations"* (1543) might almost be said to reek with similar instances. He became quickly famous for his biting pen and was solemnly reproved by Sebastian Castellion for employing such weapons and encouraging others in the use of them. He not only, however, approved Beza's and Viret's satirical polemics and heartily enjoyed them—commending them to his friends as full of delightfulness—but he even develops a theory of the use of humor in instruction, and of the nature of true facetiousness. "Many—or perhaps we may say, most—men," he says, "are much more readily helped when they are instructed in a joyous and pleasant manner than otherwise. . . . Those who have the gift to teach in such a manner as to delight their readers, and to induce them to profit by the pleasure they give them, are doubly to be praised." "He who wishes to use humor," he adds, however, "ought to guard himself from two faults,"—he must neither be forced in his wit, nor must he descend to scurrility.

But his cutting satire was only one manifestation of a special talent for pleasantry which characterized all his intercourse. Laughter, he taught, is the gift of God: and he held it the right, or rather the duty, of the Christian man to practice it in its due season. He is constantly joking with his friends in his letters,³⁵ and he eagerly joins with them in all the joys of life. "I wish I was with you for half a day," he writes to one of them, "to laugh with you."³⁶ In a word, contrary to a general impression, Calvin was a man of a great freshness and jocundness of spirit; and so little was he inclined to suppress the expression of the gayer side of life that he rather sedulously cultivated it in himself and looked

³⁴ THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October 1909, p. 574.

³⁵ *E.g.* XI. p. 326 (*jocari quam serio conqueri*).

³⁶ XII. p. 578.

with pleasure on its manifestation in others. He enjoyed a joke hugely,³⁷ with that open-mouthed laugh which, as one of his biographers phrases it,³⁸ belonged to the men of the sixteenth century. And he knew even how to smile at human folly—wishing that the people might not be deprived of their pleasures³⁹ and might even be dealt with indulgently in their faults. When his students misbehaved, for example, he simply said he thought they ought to have some indulgence and should be accorded the right to be sometimes foolish.⁴⁰

That the work of creation should be thought to occupy time was as much a matter of scoffing from the evil-disposed as that it should take place in time. Why should the omnipotent God take six days to make the world? Did He perhaps find it too hard a task for a single effort?⁴¹ This cavil, too, Calvin deals with purely from the practical point of view, not so much undertaking to refute it as recalling men's minds from it to dwell on the condescension of God in distributing His work into six days that our finite intelligence

³⁷ In his youthful work as a humanist,—the Commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia*—he betrays the readiness of his laughter by his comments on the amusing matters that come before him. In the comment on I. vii. (*Opp.* V. p. 62) he expresses his sense of the ridiculousness of the soothsayer's solemn mummery and quotes Cato's remark "that it was wonderful that every soothsayer did not laugh whenever he met a fellow soothsayer." On I. x. (*Opp.* V. 84) speaking of the apotheoses of the Roman emperors he adds; "The rites and ceremonies by which the emperors were consecrated are set forth by Herodianus in his ix Book; and I am never able to refrain from laughter when I read that passage. The religion of the Romans was as ridiculous as this" . . . Calvin enjoyed his reading and responded to the matter he read with an emotional movement.

³⁸ Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, III. pp. 535-540, where the whole subject is admirably illustrated. See also Doumergue, *L'Art et le Sentiment dans l'Oeuvre de Calvin*, etc., Geneva, 1902, the third Conférence, pp. 61-67. On Calvin's use of satire, see C. Lenient, *La Satire en France, ou la Littérature militante au XVI^e siècle*, 1877, Vol. i, pp. 107 seq., esp. pp. 175 seq. Cf. *The Methodist Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1909., pp. 650ff.

³⁹ XII. 348; non posse negari omni oblectamenta.

⁴⁰ *Opp.* X^b, p. 441.

⁴¹ I. xiv. 2: Hic etiam obstrepit humana ratio, quasi a Dei potentia alieni fuerint tales progressus.

might not be overwhelmed with its contemplation; and on the goodness of God in thus leading our thoughts up to the consideration of the rest of the seventh day; and above all on the paternal care of God in so ordering the work of bringing the world into being as to prepare it for man before He introduced him into it. In drawing the mind thus away from the cavil, Calvin does not, however, fail to meet the difficulty itself, which was adduced. His response to it, is, in effect, to acknowledge that God perfected the world by process (*progressus*, I. xiv. 2); but to assert that this method of performing his work was not for His own sake, but for ours; so that, so far is this progressive method of producing the world from being unworthy of God, because "alien from His power,"⁴² that it rather illustrates His higher attributes,—his paternal love, for example, which would not create man until He had enriched the world with all things necessary for his happiness. Considered in Himself, "it would have been no more difficult" for God "to complete at once the whole work in all its items in a single moment, than to arrive at its completion gradually by a process of this kind."⁴³

It should be observed that in this and similar discussions founded on the progressive completion of the world, Calvin does not intend to attribute what we may speak strictly of as progressive creation to God. With Calvin, while the perfecting of the world—as its subsequent government—is a process, creation, strictly conceived, tended to be thought of as an act. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth": after that it was not "creation" strictly so called but "formation," gradual modelling into form, which took place. Not, of course, as if Calvin conceived creation deistically; as if he thought of God as having created the world-stuff and then left it to itself to work out its own destiny under the laws impressed on it in its creation. A "momentary

⁴² I. xiv. 2: a Dei potentia alieni.

⁴³ I. xiv. 22: quum nihilo difficilior esset, uno momento totum opus simul omnibus numeris complere, quam ejusmodi progressionem sensim ad complementum pervenire.

Creator, who has once for all done His work," was inconceivable to him: and he therefore taught that it is only when we contemplate God in providence that we can form any true conception of Him as Creator.⁴⁴ But he was inclined to draw a sharp distinction in kind between the primal act of creation of the heavens and the earth out of nothing, and the subsequent acts of moulding this created material into the forms it was destined to take; and to confine the term "creation," strictly conceived, to the former. Hence in perhaps the fullest statement of his doctrine of creation given us in these chapters,⁴⁵ he expresses himself carefully thus: "God, by the power of His Word and Spirit created out of nothing (*creasse ex nihilo*) the heavens and the earth; thence produced (*produxisse*) every kind of animate and inanimate thing, distinguished by a wonderful gradation the innumerable variety of things, endowed each kind with its own nature, assigned its offices, appointed its place and station to it, and, since all things are subject to corruption, provided, nevertheless, that each kind should be preserved safe to the last day." "Thus," he adds, "He marvellously adorned heaven and earth with the utmost possible abundance, variety and beauty of all things, like a great and splendid house, most richly and abundantly constructed and furnished; and then at last by forming (*formando*) man and distinguishing him with such noble beauty, and with so many and such high gifts, he exhibited in him the noblest specimen of His works."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ I. xvi. 1. Cf. the Genevan Catechism of 1545 (*Opp.* vi, pp. 15-16, 17-18) where the question is asked why God is called in the Creed only Creator of heaven and earth, when "tueri conservareque in suo statu creaturos," is "multo praestantius" than just to have once created them. The answer is that by this particularizing of creation, it is not intended to imply that "God so created His works at one time (*semel*) that He afterwards rejects the care of them." On the contrary, He upholds and governs all He made; and this is included in the idea of His creation of them all. Cf. also the *Confession des Escholiers* of 1559 (*Opp.* ix. pp. 721-2) where we read: "I confess that God created the world at once (*semel*), in such a manner as to be its perpetual governor. . . ."

⁴⁵ I. xiv. 20.

⁴⁶ It is worth while to observe here how Calvin betrays his sensi-

It is God who has made all things what they are, he teaches: but, in doing so, God has acted in the specific mode properly called creation only at the initial step of the process, and the result owes its right to be called a creation to that initial act by which the material of which all things consist was called into being from non-being. "Indigested mass" as it was, yet in that world-stuff was "the seed of the whole world", and out of it that world as we now see it (for "the world was not perfected at its very beginning, in the manner it is now seen"⁴⁷) has been evoked by progressive acts of God: and it is therefore that this world, because evoked from it, has the right to be called a creation.

The distinction which Calvin here draws, it is to be observed, is not that which has been commonly made by Reformed divines under the terms, First and Second Creation, or in less exact language Immediate and Mediate Creation. This distinction posits a sequence of truly creative acts of God throughout the six days, and therefore defines creation, so as to meet the whole case, as that act by which God produced the world and all that is in it, partly *ex nihilo*, partly *ex materia naturaliter inhabili*, for the manifestation of the glory of His power, wisdom and goodness";⁴⁸ or more fully, as that "first external work of God, by which in the beginning of time, without suffering any change, by his own free will, He produced by His sole omnipotent command *immediate per se* things which before were not, from simple non-being to being,—and that, either *ex nihilo*, or *ex materia* which had afore been made *e nihilo*, but is *naturaliter inhabili* for receiving the form which, created out of nothing, the Creator induces into it."⁴⁹

bility to the glory and beauty of nature (cf. also I. v. 6; *Opp.* XXIX. p. 300). See the remarks of E. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, IV, 1910, p. 105.

⁴⁷ These phrases occur in the Commentary on Genesis i.

⁴⁸ Joannes Wollebius, *as cited*, p. 35.

⁴⁹ Amand. Polanus, *Syntagma Theologiae Christianae*, Hanov. 1625, v. 2, Cf. Gisb. Voetius, *Disp.* I. p. 554: "Creation may be distinguished . . . into first and second. The first is the production of a thing *ex nihilo*, and in this manner were produced the heavens, the elements,

It is precisely this sequence of truly creative acts which Calvin disallows; and he so expresses himself, indeed, as to give it a direct contradiction. Perhaps as distinct a statement of his view as any is found in his comment on Genesis i. 21, where the term "create" is employed to designate the divine production of the animals of the sea and air, which, according to verse 20, had been brought forth by the waters at the command of God. "A question arises here, remarks Calvin, "about the word 'created'. For we have before contended that the world was made of nothing because it was 'created': but now Moses says the things formed from other matter were 'created.' Those who assert that the fishes were truly and properly 'created' because the waters were in no way suitable (*idoneae*) or adapted (*aptae*) to their production, only resort to a subterfuge; for the fact would remain, meanwhile, that the material of which they were made existed before, which, in strict propriety, the word does not admit. I therefore do not restrict 'creation' [here] to the work of the fifth day, but rather say it[s use] refers to (hangs from, *pendet*) that shapeless and confused mass which was, as it were, the fountain of the whole world. God, then, is said to have 'created' the sea-monsters and other fishes, because the beginning of their 'creation' is not to be reckoned from the moment in which they received their form, but they are comprehended in the universal matter (*corpus, corpore*) which was made out of nothing. So that with respect to their kind, form only was then added to them; 'creation' is nevertheless a term used truly with respect to the whole and the parts."

Calvin's motive in thus repudiating the notion of "Mediate Creation" is not at all chariness on his part with respect to the supernatural. It is not the supernaturalness of the pro-

light; and every day there are so produced human souls, so far as they are spiritual in essence. The second is the production of the essential or accidental form, in *praesubjecta sed indisposita plane materia*, and that by the immediate operation of the divine power; and in this manner were produced the works of the five days as also many miraculous works in the order of nature as now constituted."

duction of the creatures which the waters and earth brought forth which he disallows; but only the applicability to their production of the term "creation". On verse 26, he comments thus: "There is in this respect a miracle as great as if God had begun to create out of nothing these things which he commanded to proceed from the earth." Calvin's sole motive seems to be to preserve to the great word "create" the precise significance of to "make out of nothing", and he will not admit that it can be applied to any production in which preëxistent material is employed.⁵⁰ This might appear to involve the view that after the creation of the world-stuff recorded in Genesis i. 1, there was never anything specifically new produced by the divine power. And this might be expressed by saying that, from that point on, the Divine works were purely works of providence, since the very differentia of a providential work is that it is the product proximately of second causes. Probably this would press Calvin's contention, however, a little too far: he would scarcely say there was no immediacy in the divine action in the productions of the five days of "creation", or indeed in the working of miracles. But we must bear in mind that his view of providence was a very high one, and he was particularly insistent that God acted through means, when He did act through means, through no necessity but purely at His own volition. Second causes, in his view, are nothing more than "instruments into which God infuses as much of efficiency as He wishes," and which He employs or not at His will.⁵¹ "The power of no created thing," says Calvin, "is more wonderful or evident than that of the sun. . . . But the Lord . . . willed that light should exist before the sun was created. A pious man will not make the sun, then, either the principal or the necessary cause of the things which existed before the sun was created, but only an instrument which God uses because He wishes to; since He could without any difficulty at all do without the sun and

⁵⁰ See above, note 10.

⁵¹ I. xvi. 2.

act of Himself."⁵² The facility with which Calvin sets aside the notion of "mediate creation" is then due in no sense to desire to remove the productions of the five days of "creation" out of the category of Divine products, but is itself mediated by the height of His doctrine of providence.⁵³

It is important further that we should not suppose that Calvin removed the production of the human soul out of the category of immediate creation, in the strictest sense of that term. When he insists that the works of the days subsequent to the first, when "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth", were not strictly speaking "creations," because they were not productions *ex nihilo*, he is thinking only of the lower creation, inclusive, no doubt, of the human body; all this is made out of that primal "indigested mass" which sprang into being at the initial command of God. The soul is a different matter; and not only in the first instance, but in every succeeding instance, throughout the whole course of human propagation, is an immediate creation *ex nihilo*. Moses, he tells us, perfectly

⁵² *Ditto*: cf. also the Commentary on Gen. i. 1 sq.

⁵³ Cf. Köstlin. *TSK*, 1868, p. 427: "In the section of edition 2^b (Vol. xxix, p. 510) on God as the Almighty Creator there should be particularly noted the emphasis with which Calvin maintains, in spite of the mediation of the divine activity through creaturely instruments, yet the dependence of these instruments, and the absolute independence of God with respect to them. And in ed. 3 (Vol. xxx. pp. 145 sq. 150; Lib. I. c. 16 §§2, 7), there are given still stronger expositions of this. God, says Calvin, bestows on the instruments powers purely in accordance with His own will, and governs them; and God could work what He works through them, say through the sun, just as easily without them, purely by Himself. God, he says, in ed. 3, lets us be nourished ordinarily by bread; and yet according to Scripture, man does not live by bread alone, for it is not the abundance of food but the divine blessing which nourishes us; and on the other hand (Isaiah iii. 1) He threatens to break the staff of bread." "We have here already," adds Köstlin, "the general premises for the special use which God, according to Calvin, makes of the Word and of the Sacraments for His saving work." Would anybody but a Lutheran have ever thought of the "means of Grace" in this connection? Nevertheless it is not bad to be reminded that the Reformed doctrine of the "means of Grace" has its analogue in the Reformed doctrine of providence: it is a corollary of the fundamental notion of God as the Independent One.

understood that the soul was created from nothing;⁵⁴ and he announces with emphasis,⁵⁵ that it is certain that the souls of men are "no less created than the angels," adding the decisive definition: "now, creation is the origination of essence *ex nihilo*." It is thus with the lower creation alone in his mind that Calvin insists that all that can justly be called by the high name of "creation" was wrought by God on the first day, in that one act by which He created, that is called into Being out of nothing, the heavens and the earth.

It should scarcely be passed without remark that Calvin's doctrine of creation is, if we have understood it aright, for all except the souls of men, an evolutionary one. The "indigested mass," including the "promise and potency" of all that was yet to be, was called into being by the simple *fiat* of God. But all that has come into being since—except the souls of men alone—has arisen as a modification of this original world-stuff by means of the interaction of its intrinsic forces. Not these forces apart from God, of course: Calvin is a high theist, that is, supernaturalist, in His ontology of the universe and in his conception of the whole movement of the universe. To him God is the *prima causa omnium* and that not merely in the sense that all things ultimately—in the world-stuff—owe their existence to God; but in the sense that all the modifications of the world-stuff have taken place under the directly upholding and governing hand of God, and find their account ultimately in His will. But they find their account proximately in "second causes"; and this is not only evolutionism but pure evolutionism. What account we give of these second causes is a matter of ontology; how we account for their existence, their persistence, their action,—the relation we conceive them to stand in to God, the upholder and director as well as creator of them. Calvin's ontology of second causes was, briefly stated, a very pure and complete doctrine of *con-*

⁵⁴ *Commentary* on Malachi i. 2-6 (*Opp.* 44, p. 401).

⁵⁵ *Inst.*, I. xv. 5.

cursus, by virtue of which he ascribed all that comes to pass to God's purpose and directive government. But that does not concern us here. What concerns us here is that he ascribed the entire series of modifications by which the primal "indigested mass," called "heaven and earth," has passed into the form of the ordered world which we see, including the origination of all forms of life, vegetable and animal alike, inclusive doubtless of the bodily form of man, to second causes as their proximate account. And this, we say, is a very pure evolutionary scheme. He does not discuss, of course, the factors of the evolutionary process, nor does he attempt to trace the course of the evolutionary advance, nor even expound the nature of the secondary causes by which it was wrought. It is enough for him to say that God said, "Let the waters bring forth, . . . Let the earth bring forth", and they brought forth. Of the interaction of forces by which the actual production of forms was accomplished, he had doubtless no conception: he certainly ventures no assertions in this field. How he pictured the process in his imagination (if he pictured it in his imagination) we do not know. But these are subordinate matters. Calvin doubtless had no theory whatever of evolution; but he teaches a doctrine of evolution. He has no object in so teaching except to preserve to the creative act, properly so called, its purity as an immediate production out of nothing. All that is not immediately produced out of nothing is therefore not created—but evolved. Accordingly his doctrine of evolution is entirely unfruitful. The whole process takes place in the limits of six natural days. That the doctrine should be of use as an explanation of the mode of production of the ordered world, it was requisite that these six days should be lengthened out into six periods,—six ages of the growth of the world. Had that been done Calvin would have been a precursor of the modern evolutionary theorists. As it is, he only forms a point of departure for them to this extent,—that he teaches, as they teach, the modification of the original world-stuff into the varied forms which constitute the

ordered world, by the instrumentality of second causes,—or as a modern would put it, of its intrinsic forces. This is his account of the origin of the entire lower creation.⁵⁶

Of this lower creation he has, however, as has already been pointed out, very little to say in the discussion of the creature which he has incorporated in the *Institutes* (I. xiv. §§20-22). And what he does say is chiefly devoted to the practical end of quickening in our hearts a sense of the glory and perfections of its Maker, whose wisdom, power, justice and goodness are illustrated by it, and of raising our hearts in gratitude to Him for His benefits to us. These are the two things, he says, which a contemplation of what is meant by God being the Creator of heaven and earth should work in us: an apprehension of His greatness as the Creator (§21) and an appreciation of His care for us His creatures, in the manner in which He has created us (§22). More than to suggest this, the scope of his treatise does not appear to him to demand of him; as it does not permit him to dwell on the details of the history of creation,—for which he therefore contents himself with referring his readers to the narrative of Genesis, with the comments of Basil and Ambrose. He pauses, therefore, only to insert the comprehensive statement of the elements of the matter which has already been cited, and which asserts that “God by the power of His Word and Spirit created out of nothing the heavens and the earth” and afterwards moulded this created material into the ordered world we see around us, which also He sustains and governs; in which, then, He has placed man, up to whom all the rest had tended and in whom He has afforded the culminating manifestation of His creative power (§20).

⁵⁶ H. Bavinck in the first of his “Stone Lectures” remarks: “The idea of development is not a production of modern times. It was already familiar to Greek philosophy. More particularly Aristotle raised it to the rank of the leading principle of his entire system by his significant distinction between *potentia* and *actus*. . . . This idea of development aroused no objection whatever in Christian theology and philosophy. On the contrary it was greatly extended and enriched by being linked with the principle of theism.” Calvin accordingly very naturally thought along the lines of a theistic evolutionism.

The main items of his teaching as to the physical universe may therefore be summed up in the propositions that it owes its existence absolutely to the Divine power;⁵⁷ that it was created out of nothing; that it was perfected through a process of formation which extended through six days; that it was made and adorned for the sake of man, and has been subjected to him; and that it illustrates in its structure and in all its movements the perfections of its Maker.

It is to the spiritual universe that Calvin turns with predilection, and the greater portion of the fourteenth chapter is devoted accordingly to a thoroughly Biblical account of angelic beings, good and bad (§§3-19). The careful Scripturalness of this account deserves emphasis. Calvin himself emphasizes it, and even permits himself to fall into a digression here, in order to expound at some length the proper attitude of the theological teacher to Scripture (I. xiv. 4). His design is to transmit plainly and clearly what the Scriptures teach,⁵⁸ and not to pass beyond the simple doctrine of Scripture in anything.⁵⁹ He therefore warns his readers against speculations as to "the orders" of angels, asking them to consider carefully the meagreness of the Scriptural foundation these have;⁶⁰ and holds the Pseudo-Dionysius up as a terrible example of misplaced subtlety and acuteness in such matters.^{60a} Whereas Paul, who was actually rapt beyond the third heavens sealed his lips and declared it not lawful for a man to speak of the hidden things which he saw, Dionysius who never had such an experience writes with a fullness and confidence of detail which could be justified only if he had come down from heaven and was recounting what he had had the privilege of

⁵⁷ *Commentary* on Ps. cxlviii. 5 (*Opp.* 32, p. 432), he remarks: "The pronoun *He* is therefore emphatic, as if the prophet would say that the world is not eternal as profane men dream, nor is produced by some concurring atoms, but this beautiful order which we see suddenly stood forth (exstitisse) on the mandate of God." Cf. also *Opp.* 31, p. 327.

⁵⁸ I. xiv. 3: *diserte et explicate tradamus quae docet scriptura.*

⁵⁹ I. xiv. 4 end: *ex simplici scripturae doctrina.*

⁶⁰ I. xiv. 8 *ad init.*: *viderint quale habeant fundamentum.*

^{60a} I. xiv. 4.

observing carefully with his own eyes. Such prating of things of which we can really know nothing is unworthy of a theologian, says Calvin; "for it is the part of the theologian not to amuse the ear with empty words, but to confirm the conscience by teaching what is true, certain, profitable."⁶¹ And, "since the teaching of the Spirit is invariably profitable (*utiliter*), but in matters which are of less moment for edification, either He is altogether silent or touches on them only lightly and cursorily, it is our business cheerfully to remain ignorant of what is of no advantage to us."⁶² There are two rules therefore which the modest and sober man will certainly bear in mind in the whole business of teaching religion. One is, in obscure matters, neither to speak nor to think, nor even to desire to know, anything more than what has been given us in the Word of God. The other is, in reading Scripture, to tarry for prolonged investigation and meditation only on what conduces to edification, and not to indulge curiosity or fondness for useless things.⁶³ Practicing what he preaches, Calvin endeavors therefore in all he has to say of angels to hold to the limit which the rule of piety prescribes, lest by indulging in speculation beyond measure he should lead the reader astray from the simplicity of the faith.⁶⁴ There are many things about angels, indeed, which it may be a matter of regret to some that the Scriptures have not told us.⁶⁵ But surely we ought to be

⁶¹ I. xiv. 4: Theologo autem non garriendo aures oblectare, sed vera, certa, utilia docendo, conscientias confirmare propositum est.

⁶² I. xiv. 3: Et certe, quum utiliter semper nos doceat Spiritus, in quibus vero parum est momenti ad aedificationem, vel subiceat prorsus, vel leviter tantum et cursim attingat: nostri quoque officii est, libenter ignorare quae non conducunt.

⁶³ I. xiv. 4: Ne longior sim, memimerimus hic, ut in tota religionis doctrina, tenendam esse unam modestiae et sobrietatis regulam, ne de rebus obscuris aliud vel loquamur, vel sentiamus, vel scire etiam appetamus quam quod Dei verbo fuerit nobis traditum. Alterum, ut in lectione scripturae, iis continenter quaerendis ac meditandis immoremur quae ad aedificationem pertinent: non curiositati aut rerum inutilium studio indulgeamus.

⁶⁴ I. xiv. 3 end.

⁶⁵ I. xiv. 16.

content with the knowledge which the Lord has given us, especially as, passing by frivolous questions, His wish has been to instruct us in what conduces to solid piety, the fear of His name, true confidence and the duties of holiness.⁶⁶ If we are not ashamed to be His disciples, how can we be ashamed to follow the method He has prescribed?⁶⁷ Nay, will we not even abhor those unprofitable speculations from which He recalls us, and rest in comfort in the simple Scriptural teaching, which with respect to good angels consoles us and confirms our faith by making us see in them the dispensers and administrators of the Divine goodness towards us, guarding our safety, assuring our defence, directing our ways, and protecting us by their care from evil,⁶⁸ —with respect to evil angels, warns us against their artifices and contrivances and provides us with firm and strong weapons to repel their attacks?⁶⁹

In accordance with these views of our relation to Scripture as a source of and guide to knowledge, Calvin's whole discussion of angels is not only kept close to Scripture, but is marked by the strongest practical tendency. Perhaps what strikes the reader most forcibly upon the surface of the discussion is the completeness of the faith which it exhibits in the real existence of angelic beings and the concernment of man with them. We will recall the vividness of Luther's similar faith. Perhaps we may say that the supernaturalistic tone of the conceptions of the Reformers is in nothing more visible than in their vital sense of the spiritual environment in which human life is cast. To them angels and demons were actual factors in men's lives, to be counted upon and considered in our arrangements and adjustments as truly as our fellow men.⁷⁰ Denial of their reality as

⁶⁶ I. xiv. 3.

⁶⁷ *Do.*

⁶⁸ I. xiv. 6 *ad init.*

⁶⁹ I. xiv. 13 *ad init.*

⁷⁰ Zwingli seems to have been an exception, and to have looked upon the ascription of all events to the action of angels and especially to that of devils as inconsistent with the doctrine of providence: he twits Luther with ascribing everything to "the poor devil" and asks what

substantial existences was indeed prevalent enough to require notice and refutation. Calvin's refutation of it is, of course, derived entirely, however, from Scripture, and he recognizes that, therefore, it can have no force for those who do not believe in the Scriptures. He does not consider that it is on that account useless. He designs it to fortify pious minds against such madness and to call back the slothful and incautious to a more sober and better regulated mode of life. For those who believe in the Scriptural revelation, it must be confessed that his argument is complete and final, adducing as it does in the clearest way the chief Biblical evidence for the actual existence and activity of these super-human intelligences.⁷¹

Calvin, then, teaches in accordance with Scripture, that angels are not "qualities or inspirations without substance, but real spirits".⁷² He calls them "spirits", "minds", and as such defines them as beings whose characterizing qualities are "perception and intelligence".⁷³ His intention is to represent them as purely spiritual beings; and therefore he incidentally remarks that "it is certain" that they "have no form".⁷⁴ As "celestial spirits",⁷⁵ they are of higher powers than man, and receive in Scripture designations by which their dignity is indicated: Hosts, Powers, Principalities, Dominions, Thrones, even "Gods"—not of course as if then becomes of universal providence (*Works*, II^b, 27). Cf. P. J. Muller, *De Godsleer van Zwingli en Calvijn*, 1883, p. 77, note. But Luther, remarks Muller, could believe in the determining providence of God, "*und wenn die welt voll teufel wär*". How it strikes a modern of the moderns may be learned from William Wrede's remark (*Paul*, E. T. p. 95): "Angels, in our time, belong to children and to poets; to Paul and his age they were a real and serious quantity."

⁷¹ I. xiv. 9 and 19.

⁷² I. xiv. 9: "ex quibus [Scripturis] clarissime evincitur re vera esse spiritus naturae subsistentis"; . . . "non qualitates aut inspirationes sine substantia sed veros spiritus";—19: "non motiones aut affectiones mentium, sed magis revera, quod dicuntur, mentes, vel spiritus sensu et intelligentia praeditos." Cf. *Opp.* 45, p. 271.

⁷³ I. xiv. 19, "sensu et intelligentia praeditos."

⁷⁴ I. xiv. 8: forma spiritus carere certum est. Cf. *Opp.* 40, p. 659: quoniam angeli carent corporibus.

⁷⁵ I. xiv. 5.

they were really "Gods" or ought to be worshipped, but "because in their ministry, as in a glass, they represent in some degree divinity to us".⁷⁶ "The preëminence (*præstantia*) of the angelic nature has," to be sure, "so impressed the minds of many" that they have felt it would be an injury to angels to degrade them, as it were, under the control of the One only God; and thus there has been invented for them a certain kind of divinity.⁷⁷ They are of course like God: for they were made in the image of God.⁷⁸ They are, however, just creatures of God, His servants who execute His commands.⁷⁹ Moses, it is true, in the history of creation, does not give any account of their creation: but that history does not pretend to be complete, but limits itself to the visible creation, and it is easy to collect from his subsequent introduction of angels as God's ministers that He is their maker.⁸⁰ So a matter of course does this seem to Calvin, that he does not stop here to adduce specific Scriptural assertions of the origination of angels by creation. These however he emphasizes elsewhere. Thus for example, in his commentary on the passage, he expounds Col. i. 16 as follows: "Because Paul wished to make this assertion"—that all things were created in the Son—"particularly of angels, he now mentions the invisible things: not only, then, the heavenly creatures visible to our eyes, but also the spiritual ones (*spirituales*) have been made (*conditæ*) by the Son of God." The inferiority of angels to Christ, he proceeds to remark, (in his commentary on the

⁷⁶ *Do. Cf. Opp.* 42, p. 455; 52, p. 86.

⁷⁷ I. xiv. 3.

⁷⁸ I. xv. 3 end: "Neither is it to be denied angelos ad Dei similitudinem creatos esse, since our highest perfection, as Christ testifies (Mat. xxii. 30), will be to become like them."

⁷⁹ I. xiv. 3: [Moses] angelos Dei ministros inducit, colligere facile licet eorum esse conditorem, cui suam operam et officia impendunt. *Cf.* 5: angelos sane, quum Dei sint ministri ad jussa ejus exsequenda ordinati, esse quoque illius creaturas, extra controversiam esse debet. Again 26: quum a Deo conditus sit diabolus. *Cf. Opp.* 33, p. 206; 55, p. 334.

⁸⁰ I. xiv. 3: eorum conditor. *Cf. Opp.* 35, p. 466. to the same effect.

next verse) is manifested in the four points: First, "because they were created (*creati*) by Him; secondly, because their creation (*creatio*) is referred to Him as its legitimate end; thirdly, because He always existed before they were created (*crecabantur*); fourthly, because it is He who sustains them by His power and conserves them in their condition."⁸¹ Creation in and of itself means with Calvin, as we have seen, absolute origination of essence, and he therefore teaches that the angels have been, like all other creatures, created out of nothing. It is to be held, he says, as a thing certain that the souls of men and angels alike "have been created"—adding at once: "Now creation is not transfusion but the origination out of nothing of essence."⁸²

The questions of when they were created and how their

⁸¹ *Opp.* 32, pp. 85-86. The assertion of Psalm cxlviii. 5 (*Opp.* 32, p. 432) he apparently confines to "creaturis sensu carentibus": but on the first verse he incidentally remarks of the angels that "they were created (*conditi sunt*)."
⁸² Cf. the assertions of the creation of the angels, good and bad, *Opp.* 30, p. 316; 33, p. 206. In the exposition of the Symbol, in the *Institutes* of 1543, he comments on the words "Creator of heaven and earth" thus (ch. vi. §§ 28 and 29): "Under the names of heaven and earth all celestial and terrestrial things are comprehended, as if God were said to be the Creator of all things without exception. This is found more clearly expressed in the Nicene Creed, where He is called the Maker of all things visible and invisible. That was done probably on account of the Manichees, who imagined two principles, God and the Devil; and attributed to God the creation of good things, indeed, but referred evil natures to the Devil as their author,"—and so on as in the *Institutes* of 1559, I. xiv. 3. Then in § 29: "God then is in the first place said to have created the heavens and all that is contained in the heavens. But in that order are the celestial spirits, as well those who have persisted by obedience in their integrity, as those who by defection have fallen into ruin," &c.,—explaining that the fact that Moses does not mention this in the history of creation in no respect throws it into doubt. Cf. the *Confession des Escholiers*, 1559 (*Opp.* ix. 721-2): "I confess that God created not only the visible world, that is the heaven and the earth, and whatever is contained in them, but also the invisible spirits, some of whom have persisted in obedience to God, and some by their own sin have been precipitated into destruction."

⁸³ I. xv. 5: *animas ergo . . . creatas esse non minus quam angelos, certo statuendum est. Creatio autem non transfusio est, sed essentiae ex nihilo exordium.*

creation is to be related to Moses' narrative Calvin puts aside as frivolous. Moses narrates that the earth was perfected, and the heavens were perfected with all their hosts (Gen. ii. 1): that is certainly broad enough to cover the fact of their creation,—why make anxious inquisition as to the day, in which besides the stars and planets, these other more hidden (*reconditi*) celestial hosts began to be?⁸³ The very language in which he repels the question, however, as it certainly suggests that Calvin conceived of the entire creation, inclusive of the angelic hosts, as a systematized whole, seems also to hint that he himself thought of the creation of this unitary whole as taking place at the one creative epoch, if such language can be pardoned. If so, then in his instinctive thought on this subject—on which, however, he laid no stress,—he followed the scholastic opinion, as expounded, say, by Thomas Aquinas rather than that of the Greek fathers, who interposed an immense interval between the creation of the spiritual and the subsequent creation of the corporeal universe.⁸⁴ It is doubtless, however, a mistake to press his language to imply that he thought of the creation of the angels as taking place on the same day with the

⁸³ I. xiv. 4: terram esse perfectam, et coelos perfectos cum omni exercitu eorum, narrat Moses (Gen. ii. 1). Quid attinet anxie preconitari quoto die, praeter astra et planetas, alii quoque magis reconditi coelestes exercitus esse coeperint?

⁸⁴ Aquinas, *Summa*, Pars. I, qu. lxi, art. 3, argues: "Angels are a part of the universe. For they do not constitute in themselves a universe; but unite along with the corporeal creation in a universe. This appears from the relation of one creature to another. For the mutual relation of things is the good of the universe. But no part is perfect, when separated off into a whole by itself. It is not therefore probable that God, 'whose works are perfect', as is said in Deut. xxxii, created the angelic creation off to itself before the other creatures." Jerome, on the other hand, following the Greeks, exclaims on the multitudinous ages which intervened between the creation of the angels and that of man. It is interesting to observe Dante following Aquinas and making the creation of the angels simultaneous with that of the universe at large, the fall of the evil angels being delayed but twenty seconds after their creation (*cf.* Maria Rosetti's *Shadow of Dante*, pp. 14, 15), and Milton following Jerome and putting the creation of angels aeons before that of man.

stars and planets, that is to say, on the fourth day. More probably he thought of them as produced as part of the general creation of the "heavens and earth," that is to say on the first day,⁸⁵ and this became the traditional view in the Reformed churches. "When were the angels created?" asks Bucanus, and answers, "Not before the ages, for the Son of God alone was existent before the ages: whence it follows that they were made in the beginning of all things. On what day, however, cannot certainly be defined, though it may be gathered with probability from the history of Moses that they were created on the first day, in which the heavens, the inhabitants of which they are, were created; wherefrom they are called the 'angels of heaven'."⁸⁶ "The first day of the creation," says Wollebius,⁸⁷ "is illustrious for three works," the first of which is "the creation of the angels with the highest heaven (the heaven called that of the blessed)"; for, he argues, "the creation of the angels can be referred to no better time than the first day, because when God laid the foundations of the earth, it was already celebrated by them (Job xxxviii. 7)"—an argument which is repeated by others, as for example by Van Mastricht,⁸⁸ who reasons in general that "it is certain that they were not created before the first day of creation since before that there was nothing but eternity, . . . and it is equally certain that they were not created after man, whom they seduced."⁸⁹ Doubtless some such reasoning as this was before Calvin's mind also, although it is clear that he did not take it so seriously.

⁸⁵ So he seems to say explicitly in the middle editions of the *Institutes*, (first in 1543), VI. §29 (*Opp.* I. 497): "First then God is said to have created the heavens and all that the heavens contain. But in this order are the celestial spirits, whether those who by obedience remained in their integrity, or those who by defection fell into ruin."

⁸⁶ *Instit. Theolog.* ed. 2, 1604, *Loc.* vi. 4. p. 64.

⁸⁷ *Compend. Theolog. Christ.* ed. Oxford 1657, p. 36.

⁸⁸ *Theoretico-practica theol.* 1714, III. vii. 4.

⁸⁹ Heppé, *Dog. d. ref. Kirche*, p. 149, adds that this is also the teaching of the Leiden Synopsis, Riissen, Wendelinus and of the Reformed in general. Cocceius (*Summa Theol.* XVI. 12) thought of the day when the waters above and below the firmament were separated.

On another matter of speculative construction, however, he was not so much inclined to an attitude of indifference. This concerned the distribution of angels into ranks and orders. We have already had occasion to note his reprobation of the Pseudo-Dionysius for his empty speculations on the "celestial hierarchy."⁹⁰ He returns to the general matter later⁹¹ to express the opinion that data are lacking in Scripture to justify an attempt "to determine degrees of honor among angels, to distinguish the respective classes by their insignia, or to assign its place and station to each". His positive attitude here is due, of course, to the comparison instituted by the Romanists between the celestial and the ecclesiastical hierarchies,⁹² which he wishes to discredit. Here too he set the fashion for the Reformed theology. Quite in this sense Van Mastricht⁹³ remarks that "the Reformed recognize, indeed, that there is some order among the angels, not only because God their Maker is a God of order, but because the various names of the angels seem to suggest an order to us (Col. i. 16, Eph. iii. 10, *cf.* Ezek. ix. 3, Is. vi. 2, 1 Thes. iv. 16, Gen. iii. 24, Jude 5) while the disjunctive particle, *εἴτε θρόνοι, εἴτε κυριότητες* (Col. i. 16), seems especially to confirm some order among angels, to say nothing of the existence of some order among the evil spirits themselves. But they believe it is not possible for men in this imperfection to determine what the order among the angels is." If this seems to allow a little more than Calvin does, it is to go a little further than he does in denial on the other hand, to contend with Hyperius that there are no permanent distinctions among angels "by virtue of which some angels are always preëminent, others always subordinate," or even with Bucanus, that there are no distinctions in nature among the angels but only differences in office. Surely these determinations are open to Calvin's

⁹⁰ I. xiv. 4.

⁹¹ I. xiv. 8.

⁹² *Cf.* a similar rejection of the efforts to determine the numbers and orders of angels in *Opp.* 51, 158.

⁹³ As cited, III. iii. 30.

rebuke of pretensions to knowledge which we do not possess, and contrast sharply with the sobriety with which Calvin abides by the simple statements of Scripture, allowing that there are some hints in Scripture of ranks among angels⁹⁴ and contending only that these hints are insufficient to enable us to develop a complete theory of their organization.

In holding back from the temptation to speculate on the organization of the angelic hosts, however, Calvin betrays no tendency to minify their numbers, and he of course recognizes the great distinction between good and bad angels. The numbers of both are very great. Of the good angels, he tells us, "we hear from the mouth of Christ of many legions (Mt. xxvi. 53), from Daniel of many myriads (Dan. vii. 10), Elisha's servant saw numerous chariots; and when it is said that they encamp around about those that fear God (Ps. xxxiv. 8), a great multitude is suggested."⁹⁵ When he comes to speak of evil angels his language takes on an even increased energy. He speaks of "great crowds" (*magnas copias*) of them, and even with the exaggerating emphasis of deep conviction of the "infinite multitude" of them.⁹⁶ Though these two hosts stand now arrayed against each other they are in origin and nature one; for the evil spirits are just good spirits gone wrong. The fundamental facts which Calvin most insists upon with respect to what he calls "devils" (*diaboli*) are that they are creatures of God and were therefore once good—"for it is impious (*nefas*) to ascribe to the good God the creation of any evil thing"⁹⁷—and that they have become evil by corrupting the good nature with which God endowed them.⁹⁸ Their

⁹⁴ I. xiv. 8, cf. 14.

⁹⁵ I. xiv. 8.

⁹⁶ I. xiv. 14.

⁹⁷ I. xiv. 3: *nefas esse adscribi bono Deo ullius rei malae creationem.*

⁹⁸ I. xiv. 3: "The orthodox faith does not admit that any evil nature exists in the universe of the world; since neither the pravity and malice whether of man or devil or the sins which proceed from them, came from nature but from the corruption of nature; nor has anything at all come into being from the beginning in which God has not given a specimen of His wisdom and righteousness."

evil, says he crisply, is "not from creation but from depravation".⁹⁹ "At their original creation they were angels of God, but they destroyed themselves through degeneration."¹⁰⁰ To ascribe to God, their Creator, the evil they have acquired by their defection and lapse, would be to ascribe to Him what above all things is most alien from Him;¹⁰¹ and thus far the Manichaeans are right—for the good God cannot have created any evil thing.¹⁰² The Scriptural evidence of the fall of the "devils" Calvin states with great brevity but with sufficient point. He adduces 2 Peter ii. and Jude 6 as a clear statement; and 1 Timothy v. 21 as a tacit implication; and he argues that when our Lord (Jno. viii. 44) declares that when Satan "speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own," and adds as a reason "because he abode not in the truth," He implies that he had once been in the truth and issued from it by an act of his own.¹⁰³ In his other writings he returns repeatedly to these conceptions and always with the greatest directness and force of statement. "The devils," says he, "have been angels of God but they did not retain the condition in which they were created but have fallen by a horrible fall, so as to become the examples of perdition."¹⁰⁴ "The devils were created by God as well as the angels, but not as they now are. We must always reserve this,—that the evil which is in the devils proceeds from themselves. . . ."¹⁰⁵ "For we know that the devil is evil not by nature, nor from his original creation (*creationis origine*), but by the fault of his own defection."¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ I. xiv. 16: quum a Deo conditus sit diabolus, hanc malitiam quam ejus naturae tribuimus, non ex creatione sed ex depravatione esse meminerimus.

¹⁰⁰ *Do.*: contenti simus hoc breviter habere de diabolorum natura: fuisse prima creatione angelos Dei, sed degenerando se perdidisse et aliis factos esse instrumenta perditionis.

¹⁰¹ I. xiv. 16, quod est ab eo alienissimum.

¹⁰² I. xiv. 3, as above.

¹⁰³ I. xiv. 16.

¹⁰⁴ *Sermon* XVI. on Job. iv. (*Opp.* 33, p. 206).

¹⁰⁵ *Sermon* IV. on Job. i. (*Opp.* 33, p. 60).

¹⁰⁶ *Comment.* on 1 Jno. iii. 8 (*Opp.* 55, p. 334). Cf. farther *Opp.* 30,

It is worth while to dwell on these deliverances, because they contain not merely Calvin's doctrine of devils, but also, so far, his doctrine of the origin of evil. This includes, we already perceive, a vigorous repudiation of the notion that God can be in any way the author of evil. The Augustinian doctrine that *omne esse est bonum* is explicitly reaffirmed. God is good and it is impious to suppose that He may have created anything evil (*malum*). But as God is the author of all that is, everything that has come into being is in its nature good. There is, therefore, no such thing in the universe as an evil nature (*mala natura*). All that is evil arises not from nature (*ex natura*) but from corruption of nature (*ex naturae corruptione*).¹⁰⁷ This corruption has been introduced by the free action of the creature: it is not "of creation" but "of depravation,"—a depravation of which the creature itself is the cause (*cujus ipse sibi causa*).¹⁰⁸ To put it all in a nutshell,—evil according to Calvin has its source not in the creative act of God but in the deflected action of the creaturely will. Such an assertion takes us, of course, only a little way towards a theodicy: but it is important that as we pass we should note as a first step in Calvin's theodicy that he very energetically repudiates the notion that God, who is good, can be, as Creator, the author of any evil thing. All that comes from His hands is "very good."

As the angels owe their existence to God, so of course they subsist in Him. They were not brought into being to stand, deistically, over against God, sufficient to themselves:

p. 316 (*Hom. 71 on 1 Sam. xix*): "Just as when we call the good angels spirits of God, not because they have the same essence with God, but because they were formed and created (*formati et creati sunt*) by Him, so also it is to be thought of devils whose origin was the same with the good angels. For they were not created evil as we see them today, and with that evil with which the Scriptures depict them, but they were corrupted and alienated from God by their departure from their original state; just as, we know, man too fell away from his purity into his present misery."

¹⁰⁷ I. xiv. 3.

¹⁰⁸ I. xiv. 16.

like all the rest of His creatures their dependence on God is absolute. Nothing can be ascribed to them as if it belonged to them apart from Him. They are, indeed, immortal: but this is so far from meaning that it is beyond the power of God to destroy them, that it rather means merely that it is the will of God to sustain them in endless being. In themselves considered, like all other creaturely existences, they are mortal.¹⁰⁹ "We know," remarks Calvin,¹¹⁰ "that angels are immortal spirits, for God has created them for this condition, that they shall never be destroyed any more than the souls of men shall perish. . . . The angels are immortal because they are sustained by power from on high, and God maintains them—He who is immortal by nature and the fountain of life is in Him, as says the Psalmist (xxxvi. 10). . . . The angels are not stable save as God holds their hand. They are no doubt called Might and Powers; but this is because God executes His power by them and guides them. Briefly, the angels have nothing in themselves by reason of which they may glory in themselves. For all that they have of power and stability they possess from God. . . ." In all their activities, accordingly, angels are but the instruments of God, although, to be sure, they are "the instruments in which God especially (*specialiter*) exhibits the presence of His divinity (*numinis*)."¹¹¹ We must not think of them, then, as interposed between us and God, so as to obscure His glory; nor must we transfer to them what belongs to God and Christ alone,¹¹²—worshipping them, perchance,¹¹³ or at least attributing to them independent activities. The splendor of the divine majesty is indeed reflected in them;¹¹⁴ but the glory by which they

¹⁰⁹ *Opp.* 48, p. 594: "As they have not always existed, so they are capable of reaching their end."

¹¹⁰ *Opp.* 33, p. 206 (*Sermon* 16 on Job. 4); cf. *Opp.* 33, p. 368, and 38, p. 152.

¹¹¹ I. xiv. 5.

¹¹² I. xiv. 10.

¹¹³ *Do.*: the cult of angels in the Church of Rome led Calvin to be particularly insistent against their worship. Cf. *Opp.* vi. 83, vii. 653.

¹¹⁴ I. xiv. 10: in eis fulgor divini numinis refulgeat.

shine is a derived glory, and it would be preposterous to allow their borrowed brightness to blind us to its source. In all their varied activities they must be considered merely "the hands of God, which move themselves to no work except under His direction."¹¹⁴

Some question may arise as to the wideness of the sphere of activity in which angels are employed as "the hands of God." There is at least a *prima facie* appearance that Calvin thought of them as the instruments through which the entirety of God's providential work is administered. He dwells especially, to be sure, on their employment as "the dispensers and administrators of the divine beneficence" towards His people;¹¹⁵ but he appears to look upon this as only the culminating instance of a universal activity. When he says that they are "God's ministers ordained for the execution of His laws,"¹¹⁶ we may indeed hesitate to press the language. But three several spheres of activity of increasing comprehensiveness seem to be distinguished, when he tells us God "uses their service for the protection of His people, and by means of them both dispenses His benefits among men and executes also the rest of His works."¹¹⁷ And the whole seems summed up in a phrase when he tells us again that God "exercises and administers His government in the world through them."¹¹⁸ The universal reach of their activities appears to be explicitly asserted in the comprehensive statement that God "uses their ministry and service for executing all that He has decreed."¹¹⁹ It

¹¹⁴ I. xiv. 12: si non ut ejus manus a nobis considerantur, quae nullum ad opus nisi ipso dirigente se moveant.

¹¹⁵ I. xiv. 6.

¹¹⁶ I. xiv. 4: Dei ministri ad jussa ejus exsequenda ordinati.

¹¹⁷ I. xiv. 9: quorum obsequio utitur Deus ad suorum protectionem, et per quos tum sua beneficia inter homines dispensat, tum reliqua etiam opera exsequitur.

¹¹⁸ I. xiv. 5: imperium suum in mundo.

¹¹⁹ I. xiv. 5 *ad init.*: ad exsequenda omnia quae decrevit. Cf. Heidegger's threefold distribution of angelic functions: in praeconium laudum ejus, necnon in regimine mundi, ecclesiae imprimis ministrant (as cited by Heppe: *Dogmat. d. ref. Kirche*, p. 146).

certainly would appear from such broad statements that Calvin looked upon the angels as agents through which God carries on His entire providential government.

The question is not unnaturally raised whether by this conception Calvin does not remove God too far from His works, interposing between Him and His operations a body of intermediaries by which He is separated from the universe after the fashion of a false transcendenceism.¹²⁰ It is quite plain that Calvin did not so conceive the matter. So far from supposing that the execution of the works of providence through the medium of angels involves the absence of God from these works, he insists that they are only the channels of the presence of God. "How preposterous it is," he exclaims, "that we should be separated from God by the angels when they have been constituted for the express purpose of testifying the completer presence of His

¹²⁰ "It deserves remark," says P. J. Muller (*De Godsleer van Zwingli und Calvin*, p. 77), "that Calvin answers the question why God makes use of angels, after a fashion which more or less affects the immanence of God. He points to the multiplicity of our dangers, to our weakness, and to our liability to *trepidatio* and *desperatio*. Now God not merely promises us His care; but He even appoints an 'innumerable multitude of protectors, whom He has commissioned to keep watch over us'; so that we may 'feel ourselves without danger, no matter what evil threatens, so long as we are under this protection and care' (I. xiv. 11),—a mode of conception to which he does not, however, hold, since he looks upon all things and man as well rather as immediately dependent on God Himself and on His care alone." Muller quotes Zwingli (*Opp.* II. b. 27) as complaining of Luther's attribution of all evils to the devil as if there were no such thing as the providence of God. "How is it," asks Zwingli, "that to you the poor devil must have done everything, as no man can do in my house? I thought the devil was already overcome and judged. If the devil is now a powerful lord in the world, as you have just said, how can it be that all things shall be worked out through God's providence?" In both Zwingli's and Muller's cases the antithesis is not exact. All things can be worked out by God's providence and yet the Devil be the author of all that is evil; because the Devil himself may be—and is—an instrument of God's providence. God's use of angels in His providence is no injury to His immanent working, because they are the instruments of His immanent working; and Calvin does not depart from the one notion while emphasizing the other, because they are not mutually exclusive notions but two sides of one idea.

aid to us.”¹²¹ Are we separated from the works of our hands because it is by our hands that they are wrought? And the angels, if rightly conceived, must be thought of just as the hands of God—the appropriate instruments, not which work instead of Him, but by which He works.¹²² He, therefore, once for all dismisses “that Platonic philosophy” which interposes angels between God and His world, and even asks us to seek access to God through the angels, as if we had not immediacy of access to Him. “For this is the reason they are called Angels of Power or Powers,” he remarks in another place;¹²³ “not that God, resigning His power to them, sits idle in heaven, but because, by acting powerfully in them, He magnificently manifests His power to us. They therefore act ill and perversely who assign anything to angels as of themselves, or who so make them intermediaries between us and God that they obscure the glory of God as if it were removed to a distance; since rather it manifests itself as present in them. Accordingly the mad speculations of Plato are to be shunned as instituting too great a distance between us and God. . . .” In his view, therefore, the angels do not stand between God and the world to hold them apart but to draw them together as channels of operation through which God’s power flows into His works.

If he were asked whether he does not, by this interposition of angels between God and His works, infringe on the conception of the Divine immanence and raise doubt as to God’s immanent activity, Calvin would doubtless reply that he does not “interpose” the angels between God and His works, but conceives them as just “the hands of God” working; and that he, of course, conceives God as immanent in the angels themselves, so that their working is just His working through them, as His instruments. We must not confuse the question of the method of God’s immanent ac-

¹²¹ I. xiv. 12.

¹²² I. xiv. 12.

¹²³ *Com. on Jno. v. 4* (*Opp.* 47, p. 105).

tivity with that of the fact of that activity. The suggestion that God carries on His providential government through the agency of angels is only a suggestion of the method of His immanent working and can raise doubt of the reality of His immanent working only on the supposition that these angels stand so over against God in their independence as to break—so to speak—His contact with His works. This is Deism, and is therefore of course inconsistent with the Divine immanence; but it has nothing to do with the question whether He employs angels in which He is immanent in His operations. In any event God executes His works of providence through the intermediation of second causes; for this is the very definition of a work of providence. The discovery that among these second causes there are always personal as well as impersonal agencies to be taken into account, can raise no question as between immanence and transcendence in God's modes of action—unless personal agents are conceived to be, as such, so independent of God as to exclude in all that is performed by their agency the conception of His immanent working. And in that case what shall we say of the divine immanence in the sphere of human life and activity? In a word, Calvin's conception that all the works of God's providence are wrought through the intermediation of angels excludes the immanence of God in His world as little as the recognition of human activities excludes the immanence of God in history.

The real interest of his conception does not lie, therefore, in any bearing it may be supposed to have on his view of the relation of God to the universe—it leaves his view on that point unaffected—but in the insight it gives us into Calvin's pneumatology. We have already had occasion to note the vividness of his sense of the spiritual environment in which our life is cast. We see here that he conceived the universe as in all its operations moving on under the guiding hand of these superhuman intelligences. This is as much as to say that there was no dualism in his conception of the universe: he did not set the spiritual and physical worlds, or the earthly

and supramundane worlds, over against one another as separate and unrelated entities. He conceived them as all working together in one unitary system, acting and interacting on one another. And he accustomed himself to perceive beneath the events of human history—whether corporate or individual—and beneath the very operations of physical nature—not merely the hand of God, upholding and governing; but the activities of those “hands of God” who hearken to His voice and fulfil His word, and whom He not only charges with the care of His “little ones”, and the direction of the movements of the peoples, but makes even “winds” and a “flaming fire.”

To the question why God thus universally operates through the instrumentality of subordinate intelligences, Calvin has no answer, in its general aspects, except a negative one. It cannot be that God needs their aid or is unable to accomplish without them what He actually does through them. If He employs them, “He certainly does not do this from necessity, as if He were unable to do without them; for whenever He pleases, He passes them by and accomplishes His work by nothing but His mere will; so far are they from relieving Him of any difficulty by their aid.”¹²⁴ These words have their application to the whole sphere of angelical activities, as indeed they have to the entire body of second causes,¹²⁵ but they are spoken directly only of the employment of angels as ministers to the heirs of salvation. It is characteristic of Calvin that he confines his discussion of the subject to this highest function of angelic service, as that which was of special religious value to his readers, and that to which as a practical man seeking practical ends it behoved him particularly to address himself. In this highest sphere of angelic operation he is not without even a positive response to the query why God uses angels to perform His will. It is not for His sake but for the sake of His people; it is, in fact, a concession to their weakness.

¹²⁴ I. xiv. 11.

¹²⁵ I. xvi. 2.

God is able, certainly, to protect His people by the mere nod of His power; and surely it ought to be enough for them and more than enough that God declares Himself their protector.¹²⁶ To look around for further aid after we have received the promise of God that He will protect us, is undeniably wrong in us.¹²⁷ Is not the simple promise of the great God of heaven and earth sufficient safeguard against all dangers? But we are weak;¹²⁸ and God is good,—full of leniency and indulgence,¹²⁹—and He wishes to give us not only His protection but the sense of His protection. Dealing with us as we are, not as we ought to be, He is willing to appeal to our imagination and to comfort us in our feeling of danger or despair by enabling us to apprehend, in our own way, the presence of His grace. He, therefore, has added to His promise that He will Himself care for us, the further one that “we shall have innumerable escorts to whom He has given charge to secure our safety.”¹³⁰ Like Elisha, then, who, when he was oppressed by the numerous army of the Syrians, was shown the multitude of the angels sent to guard him, we, when terrified by the thought of the multitude of our enemies, may find refuge in that discovery of Elisha’s: “There are more for us than against us.”

In insisting upon this particular function of angels above all others, Calvin feels himself to be, as a Biblical theologian, simply following the lead of Scripture. For, intent especially on what may most make for our consolation and the confirmation of our faith, the Scripture lays its stress, he tells us, on angels as the dispensers and administrators of the Divine beneficence towards God’s people; and “reminds us that they guard our safety, undertake our defence, direct our ways, and exercise solicitude that no harm shall befall

¹²⁶ I. xiv. 11: illud quidem unum satis superque esse deberet, quod Dominus asserit se nostrum esse protectorem.

¹²⁷ *Do.*: perperam id quidem fieri a nobis fateor, quod post illam simplicem promissionem de unius Dei protectione, adhuc circumspectamus unde veniat nobis auxilium.

¹²⁸ *Do.*: imbecilitas, mollities, fragilitas, vitium.

¹²⁹ *Do.*: pro immensa sua clementia et facilitate.

¹³⁰ *Do.*

us."¹³¹ These great provisions are universal, he tells us, and belong "to all believers" without exception. Every follower of Christ has, therefore, pledged to his protection the whole host of the angels of God. In the interests of the greatness of this pledge, Calvin enters the lists against the idea of "guardian angels", which had become the settled doctrine of the old church,¹³²—not indeed with the sharpness and decision which afterwards obtained in the Reformed churches,¹³³ but yet with an obvious feeling that this notion lacks Scriptural basis and offers less than what the Scriptures provide for the consolation and support of God's people. If it is to be accepted at all, Calvin wishes it to be accepted not instead of, but alongside of, what he feels to be the much greater assurance that the whole body of angels is concerned with the protection and salvation of everyone of the saints. "Of this indeed," he remarks, "we may be sure,—that the case of each one of us is not committed to one angel alone, but that all of them with one consent watch over our salvation."¹³⁴ This being a settled fact, he does not consider the question of "guardian angels" worth considering: if "all the orders of the celestial army stand guard over our salvation", he asks, what difference does it make to us whether one particular angel is also told off to act as our particular guardian or not? But if any one wishes to restrict the protection granted us by God to this one angel,—why that is a different matter: that would be to do a great injury to himself and to all the members of the church, by depriving them of the encouragement they receive from the divine assurance that they are compassed about and defended on all sides in their conflict by the forces of heaven.¹³⁵

¹³¹ I. xiv. 6.

¹³² I. xiv. 7.

¹³³ Cf. Voetius, *Disput.* I, p. 900, who remarks that most of the Reformed (including himself) deny the existence of guardian angels, adding: "We embrace the opinion of Calvin in *Instit.* I. xiv. 7, and *Com. on Psalms* (91) and *on Matthew* (18), and of the other Reformers, who reject this opinion as vain and curious, and we think that something in this matter has adhered to the ancient fathers from the Platonic theology and the mythological theology of the Gentiles."

¹³⁴ I. xiv. 7.

¹³⁵ This last sentence is new to the latest edition of the *Institutes*.

What Calvin has to say about the evil spirits—the “devils” as he calls them—is determined by the same practical purpose which dominates his discussion of the good angels. He begins, therefore, with the remark that “almost everything which Scripture transmits concerning devils, has as its end that we should be solicitous to guard against their snares and machinations, and may provide ourselves with such arms as are firm and strong enough to repel the most powerful enemies.”¹³⁶ He proceeds by laying stress on the numbers, the malice, and the subtlety of these devils; and by striving in every way to awaken the reader to a realizing sense of the desperation of the conflict in which he is engaged with them.¹³⁷ The effect is to paint a very vivid picture of the world of evil, set over against the world of good as in some sense its counterfeit,¹³⁸ determined upon overturning the good, and to that end waging a perpetual war against God and His people.¹³⁹ He then points out that the evil of these dreadful beings is of themselves, not of God,—coming not from creation but from corruption¹⁴⁰—and closes with two sections upon the relation they sustain to God’s providential government. To these closing sections (§§17 and 18), it will repay us to devote careful attention. In them Calvin resolves the dualism which is introduced into the universe by the intrusion of evil into it, by showing that this evil itself is held under the control of God and is employed for His divine purposes; and he does this in such a manner

We may note in passing that Calvin both in the *Institutes* and in his commentary on the passage, understands Mat. xviii. 10 of “the angels of little children” (cf. *Instit.* I. xiv. 7, 9), which seems certainly wrong. Cf. art. “Little Ones” in Hastings’ *Dict. of Christ and the Gospels*.

¹³⁶ I. xiv. 13 *ad init.*

¹³⁷ *Do.*: 13-15.

¹³⁸ I. xiv. 14, end: “For just as the Church and the Society of the Saints have Christ as head, so the faction of the impious and impiety itself is depicted to us with its prince, who holds there supreme dominion.” Cf. *Opp.* 35, p. 35; 53, p. 339.

¹³⁹ I. xiv. 15, beginning: Hoc quoque ad perpetuum cum diabolo certamen accendere nos debet, quod adversarius Dei et noster ubique dicitur. Cf. the whole § and especially its closing words.

¹⁴⁰ I. xiv. 16.

that we scarcely know whether to admire most the justice of the conceptions or the precision and clearness of the language in which they are given expression.¹⁴¹

The first of these sections asserts the completeness of the control which God exercises over the devils. It is true that Satan is at discord and strife with God:¹⁴² he is by nature—that is, acquired nature—wicked (*improbis*) and every propension of his will is to contumacy and rebellion; of his own accord he does nothing, therefore, which he does not mean to be in opposition to God.¹⁴³ But he is, after all, but a creature of God's and God holds him in with the bridle of His power and controls his every act. Although, therefore, every impulse of his will is in conflict with God, he can do nothing except by God's will and approval.¹⁴⁴ So it is uniformly represented in Scripture. Thus we read that Satan could not assault Job until he had obtained permission so to do;¹⁴⁵ that the lying spirit by which Ahab was deceived was commissioned from the Lord;¹⁴⁶ that the evil spirit which punished Saul for his sins was from the Lord;¹⁴⁷ that the plagues of Egypt, sent by God as they were, were wrought, nevertheless, by evil angels.¹⁴⁸ And thus Paul, generalizing, speaks of the blinding of unbelievers both as the "work of God" and the "operation of Satan", meaning of course that Satan does it only under the government of God.¹⁴⁹ "It stands fast, therefore", Calvin concludes, "that Satan is under God's power, and is so governed by God's

¹⁴¹ Cf. the definition given of demons by Voetius, *Disp.* I. p. 911, summing up what is more broadly taught by Calvin in the brevity of a definition. A demon, says he, "is an angel, created in integrity, who, subjected on account of his own defection to endless evil and misery, serves, even though unwillingly, the providence and glory of God."

¹⁴² I. xiv. 17: discordia et pugna cum Deo.

¹⁴³ *Do.*

¹⁴⁴ nisi volente et annuente Deo, nihil facere posse.

¹⁴⁵ nisi impetrata facultate.

¹⁴⁶ a Domino amandatus.

¹⁴⁷ spiritus Domini malus.

¹⁴⁸ per angelos malos.

¹⁴⁹ opus Dei—operatio Satanae.

will (*nutu*) that he is compelled to render God obedience. We may say certainly that "Satan resists God, and his works are contrary to God's works; but we at the same time assert that this repugnancy and this strife are dependent on God's permission. I am not now speaking of his will (*voluntate*), nor yet of his efforts (*conatu*), but only of the results (*effectu*). For the devil is wicked by nature and has not the least propension towards obedience to the divine will, but is wholly bent on contumacy and rebellion. What he has from his own iniquity, therefore, is that he desires and purposes to oppose God: by this depravity he is stimulated to try to do those things which he thinks in the highest degree inimical to God. But God holds him bound and curbed by the bridle of his power, so that he can carry out only those things which are divinely permitted to him, and thus, will he nill he, he obeys his Creator, seeing that he is compelled to perform whatever service God impels him to."¹⁵⁰

This important passage appears first in the edition of the *Institutes* published in 1543; but its entire substance was in Calvin's mind from the beginning. It is given expression, first, in the course of the broader discussion of the relation of God's providence to the evil acts of men and devils incorporated into the second chapter (*De Fide*) of the first edition of the *Institutes* (1536).¹⁵¹ "Thus, the affliction of Job", Calvin there declares, "was the work of God and of the devil; and yet the wickedness of the devil must be distinguished from the righteousness of God; for the devil was endeavoring to destroy Job, God was testing him (Job i. and ii.). So Assur was the rod of the Lord's anger, Sennacherib the axe in his hand (Is. x.); all called, raised up, impelled by Him, in a word His ministers. But how? While they were obeying their unbridled lust, they were unconsciously serving the righteousness of God (Jer. xxvii. 6). Behold God and them, the authors of the same work,

¹⁵⁰ I. xiv. 17, end.

¹⁵¹ *Opp.* I. p. 60.

but in the same work the righteousness of God and their iniquity manifested!" The same line of thought is much more completely worked out, and very fully illustrated from the instance of Job, as a part of the discussion of man's sinfulness in the presence of the machinations of evil and the providence of God, which was incorporated into the second edition of the *Institutes* (1539) and retained from it throughout all the subsequent editions—in the final edition forming the opening sections of the discussion of *How God works in the hearts of men* (II. iv. 1-2).¹⁵²

Much the same line of thought is developed again in the full discussion of the providence of God which appears in the tract against the Libertines, which was published in 1545. Speaking here of the particular providence of God, Calvin proceeds as follows: "It is furthermore to be noted that not only does God serve Himself thus with the insensible creatures, to work and execute His will through them; but also with men and even with devils. So that Satan and the wicked are executors of His will. Thus He used the Egyptians to afflict His people, and subsequently raised up the Assyrians to chastise them, when they had sinned; and others in like manner. As for the devil, we see that he was employed to torment Saul (1 Sam. xvi. 14, xviii. 10), to deceive Ahab (1 Kings xxii. 22), and to execute judgment upon all the wicked whenever they require it (Ps. lxxviii. 49); and on the other hand to test the constancy of God's people, as we see in the case of Job. The Libertines, now, meeting with these passages, are dumfounded by them and without due consideration conclude that, therefore, the creatures do nothing at all. Thus they fall into a terrible error. For not only do they confound heaven and earth together but God and the devil. This comes from not observing two limitations which are very necessary. The first is that Satan and wicked men are not such instruments of God that they do not act also of their own accord. For we must not imagine that God makes use of a wicked man

¹⁵²*Opp.* I. p. 351; II. p. 225.

precisely as He does of a stone or of a piece of wood. He employs him rather as a reasonable creature according to the quality of the nature He has given him. When, then, we say that God works by means of the wicked, this does not forbid that the wicked work also on their own account. This Scripture shows us with even remarkable clearness. For while, on the one hand, it declares that God shall hiss (Is. v. 26), and as it were sound the drum to call the infidels to arms and shall harden or inflame their hearts—yet, on the other, it does not leave out of account their own thought and will, and attributes to them the work they do by the appointment of God. The second limitation which these unhappy men disregard is that there is a very real distinction between the work of God and that of a wicked man when he serves as the instrument of God. For it is by his own avarice, or his own ambition, or his own jealousy, or his own cruelty, that a wicked man is incited to do what he does; and he has no regard to any other end. And it is according to the root, which is the affection of the heart, and to the end which it seeks, that the work is qualified; and so it is rightly accounted wicked. But God has an entirely contrary purpose. It is to execute His righteousness, to save and conserve the good, to employ His goodness and grace towards the faithful, to chastise the ill-deserving. Here, then, lies the necessity of distinguishing between God and men, so as to contemplate in the same work God's righteousness, goodness, judgment, and, on the other side, the malice of the devil or of the wicked. Let us take a good and clear mirror in which to see all that I am saying. When Job heard the news of the loss of his goods, of the death of his children, of the many calamities which had fallen on him, he recognized that it was God who was visiting him, and said, 'The Lord has given, the Lord has taken away.' And, in truth, it was so. But was it not also the devil who had brewed this pottage? Was it not the Chaldaeans who had spoiled his goods? Did he com-

mend the thieves and brigands, and excuse the devil, because his affliction had come to him from God? Certainly not. He well knew there was an important distinction to be observed here. And so he condemns the evil, and says 'Blessed be the name of the Lord.' Similarly David, when he was persecuted by Shimei, no doubt said that he had received this from the Lord (2 Sam. xvi. 11), and saw that this wretch was a rod by which God was chastising him. But while he praised God, he did not omit to condemn Shimei (2 Kings ii. 9). We shall return to this at another place. For the present let it suffice to hear this: that God so uses His creatures and makes them serve His providence, that the instrument which He employs may often be bad; that His turning the malice of Satan or of bad men to good does not in the least excuse their evil or make their work other than bad and to be condemned, seeing that every work receives its quality from the intention with which it is done. . . . On the contrary, we must needs observe that the creatures do their works here in their own degree, and these are to be estimated as good or bad according as they are done in obedience to God or to offend Him. All the time, God is above, directing everything to a good end, and turning the evil into good, or, at least, drawing good out of what is evil, acting according to His nature, that is in righteousness and equity; and making use of the devil in such a manner as in no way to mix Himself with him so as to have anything in common with him, or to entangle Himself in any evil association, or to efface the nature of what is evil by His righteousness. It is just like the sun which, shining on a piece of carrion and causing putrefaction in it, contracts no taint whatever from the corruption, and does not by its purity destroy the foulness and infection of the carrion. So God deals in such a manner with the deeds of the wicked that the holiness which is in Him does not justify the infection which is in them, nor is contaminated by it."

We have thought it desirable to quote at some length one of the more extended passages in which Calvin develops the

doctrine announced in the section before us, although it leads us somewhat away from the single point here to be emphasized, into the mysteries of the divine providence. This broader view once before us, however, we may return to emphasize the single point which now concerns us—Calvin's teaching of the absolute control of the evil spirits by God. This seemed to Calvin to lie so close to the center of Christian hope and life that he endlessly repeats it in his occasional writings, and has even incorporated an assertion of it in his Catechism (1545).¹⁵³ "But what shall we think of the wicked and of devils", he there asks,—“are they, too, subject to God?” And he answers: “Although God does not lead them by His Spirit, He nevertheless holds them in check as with a bridle, so that they cannot move save as He permits them. And He even makes them ministers of His will, so that He compels them to execute unwillingly and against their determination what seems good to Him.”¹⁵⁴ The recognition of this fact seemed to him essential even to an intelligent theism, which, he urges, certainly requires that God should be conceived not less as Governor than as Creator of all things—as, indeed, the two things go together. “If, then, we imagine”, he writes,¹⁵⁵ “that God does not govern all, but that some things come about by fortune, it follows that this fortune is a goddess who has created part of the world, and that the praise is not due to God alone. And it is an execrable blasphemy if we think that the devil can do anything without the permission of God: that is all one with making him creator of the world in part.” “Now Satan”, says he again,¹⁵⁶ “is also subject to God, so that we are not to imagine that Satan has any principality except what is given him by God; and there is good reason why he should be subject to Him since he proceeds from Him. The devils were created by God as well as the angels, but not

¹⁵³ *Opp.* vii. p. 188 *sq.*

¹⁵⁴ *Opp.* vi. pp. 17, 18.

¹⁵⁵ *Opp.* xxxv. p. 152 (Sermon 130, on Job. xxxiv).

¹⁵⁶ *Opp.* xxxiii. p. 60 (Sermon 4 on Job. i).

such as they are. It is necessary that we always reserve this,—that the evil which is in the devils proceeds from themselves.”¹⁵⁷

Calvin was not the man, however, to insist on the control of the devils by God without consideration of the ends for which this control was exercised. He therefore follows up his assertion of this control (§17) with a discussion of the use God makes of “unclean spirits” (*immundi spiritus*) (§18). This use, he tells us, is twofold. They are employed to test, try, exercise and develop the faithful. And they are employed to punish the wicked. On the latter of these he dwells as little as its faithful presentation permitted. Those whom God “does not design to enroll in His own flock”, he tells us, He delivers over to the control of Satan as the minister of the divine vengeance; and he pictures in a few burning words the terribleness of their fate. On the employment of Satan and his angels for the profit of God’s people he dwells more at length and with evident reminiscence of his own Christian experience. “They exercise the faithful with fighting”, he tells us, “they assail them with snares, harrass them with assaults, push them in combat, even fatigue them often, confuse, terrify, and sometimes wound them.” Yet they never, he adds, “conquer or overcome them”. God’s children may often be filled with consternation, but they are never so disheartened that they cannot recover themselves; they may be struck down by the violence of the blows they receive, but they always rise again; they may be wounded, but they

¹⁵⁷Cf. also *Opp.* ix. p. 309; xxxviii. pp. 478-484; xxx. pp. 287, 315; xlviii. p. 594 where it is the ascended Christ who is affirmed (as God of providence) to hold the devils in check so that they do nothing save by His will. Also the statement in the *Confession des Escholiers* of 1559 (*Opp.* ix. pp. 723-4): “And although Satan and the reprobate endeavor to throw everything into confusion to such an extent that the faithful themselves doubt the right order of their sins, I recognize nevertheless that God, as the Supreme Prince and Lord of All, turns the evil into good, and governs all things by a certain secret curb, and moderates them in a wonderful way, which we ought with all submission of mind to adore, since we are not able to comprehend it.”

cannot be slain; they may be made to labor through their whole lives, but in the end they obtain the victory.

There are several things that are thrown out into a high light in this discussion which it will repay us to take notice of. We observe, first of all, Calvin's view of the Christian life as a conflict with the powers of evil. "This exercise", he says, or we might perhaps almost translate it "this drill" (*exercitium*)—it is the word for military training—"is common to all the children of God. We observe, next, his absolute confidence in the victory of God's children. The promise that the seed of the woman shall crush the head of Satan belongs not only to Christ, but to all His members; and, therefore, he can categorically deny that it is possible for the faithful ever to be conquered or overcome of evil. The dominion of Satan is over the wicked alone, and shall never be extended to the soul of a single one of the faithful. We observe again that Calvin conceives the victory as therefore complete already in principle for every one who is in Christ. "In our Head indeed", he declares, "this victory has always been full and complete (*ad plenum exstitit*); because the prince of the world had nothing in Him." And we observe, finally, that he holds with clear conviction that it will never be complete for any of us in this life. We labor here throughout the whole course of life (*toto vitae curriculo*) and obtain the victory only in the end (*in fine*). The fulfilment of the promise of crushing the head of Satan is only "begun in this life", the characteristic of which is that it is the period of conflict (*ubi luctandum est*): it is only after this period of conflict is over (*post luctam*) that it shall be completely fulfilled. It is only in our Head that the victory is now complete: in us who are members, it appears as yet only in part: and it is only when we put off our flesh, according to which we are liable to infirmity, that we shall be filled with the power of the Holy Spirit. In these several considerations we have outlined for us very vividly Calvin's conception of the life which we now live in the flesh, a life of faith and hope not of full attainment:

a life filled with conflict, but with the sure promise of victory.

The preoccupation of Calvin's mind with man throughout his whole discussion of creation is very strikingly illustrated by his absorption, even while discussing angels and devils, with human relations and human problems. What he is apparently chiefly concerned about is that men shall understand and take their comfort out of the assurance that angelic hosts encamp about them for their protection, and angelic messengers are busied continually with their direction; that men shall understand and take their admonition from the certainty that numerous most subtle and malignant unseen foes lie in wait continually for their souls. We have pointed out that Calvin's conception of the universe was frankly anthropocentric. We see that this anthropocentrism of thought embraced in it the spiritual as well as the physical universe. He does not say, indeed, that these higher spiritual existences exist purely for man: he only says that for our consolation and the confirmation of our faith the Scriptures insist principally on their employment for the dispensing and administering of God's kindness to His people. Here is no speculative investigation into the final cause of angels. Here is only a practical reference to those functions of angels which it most concerns us to know. But he does teach of course (on the basis of Col. i. 16) that the very creation of angels is referred to Christ as its end: and it might be contended that in this declaration there lie the beginnings of a "gospel of creation" by which all things without exception which have been brought into being are set forth as ancillary to the great end of the redemption of the human race. A certain amount of confirmation may be found for this contention in the unitary conception which, as has been pointed out, Calvin cherished of the universe as a systematized whole. Meanwhile we have no formal discussion from him of the final cause of angels, and not even (at this place, at all events), any guiding hints of how he would

resolve such a question. Least of all have we here any such discussion as meets us in many of his followers of the final cause of the devil,¹⁵⁸ although the elements of such a discussion are involved in any theodicy, and cannot escape suggestion in any attempt to deal seriously with the great problem of evil. Calvin, therefore, has not failed to suggest them; but not directly in our present context, where he contents himself with assuming the existence of evil in the spiritual world, declaring its origination by the creature and asserting the divine control of it and utilization of it in God's government of the world.¹⁵⁹ For what may penetrate into the problem more deeply than this, we shall have to go elsewhere.

Meanwhile, having expounded at some length the nature of the spiritual, and more briefly the nature of the physical, environment of man, Calvin is now able to turn definitely to the subject which had really been occupying his thoughts throughout the entire discussion of creation,—man, con-

¹⁵⁸ Few of them, however, have been able to say so much so well in such few words as Voetius, *Disp.* I. 922: "Final causes of the devil as such ought not to be assigned, because evil has no end. But although the *opus* (as we say) in and of itself has no end, the *operans Deus* has—who has made everything for Himself (*propter seipsum*, Prov. xvi. 4). For to a fixed end He both created him in the state of integrity, and permitted his fall, and left him in his fallen state, and ordained his malice to multiplex good. His ultimate end is therefore the glory of God; the subordinate use of the devil is as an instrument of divine providence, in this life for plaguing men, the pious for their discipline only, the impious for their punishment and undoing; after this life, for torturing the impious. Thus God in both raises a trophy to the honor of His blameless glory."

¹⁵⁹ A brief statement of how Calvin habitually thought of devils may be found in his tract against the Libertines xii. (*Opp.* vii. p. 282): "The Scriptures teach us that the devils are evil spirits who continually make war on us, to draw us to perdition. And as they are destined to eternal damnation, they continually strive to involve us in the same ruin. Likewise that they are instruments of the wrath of God, and executioners for the punishment of unbelievers and rebels, blinding them and tyrannizing over them, to incite them to evil (Job. i. 6, xii. 2, vii. 7; Zech. iii. 1; Mat. iv. 2; Lk. vii. 29, xxii. 31; Acts vii. 51, xxvi. 18; 2 Cor. ii. 11; 1 Thes. ii. 18; Jno. viii. 44; xiii. 2; 1 Jno. iii. 8)."

sidered as a creature of God. The ruin which has been wrought in man by sin, he postpones for a later discussion; here he concerns himself only with the nature of man as such. Not of course as if he were inviting an idle contemplation of something which no longer exists and therefore cannot deeply concern us. But with a twofold practical object in view. In the first place, that we may not attribute to God, the author of our nature, those natural evils which we perceive in ourselves, in our present condition. And next, that we may properly estimate the lamentable ruin into which we have fallen, by seeing it as it really is,—as a corruption and deformity of our proper nature. With these ends in view he invites us to attend to a *descriptio integrae naturae*, that is to an account of the constitution and nature of man as such.^{159a}

Man, in his view, owes his origin, of course, to the productive energy of God¹⁶⁰ and is spoken of by Calvin as among all the works of God, "the most noble and supremely admirable example of the Divine righteousness and wisdom and goodness."¹⁶¹ His peculiarity among the creatures of God is that he is of a duplex nature. For that man consists of two disparate elements—soul and body—ought, in Calvin's opinion, to be beyond controversy.¹⁶² On the one side, then, man takes hold of lower nature,—“he was taken from earth and clay”;¹⁶³ and this surely ought to be a curb to our pride. On the other side,—which is “the

^{159a} I. xv. 1.

¹⁶⁰ I. xv. 5.

¹⁶¹ I. xv. 1 *init.*: inter omnia Dei opera nobilissimum ac maxime spectabile justitiae ejus, et sapientiae, et bonitatis specimen. Cf. *Commentary* on Gen. i. 25: "If you rightly weigh all circumstances man is among other creatures a certain preëminent specimen of divine wisdom, justice and goodness, so that he is deservedly called by the ancients μικρόκοσμος, 'a world in miniature'." Calvin seems to be speaking with regard only to the other *visible* creatures.

¹⁶² I. xv. 2 *init.*: porro hominem constare anima et corpore, extra controversiam esse debet. Cf. *Opp.* xii. 111, 1544: "We hold then, in conformity with the whole teaching of God that man is composed and consists of two parts: that is to say of body and soul."

¹⁶³ I. xv. 1, end: ex terra et lute sumptus fuit.

nobler part" of man,¹⁶⁴—he is an immortal spirit dwelling in this earthly vessel as a domicile; and in this he may justly glory as a mark of the great goodness of His maker.¹⁶⁵ Calvin, we perceive then is a dichotomist, and that not merely inadvertently but with an express rejection of the trichotomistic schematization. He recognizes some plausibility in the arguments advanced to distinguish between the sensitive and rational souls in man; but he finds that there is really no substance in them and advises that we draw off from such questions as frivolous and useless.¹⁶⁶

Of the bodily nature of man, Calvin has (here at least) little to say. He is not insensible to the dignity of the human form and carriage, celebrating it in a familiar classical quotation;¹⁶⁷ and he admits that by as much as it distinguishes and separates us from brute animals by that much it brings us nearer to God.¹⁶⁸ Though he insists that the image of God is properly spiritual,¹⁶⁹ and that even though it may be discerned sparkling in these external things it is only as they are informed by the spirit;¹⁷⁰ he yet in this very statement seems in some sense to allow that it does "sparkle" at least in these external things, and indeed says plainly that "there is no part of man including the body itself, in which there is not some luminous spark of

¹⁶⁴ I. xv. 2: quae nobilior ejus pars est.

¹⁶⁵ I. xv. 1: fictoris sui.

¹⁶⁶ I. xv. 6: qui plures volunt esse animas in homine, hoc est sensitivam et rationalem, . . . repudiandi nobis sunt.

¹⁶⁷ From Ovid, *Metam.* Lib. I.

¹⁶⁸ I. xv. 3. Cf. *Com.* on Genesis ii. 7 where he finds in the very way in which man was formed, gradually and not by a simple fiat, a mark of his excellence above the brutes. "Three stages," he says, "are to be noted in the creation of man: that his dead body was formed out of the dust of the earth; that it was endued with a soul whence it should receive vital motion; and that on this soul God engraved His own image, to which immortality is annexed."

¹⁶⁹ In accordance with Augustine's declaration (*De Trinitate* xii. 7): Non secundum formam corporis homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, sed secundum rationalem mentem. (Cf. *De Gen. ad lit.* vi. 27: imaginem Dei in spiritu mentis impressam. . .).

¹⁷⁰ I. xv. 3: modo fixum illum maneat, imaginem Dei, quae in his externis notis conspicitur vel emicat, spirituale esse.

the divine image."¹⁷¹ What he objected to in Osiander's view accordingly was not that he allowed to the body some share in the divine image but that he placed the image of God "promiscuously" and "equally" in the soul and body.¹⁷² Calvin might allow it to extend even to the body, but certainly he would not admit that it had its seat there in equal measure as in the soul. The only proper seat of the image of God was to him indeed precisely the soul itself,¹⁷³ from which only it might shine into the body.¹⁷⁴

He even, indeed, permits himself to speak of the body as a "prison" from which the soul is liberated at death;¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ *Inst.* I. xv. 3. Cf. A. S. E. Talma, *De Anthropologie van Calvin*, 1882, who thinks Calvin speaks somewhat waveringly about the body.

¹⁷² Promiscue tam ad corpus quam ad animam.

¹⁷³ So he says in the *Psychopannychia* (*Opp.* v. p. 180) that in the body, mirabile opus Dei, prae caeteris corporibus creatis, apparet, nulla tamen ejus (in eo) effulget, and reasons out the matter at length in *Opp.* vii. 112 (1544): "Now where will it be that we shall find this image of God, if there is no spiritual essence in man on which it may be impressed? For as to man's body it is not there that the image of God resides. It is true that Moses afterwards adds (*Gen.* ii. 7) that man was made a living soul,—a thing said also of beasts. But to denote a special excellence, he says that God inspired the power of life into the body he had formed of dust. Thus, though the human soul has some qualities common to those of beasts, nevertheless as it bears the image and likeness of God it is certainly of a different kind. As it has an origin apart, it has also another preëminence and this is what Solomon means when he says that at death the body returns to the dust from which it is taken, and the soul returns to God who gave it (*Ecc.* xii. 7). For this reason it is said in the Book of Wisdom (ii. 23) that man is immortal, seeing that he was created in the image of God. This is not an authentic book of Holy Scripture but it is not improper to avail ourselves of its testimony as of an ancient teacher (*Docteur ancien*)—although the single reason ought to be enough for us that the image of God, as it has been placed in man, can reside only in an immortal soul, if we understand its contents as Paul expounds it, that is to say, that we are like God in righteousness and true holiness."

¹⁷⁴ *Sermons on Daniel*, *Opp.* xlv. 459.

¹⁷⁵ *I.* xv. 2: ubi soluta est a carnis ergastulo anima; nisi animae corporum ergastulis solutae manerent superstites. In his early tract (1534) against soul-sleeping, he rings the changes on this idea: ex hoc corporis ergastulo; corpus animae est carcer; terrena habitatio eomedes sunt; post dissolutam compagem corporis; exuta his vinculis, &c. (*Opp.* V. pp. 195, 196.)

though this is doubtless merely a classical manner of speech, adhered to without intentional implication of its corollaries,¹⁷⁶ whenever at least his mind is not consciously on "the body of this death", that is, specifically the sinful body. In contrast with the soul, he never tires indeed of pouring contempt upon the body as a mere lump of clay, which is sustained and moved and impelled solely by the soul which dwells in it.¹⁷⁷ Dust in its origin, it shall in accordance with its nature, in obedience to the curse of God, return to dust,¹⁷⁸ although of course afterwards it shall be raised again in virtue of Christ's redemption; but here we are speaking again of the body, not as it is in itself, but as it is under sin, subject on the one hand to the death from which it was wholly free in the state of integrity¹⁷⁹ and to the redemption by which it is recovered from the death incurred by sin. Though then our bodies are in themselves, under sin, "mere carcases yet as members of Christ they cannot" sink into

¹⁷⁶ This is clearly the case in his early tract, *Psychopannychia*, 1534, *Opp.* V. 195-196, where the body is "a lump of clay," "a weight of earth, which presses us down and so separates us as by a wall from God": and it is only when the load of the body is put off that "the soul set free from impurities is truly spiritual (vere spiritualis) so as to consent to the will of God and no longer to yield to the tyranny of the flesh rebelling against Him."

¹⁷⁷ *Opp.* v. 195: tanta est vis animae, in massa terrae sustinenda, movenda, impellenda; the soul is on the contrary by nature agile (natura agilis).

¹⁷⁸ *Opp.* v. 204: Is vero pulvis est, qui formatus est de limo terrae: ille in pulverem revertitur, non spiritus, quem aliunde e terra acceptum Deus homini dedit.

¹⁷⁹ *Commentary on Gen.* ii. 17: "He was wholly free from death; His earthly life no doubt would have been only for a time; yet he would have passed into heaven without death." On *Gen.* iii. 19: "When he had been raised to so great a dignity that the glory of the divine image shone in him, the earthly origin of the body was almost obliterated. Now however, despoiled of his divine and heavenly excellence, what remains but that by his very departure out of life, he should recognize himself to be earth? Hence it is that we dread death, because dissolution, which is contrary to nature, cannot naturally be desired. The first man, to be sure, would have passed to a better life had he remained upright; but there would have been no separation of the soul from the body, no corruption, no kind of destruction, in short, no violent change."

putrefaction without hope of resurrection."¹⁸⁰ They may be "wretched corpses", but they do not cease to be "temples of the Holy Ghost", and God "wishes to be adored in them". "We are the altars at which He is worshipped, in our bodies and in our souls."¹⁸¹ Hence, as well as for other reasons, Calvin has much to say of the duty of a proper care of the body—of its health and even of its cleanliness. If God deigns to dwell in us we should endeavor to walk in purity of body as well as of soul, to keep our bodies in decency, not to afflict them with austerities, or to neglect them in disease, but so to regulate our lives that we shall be able to serve God, and be in suitable condition to do good.¹⁸²

Even the body, it must be borne in mind was not according to Calvin created to be the prey of death. In his commentary on Gen. ii. 16 he tells us that had man not sinned,

¹⁸⁰ *Insi.* III. xxv. 7.

¹⁸¹ Sermons on Deuteronomy, *Opp.* xxvii. 19, 20.

¹⁸² Sermons on Deut. *Opp.* xxviii. p. 101, Sermons on 1 Tim. *Opp.* viii. 533-536. Cf. in general on Calvin's doctrine of the body, E. Doumergue, *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Jan., 1909 (VII. 1) pp. 93-96, where he brings out the salient points in opposition to the representations of Martin Schulze's *Meditatio Futurae Vitae, ihr Begriff und ihre herrschende Stellung im System Calvins*, 1901, p. 7 sq. In his address on *Calvin le prédicateur de Genève* delivered at the celebration at Geneva of the 400 anniversary of Calvin's birth (July 2, 1909) Doumergue briefly sums up his contentions here: "Oh! no doubt the body is a *tent*, a *prison* and worse still in the vehement language of our preacher. But at the same time, 'there is no part of the body in which some sparkle of the divine image is not to be found shining.' It is the 'temple of the Holy Spirit,' 'the altar' on which God would be adored. . . . And it is in a sort of canticle that Calvin celebrates its resurrection. What madness it would be to reduce this body to dust without hope. No, the body of St. Paul, which has borne the marks of Jesus Christ, which has magnificently glorified Him, will not be deprived of the reward of the 'crown.'—Accordingly what care we should take of this body! Care for the health is a religious duty: 'God does not wish that men should kill themselves,' and to abstain from the remedies which are offered is a 'diabolical pride.'—Health and cleanliness: here is the whole of modern hygiene, which is to be nowhere more scrupulous or splendid than with the peoples which have been most strictly taught in the school of the preacher of Geneva,—the Scotch and Dutch" (p. 21).

his earthly life indeed would have ceased but only to give way to a heavenly life for the whole man.¹⁸³ That man dies is due therefore entirely to sin. Without sin the body itself would have been immortal. Its *exinanitio* is as much due to sin as the *maledictio* which falls on the soul.¹⁸⁴ By Adam's sin death entered into the world¹⁸⁵ and thus alienation from God for the soul, and return to dust for the body. And therefore by the redemption in Christ there is purchased for the soul restoration to communion with God and for the body return from the dust, in order that the whole man, soul and body, may live forever in the enjoyment of the Divine favor. The body is not in and of itself therefore, although the lower part of man and uniting him with the lower creation, an unworthy element of human nature. All that is unworthy in it comes from sin.¹⁸⁶

The "nobler part"¹⁸⁷ of man, the "soul", or as it is alternatively called, the "spirit",¹⁸⁸ differs from the body not merely in nature but in origin. In its nature, Calvin conceives it as distinctively percipient substance: whose "very nature, without which it cannot by any means exist, is movement, feeling, activity, understanding".¹⁸⁹ From the metaphysical point of view Calvin defines it as "an immortal,

¹⁸³ "terrena quidem vita illi fuisset temporalis" but in coelum tamen sine interitu et illaesus migrasset.

¹⁸⁴ Nunc mors ideo horrore nobis est: primum quia quaedam est exinanitio, quod corpus: deinde quia Dei maledictionem sensit anima.

¹⁸⁵ On Rom. v. 12.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Talma, as cited pp. 37-40.

¹⁸⁷ I. xv. 2: nobilior pars: praecipua pars.

¹⁸⁸ Anima . . . interdum spiritus vocatur (I. xv. 2 *ad init.*). He repeatedly investigates in his occasional works the Biblical usage of the terms "soul" and "spirit." E.g. in his early work, *Psychopannychia*, *ad init.* (*Opp.* v. 178 sq.), and towards the end of the tract against the Anabaptists (*Opp.* vii. 111). Cf. Talma, as cited, p. 34.

¹⁸⁹ *Psychopannychia*, *Opp.* v. 184: "If any confess that the soul lives, and deprive it at the same time of all sensation (*sensu*), they just imagine a soul with nothing of soul about it; or they tear away the soul from itself; quum ejus natura, sine qua consistere ullo modo nequit, sit moveri, sentire, vigere, intelligere; and (as Tertullian says) animae anima, sensus sit.

yet created essence",¹⁹⁰ and he is at considerable pains to justify each element of this definition.

In opposition to the notion that the soul is but a breath (*flatus*) or power (*vis*) divinely infused into bodies, but itself lacking essence (*quae tamen essentia careat*),¹⁹¹ he affirms that it is a substantial entity distinct from the body, incorporeal in its own nature (*substantia incorporea*),¹⁹² and therefore incapable of occupying space, and yet inhabiting the body as its domicile "not only that it may quicken all its parts,¹⁹³ and render its organs fit (*apta*) and useful for their activities, but also that it may hold the primacy (*primatum*) in the government of the life of man", whether in concerns of this life or in those of the life to come.¹⁹⁴ The substantiality of the soul as an essence distinct from the body he considers to be clear on its own account, and on the testimony of Scripture as well.¹⁹⁵ The powers with which the soul is endowed, he urges, transcend the capacities of physical substance, and themselves afford therefore ample proof that there is "hidden in man something which is distinct from the body".¹⁹⁶ Here is conscience, for example, which, discriminating between good and evil, responds to the judgment of God. "How shall an affection without essence¹⁹⁷ penetrate to the tribunal of God and strike terror into itself from its guilt"; or fear of a purely spiritual punishment afflict the body? Here is the knowledge of God itself. How should an evanescent activity (*evanidus vigor*) rise to the fountain of life? Here is the

¹⁹⁰ I. xv. 2 *init.*: animae nomine essentiam immortalem, creatam tamen intelligo, quae nobilior ejus pars est.

¹⁹¹ I. xv. 2.

¹⁹² I. xv. 6.

¹⁹³ Cf. *Psychopannychia*, *Opp.* v. 180: essentiam immortalem, quae in homine vitae causa est.

¹⁹⁴ I. xv. 6.

¹⁹⁵ I. xv. 2: et res ipsa et tota scriptura ostendit.

¹⁹⁶ I. xv. 2: clare demonstrat latere in homine aliquid a corpore separatum.

¹⁹⁷ I. xv. 2: motus sine essentia—the expression is just in view of modern phenomenalist psychology.

marvellous agility of the human mind, traversing heaven and earth, and all the secret places of nature; here are the intellect and memory gathering into themselves all the ages, arranging everything in proper order and even forecasting the future from the past; here is the intellect, conceiving the invisible God and the angels, which have nothing in common with the body, apprehending what is right, and just, and honest, things to which no bodily sense is related: must there not be something essentially distinct from the body which is the seat of such intelligence?¹⁹⁸ It is upon the Scriptural argument for the distinctness of the soul, however, that Calvin especially dwells; and he has, of course, no difficulty in making it perfectly plain that from beginning to end the Scriptures go on the assumption of the distinctness and even the separability of the soul from the body.¹⁹⁹

This whole argument was inserted into the *Institutes* for the first time in the preparation of the last edition (1559). But it is old ground for Calvin. It was already traversed by him with great fullness in his youthful tract against the advocates of Soul-Sleep (1534), the main contention of which is that the soul "is a substance and lives after the death of the body, endowed with sense and intelligence".²⁰⁰ Ten years later (1544) it was gone over again somewhat more concisely in his "Brief Instructions to arm all good Christians against the errors of the common sect of the Anabaptists", among whose errors was the contention that "souls, departed from the body, do not live until the resurrection", whether because the soul was conceived, not as "a substance or as a creation having essence, but only as the power which man has to breathe, move and perform the other acts of life, while he is living", or because, while it was conceived as "an essential creature", it was thought to sleep "without feeling or knowledge" until the judgment day. As over against the former and extremer type of

¹⁹⁸ I. xv. 2.

¹⁹⁹ I. xv. 2 *ad fin.*

²⁰⁰ *Opp.* v. 177.

Anabaptism he undertakes to demonstrate that "souls have an essence of their own"²⁰¹ given to them by God".²⁰² The richness of the Scriptural material at Calvin's disposal is fairly illustrated by the fact that in these three Scriptural arguments, although some of it is employed more than once, yet much of it is in each case drawn from different passages.

It is interesting to observe that Calvin conceives himself to establish the immortality of the soul in establishing its distinct substantiality. In the argument in the *Institutes*, the two topics of the essentiality and the immortality of the soul are treated so completely as one, that the reader is apt to be a little confused by what seems their confusion.²⁰³ Calvin's idea seems to be that if it be clear that there is "something in man essentially distinct from the body", the subject of all these great powers of intellect, sensibility and will, it will go of itself that this wonderful somewhat will survive death. This point of view is perhaps already present to his mind in the *Psychopannychia*, although there he more clearly distinguishes between the proof "that the soul or spirit of man is a substance distinct from the body", and the proof that the soul remains in existence after the death of the body, representing the latter specifically as the question of the immortality of the soul²⁰⁴—although it does not seem obvious that even the question of the survival of the crisis of death is quite the same question as that of immortality. His method seems in point of fact to be the result of a more fundamental conception. This fundamental conception which underlies his whole point of view seems to be that a spiritual substance is, as un compounded, naturally immortal. On that presupposition the proof that there is a spiritual substance in man is the proof of his immortality. Of course this assumption

²⁰¹ *Opp.* vii. III-III2: que les ames ont une essence propre.

²⁰² *Opp.* vii. III2: l'ame humaine a une essence propre qui luy soit donnée de Dieu.

²⁰³ I. xv. 2.

²⁰⁴ *Opp.* v. 184.

is not to be understood to mean that Calvin imagined that any creatures of God whether men or angels are so immortal in and of themselves, that God cannot destroy them or that they exist otherwise than "in Him", and by virtue not only of His purpose in constituting them as He has constituted them, but of His constant upholding power.²⁰⁵ It means only that Calvin supposed that in constituting them spirits God has constituted them for immortality and given them

²⁰⁵ Accordingly Calvin in his *Psychopannychia* (*Opp.* v. p. 222) says plainly: "When we say that the spirit of man is immortal we do not affirm that it is able to stand against the hand of God or to subsist apart from His power." In his Commentary on 1 Tim. vi. 16 he explains the declaration that God alone has immortality to refer not to His having immortality *a seipso* but to His having it *in potestate*: accordingly, he says, immortality does not belong to creatures save as it is planted in them by the inspiration of God: *nam si vim Dei quae indita est hominis animae tollas, statim evanesceret: naturae immortalitas does not belong to souls or angels.* Similarly in his *Responsio contra Pighium de Libero Arbitrio* (*Opp.* vi. 361) he denies that the soul of man is in this sense *per se* immortal: *nam et eo modo neque animam per se immortalem esse concedimus.* The exception however proves the rule, and the use of this as an argument against Pighius *ex concessu*, suggests that there is a sense in which otherwise than *eo modo*, the soul is *per se* immortal. Pighius had asserted that "mortality and corruption are *ex conditione, non vitio naturae.*" "What is his proof?" asks Calvin, and supplies it thus: "Since the body is thus from its principia out of which it is compounded and from the nature of composition." "But by that argument," rejoins Calvin, "it might be proved that the body would be obnoxious to death even after the resurrection; and that the soul is now mortal. For from what principium has the soul sprung except nothing?" "No doubt," he adds, "if we should say that that perfection which God conferred on man from the beginning did not so belong to nature that he had it *per se* and *ex se*, I would freely accept this opinion. For not even do we concede that the soul is after that fashion *per se* immortal. And this is what Paul teaches when he attributes immortality to God alone (1 Tim. vi. 16). Nevertheless we do not on that account confess the soul to be mortal: for we do not estimate its nature from the first power (virtute) of the essence, but from the perpetual condition which God has imparted to His creatures." Cf. the tract against the *Libertines* (vii. p. 180): "St. Paul, they say, calls God alone immortal (1 Tim. vi. 16). I fully agree with St. Paul. But he means that God alone has this privilege of Himself and of His own nature, so that He is the source of immortality. But what He has of Himself He communicated to our souls by His grace, when He formed them in His image."

natures adapted for and implicating their endless existence. The proof that there is an uncompounded spirit in man, therefore, is in his view already a proof of immortality.

It must not be inferred, however, that Calvin always relies solely on this indirect proof of the immortality of the soul. More direct proofs are found elsewhere in the *Institutes*,—as for example, in the chapter on the witness of the works and deeds of God to Him (I. v. 10), where a digression is made to point out that the apparent inequality of the moral government of the world suggests the hypothesis of a further life for its rectification. But the simplicity with which he as a Biblical theologian relies on the Scriptures precluded the development by Calvin of an extended or a complete argument for immortality on general considerations. On his view of the disabilities of the human mind induced by sin, he would not look for such an argument among the heathen. The heathen philosophers, he tells us accordingly, having no knowledge of the Scriptures, scarcely attained to a knowledge of immortality. Almost no one of them, except Plato, roundly asserts the soul to be an immortal essence. Certain other Socratics reach out towards such a conception indeed; but they are all in more or less doubt and cannot teach clearly what they only half-believe. Nevertheless Calvin is persuaded that there is ineradicably imprinted on the heart of man a desire for the celestial life, and also some knowledge of it.²⁰⁶ No man can escape then from some intimations of immortality. And after the heart has been quickened by grace and the intellect illuminated by the workings of the Spirit, proofs of it will abundantly suggest themselves.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ I. xv. 6.

²⁰⁷ Cf. the remarks of Talma, as cited, p. 35: "But still all men, according to Calvin too, have a certain sense of their immortality. By their alienation from the Father of lights, the light in men is not so wholly extinguished that they are incapable of this sense. . . ." Talma sums up: "It is very certain that Calvin has not fully and finally proved the existence and immortality of the human soul. But this is not his purpose. His object was not so much to refute the error of those who denied these two things, as to strengthen his believing

Now, this immortal substance, alternately called soul and spirit, which constitutes the animating or governing principle in the human constitution, Calvin is insistent, is an immediate creation of God. He insists upon this, not merely in opposition to the notion that it is no thing at all, but a mere "breath" or power", but with equal strenuousness in opposition to that "diabolical error" which considers the soul a derivative (*traducem*) of the substance of God—seeing that this would make "the divine nature not only subject to change and passions, but to ignorance also, to depraved desires, to weakness and every kind of vices"²⁰⁸ . . . "rending the essence of the Creator that every one may possess a part of it". No, says he, "it is to be held as certain that souls are created" and "creation is not transfusion of essence, but the origination of it from nothing".²⁰⁹ This "origination of the soul out of nothing", which alone can be called "creation" he insists on, again, not merely with reference to the origin of the first soul,²¹⁰ but also with reference to every soul which has come into existence since. It is horrible, says he, that it should be thrown into doubt by men who call themselves Christians, whether the souls of men are a true created substance.²¹¹ Calvin's doctrine of the creation of the soul is thrown up into contrast, therefore, on the one side with his view that all else which was brought into being during the creative week, after the primal creation of the indigested mass of the world-stuff on the first day, was proximately the product of second causes; and on the other side, with his belief in the production of the body by

readers in their faith. And for this end the popular presentation of the grounds on which the two things rest was sufficient." On the difference between the human soul and the souls of animals according to Calvin, see Talma, p. 36.

²⁰⁸ I. xv. 5.

²⁰⁹ *Do.*

²¹⁰ *Cf. e.g. Comment. on Mat. xii. 6 (Opp. 44. p. 401): "Moses understands that man's soul was created from nothing. We are born by generation, and yet our origin is clay, and the chief thing in us, the soul, is created from nothing."*

²¹¹ *Opp. vii. 180.*

ordinary generation in the case of all the descendants of Adam. The soul of the first man stands out as an exception in the midst of mediately produced effects, as the one product of God's direct creative power in the process of the perfecting of the creative scheme. And the souls of the descendants of this first man stand out in contrast with their bodily forms, as in every case also products of God's direct creative activity. In creating souls (*in creandis animabus*), he says, "God does not use the instrumentality of man (*non adhibet hominum operam*)."²¹² "There is no need," he says again, "to resort to that old figment of some (*figmentum*), that souls come into being (*orientur*) *ex traduce*."²¹³ "We have not come of the race of Adam," he says yet again, "except as regards the body."²¹⁴ And not only does he thus over and over again through his writings sharply assert creationism as over against traducianism, but he devotes a whole section of the *Institutes* to the question and formally rejects the whole traducian conception.²¹⁵

In its nature, as we have seen, this "immortal and yet created essence" which vitalizes and governs the human frame, is defined by Calvin as percipient substance, whose very nature it is to move, feel, act, understand; which is, in a word, characteristically sensibility.²¹⁶ When we attend to Calvin's conception of the soul from this point of view we are in effect observing his psychology: and, of course, he develops his psychology with his eye primarily upon the nature of man in his state of integrity—or rather, let us

²¹² On Heb. xii. 9.

²¹³ On James iii. 6.

²¹⁴ Sermon on Job. xiv. 4.

²¹⁵ II. i. 7. Two subordinate points in Calvin's doctrine of creation may be worth noting here. He remarks in passing while commenting on Numbers xvi. 22 (*Opp.* 25. p. 222) that it may be collected from that passage that each man has his separate soul: and that by this "is refuted the prodigious delusion of the Manichaeans that all souls are so infused *ex traduce* by the Spirit of God that there should still be one spirit." He returns often to this. Commenting on Job iii. 16 (*Opp.* 33, p. 162) he teaches that God breathes the soul into the creature at the moment when it is conceived in its mother's womb.

²¹⁶ *Opp.* v. 184: *sensus*.

say, in his uncorrupted condition.²¹⁷ "When definitions are to be given", he remarks in another place,²¹⁸ "the nature of the soul is accustomed to be considered in its integrity." He develops it also, however, under the influence of a strong desire to be clear and simple. Subtleties in such matters he gladly leaves to the philosophers, whose speculations he has no desire to gainsay as to either their truth or their usefulness; for his purposes, however, which look to building up piety, a simple definition will suffice.²¹⁹ It is naturally upon the questions which cluster around the Will that Calvin's chief psychological interest focuses. We must, however, leave the whole matter of Calvin's psychology and his doctrine of the Will to another occasion. We must postpone also an exposition of his doctrine of the image of God. A survey of these two topics remains in order to complete our exposition of his doctrine of the creature.

Princeton.

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²¹⁷ I. xv. I.

²¹⁸ *Responsio contra Pighium de Libero Arbitrio* (Opp. vi. p. 285): "It is sufficiently clear that [in Basil's remarks here under consideration] the nature of the soul is considered in its integrity; as it is accustomed to be in giving definitions."

²¹⁹ Talma, as cited, p. 43, remarks: "The whole manner in which Calvin deals here (*Int.* I. xv. 6) with the faculties of the soul is remarkable. The style loses the liveliness, the progress of thought its regularity; and the whole makes the impression that Calvin did not feel fully at home in this field. . . ." Talma notes that the discussion of the faculties of the soul is not found in the *Institutes* of 1536, but is already very full in the edition of 1539. (Cf. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, iv. p. 109, for Calvin's psychology).

THE LIFE AND WORK OF JOHN HUS*

July the sixth, five hundred years ago, beyond the city walls of Constance, Switzerland, with hardly a voice raised to comfort, encourage, or to praise him, John of Husinecz, a man of God, died at the stake for his faith. With the sound of his singing still lingering in the air and with his lips murmuring prayers to his blessed Master, his soul passed on to God who gave it. His ashes, soon after dissipated upon the waters, drifted on to the sea. But his message remained warm in the hearts of his fellow-men, now truly understood by a few, now perverted by the many, now prominent in the bitter civil wars, now re-expressed as a part of the Protestant Reformation and now at last finding a noble end in the inauguration of the grand and glorious endeavor to carry the gospel to every land, that all might know of the love of God manifested in Christ Jesus.

A hero was John Hus and a great one, a patriot and the truest, and in all things a great noble God-fearing soul, and he died at the stake for his faith. He was brought to death by a church grown worldly, grown rich, grown faithless to God's will, finding its head in the most pretentious council in the history of Christianity, yet narrow, bigoted and mean, sending a son of its own, unheard, to the burning stake. He was brought to death by a state finding its head in a man false to his word, false to his friends, false to his own kinsman, unworthy of the name of king. He was brought to death by the church and the state, but he was beloved and honored by the best of his own people, the rich and the poor, the great and the small, the noble and the peasant, with a fervent love that continues down to our own day. Well may we remember his death, for by his sacrifice he achieved a great victory. Well may we recount the story of his life, for it is one that thrills, inspires, ennobles, and im-

* An address delivered in Miller Chapel, April 1, 1915, in honor of the five hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of John Hus.

pels to deeds of valor for God, for truth, and for the land we love so well.

John Hus came from obscurity and died the most talked of man of his day. One of many children of a humble but thrifty peasant pair, he was born some time between the years 1369 and 1375 in the little village of Husinecz near the Bavarian frontier, where the Teuton met the Slav, where the border spirit ran high and the race rivalry was bitter. The son John was a lad o' pairts with loving sacrificing parents and a vision lighting his heart. His early education was obtained in the larger town of Prachtice a short distance removed from Husinecz. These vague bits of information and the statement that he was the favorite son of his mother constitute the sum of our knowledge of this period of his existence.

In 1389 he left his home and journeyed forth to the city of Prague, his heart strong, his purse empty, but a great ambition moving him forward to better his condition and to serve God in the labor of the ministry. Here in the University he lived and labored many years. Here he found the truth and became its loyal servant. Here he led his people in their religious and political struggles and aspirations. Here his troubles originated. Here his great friends were made. Here his enemies were busy, spying out and seeking to accomplish his downfall.

The University of Prague was founded in 1348 by Charles IV for his people, the Bohemians, but it very soon came under the control of the ever-present Germans. They had the majority in the voting. They controlled the church of Bohemia and secured for themselves the rich benefices. They domineered over the Bohemians to the point of desperation. What the Czech advocated, the German despised, and what the German proclaimed as true the Bohemian was ready to declare false. In the scholastic controversies the Bohemians were Realists, the Germans were Nominalists. In the questions of empire, the Germans recognized the claims of Rupert, the Czechs rallied about Wenzel. In

the troublous conditions arising out of the papal Schism the Germans supported Gregory XII, the Bohemians forsook him and gave their approval to the Pisan cardinals and later Alexander V. This was the condition of things when Hus arrived at Prague, a poor student, unknown, with his heart afire with patriotism; and it was in this very struggle of nations that he was to play the leading rôle.

We have some information concerning his student days. We know that he did his work well and was interested therein, though not especially proficient. He was well liked by his companions, cheerful in labor, interested in the recreations of the time, particularly in the playing of chess—in which he showed great skill; and in spite of poverty and oftentimes dire want the days seem to have passed in a rather happy and healthful way. The latter part of his student life was rendered free from great care by his admission to the newly founded college of Wenzel, where his expenses were greatly reduced.

The third period in the life of Hus, extending from 1393 to 1408, may be characterized as one of academic activity, patriotic leadership and popular preaching. In 1393 he received the bachelor's degree, in 1396 the master's, in 1398 he began to lecture in the University, in 1400 he was ordained priest, and in 1402 he was elected rector, which position he held according to the custom, for about half a year.

In the year 1402 he was also appointed preacher at the recently founded Bethlehem Chapel, an establishment which had come into existence as a result of the reformatory preaching of Milicz and through the munificence of two rich burghers. Here preaching was the chief concern and the gospel—a fact which is noteworthy and important—was proclaimed in the Bohemian tongue. Here Hus had a popular outlet for his great spirit. Here he influenced many from all classes who came to hear him and who remained his ardent supporters and the leaders in the Hussite movement. Among those who were affected by his message de-

livered in the Bethlehem Chapel was the wife of Wenzel, Queen Sophia, who remained loyal to Hus to the end, thereby on several occasions endangering her own reputation for orthodoxy.

It was during these years that Hus became intimately acquainted with the writings of Wyclif, which were to play such an important part in the reform movement in Bohemia. The works of John Wyclif had been introduced into Bohemia by students who had gone to England in the reign of Richard II. The occasion of their departure for England was the marriage of their country-woman, Anna, sister of Wenzel and Sigismund, to Richard, and the reason for it was the great fame of the University of Oxford. During the years of their sojourn Wyclifism was at its high water mark in the University circles. They became imbued with his doctrines and returned home with many of his important works. Wyclif was first known in Bohemia as a philosopher and schoolman and in the scholastic controversies as a Realist, but as matters of speculation were to him secondary to the preaching of God's word and the reform of the church, so were they soon relegated to the background by his followers in Bohemia, and he became through his writing their leader in solving the more vital questions of holy scripture and holy church. Wyclifism became especially popular in Prague where his works were studied, expounded and popularized primarily by John Hus, by other masters of the University many of whom afterwards fell away, and by the occasionally present but ever erratic Jerome of Prague.

We have during these comparatively untroubled years the Hussite movement taking definite form and the opposition developing which was to wreck the career of its leader. It is during these years that the storm clouds were packed and the winds piled up which were to be loosened in full fury in the years which were to follow. Here we can trace ever so clearly the lines of force which were uniting to break his influence and destroy his life.

In the first place Hus was the leader of the Bohemians in the University struggles and won for himself in his identification with their cause the personal hatred of the Germans, and the Germans held the ruling power in the Bohemian church. Secondly, his popularity in the Bethlehem Chapel was a source of great envy for the less successful parish priests who became at first secretly and then openly his enemies, spying out and spreading abroad their evil gossip, charging things which were often slanderous, many times perverted and generally groundless. These very charges were themselves a third source of opposition in that they spread to Rome itself the endeavor to crush out his influence. He was charged with false teachings concerning the church, the sacraments, and the Trinity, and with the full advocacy of the already condemned Wyclifism. But especially did he draw upon himself the bitter hatred of the clergy in his clear-cut condemnation of their life, in his bitter denunciation of the shocking clerical immorality, of the practices of simony, and of the worldliness and greed of prelates and especially of the See of Rome. His words rang out with the fierce challenge of a John the Baptist, and as of old they who felt themselves accused resolved to silence the accuser.

The year 1408 marks the turning point in the life of Hus. Now he begins to reap what he has sown. Now he stands forth as the avowed enemy of clerical immorality and the champion of his people in their religious and political struggles with the worldly forces in the church openly arrayed against him. Now we find the parish priests, the powerful archbishop and the pope of Rome all united in the endeavor to stem the tide which had swept over the country as a result of the preaching of one poor priest. Now he rises to the position of the greatest popular leader Bohemia has ever known, with all classes of the people ready to support him, ready to defend him with their lives. Now popular enthusiasm rises to the very heights and clerical antagonism and bitter hatred begin to lay the mines for his destruction.

It was towards the end of the year 1408 that the volcanic conditions in the University came to the eruptive point and that Wenzel, with considerable difficulty, was persuaded by his courtiers, his queen, and the French envoys present and interested in the papal question involved, to side definitely with the nationalists. January 18, 1409 he was induced to sign the decree of Kutna Hora by which the king declared that the Bohemians, who in all University assemblies, judgments, and so forth, had heretofore had but one vote out of four should henceforth have three. This decree changed radically the constitution of the University and was a great victory for the Bohemians. It was followed almost immediately by the famous withdrawal of the Germans and the founding of the new University of Leipzig.

The departure of the Germans was almost a death knell to the University of Prague. The institution now became one of secondary importance, and the struggles which had been carried on in a circumscribed way in Bohemia were now aired abroad throughout northern Europe. These conditions resulting from the victory of the Bohemians were unfortunate and unhappy, but a true patriot would willingly and bravely accept them. Rather see the University become merely the instructor of a few Bohemians, rather destroy it entirely, than have it continue under the control of domineering foreigners.

The University now became the rallying point of the Bohemians in the religious and political struggles, and Hus as the newly appointed rector came more and more to the fore.

The archbishop of Prague, during these years, was Zbinek Zajic of Hasenburg, a man of good intentions and truly zealous for the reform of the church, but more of a soldier than a priest, better qualified for service in the camp than in the church. He, at first, treated Hus with high regard and endeavored to support him in his plans for the cleansing of the church. He made him synodical preacher and appointed him upon a rather important commission to Brandenburg. The two were gradually estranged, first through the

position which Hus assumed on the papal question when he refused to recognize Gregory XII, and then because of his fuller acceptance of the doctrines of Wyclif. Finally Zbinek, reading the signs of the times, transferred his allegiance to the pope of the Pisan cardinals and became himself the leader of the opposing forces and the chief representative of the papacy in the endeavor to crush out the Hussite movement.

Alexander V, elected pope June 26, 1409, had been made aware, by letter, by visitation, by voluntary spying and rich presents, of conditions in Bohemia, and as a result on December 20, 1409, he issued a bull against John Hus and his followers. The bull was delayed in passage and was not read in Prague until March 9 of the following year. By its terms a council of four magistrates of theology and two doctors of canon law was to be appointed to examine into the situation. After hearing opinions they were to forbid all heretical preaching and preaching of any kind except in the cathedral, the college and parish churches, and monastic houses. Furthermore the writings of Wyclif were to be delivered up and burned. In the endeavor to execute the bull feeling ran high on both sides and many excesses were indulged in. Hus continued to preach and proclaim the Word of God, to condemn clerical immorality, and to call the people to righteous living, and all with the ardent support of the nationalists, with the protection of the King, and despite the definite prohibition contained in the papal bull.

The next step taken by the church was his excommunication, and in a day when the fulminating power of the papacy had lost its force because of its lavish use very little was accomplished. Then came canonical citation and summons to Rome by John XXIII and finally the city was placed under an interdict and all with little avail, although at this time Stephen Palecz and a few others fell away who were to be numbered by Hus among his bitterest enemies.

Towards the end of the year 1411 Hus came out with all

the force of his powerful invective against the traffic in indulgences carried on to finance the so-called Holy War which John XXIII was undertaking against Ladislas, King of Naples. Conditions in Bohemia were at the breaking point, and for the good of all concerned Hus was persuaded by King Wenzel to go into retirement for a time.

The period of his voluntary exile extended from the latter part of the year 1412 to October 1414. Where the years were passed we know not. Much of the time was probably spent in Southern Bohemia with occasional visits, undoubtedly, to Prague. It was a time of very useful itinerant preaching. It was a period full of literary activity. It witnessed the production of some of his original work. Though absent from the chief center of the reform movement he was continually in touch with it, directing, encouraging and serving his people.

At this time Sigismund, King of Hungary and of the Romans, brother of Wenzel and heir to the Bohemian crown, instrumental in calling the Council of Constance and its dominant spirit, saw in the Hussite movement a force which was giving Bohemia a bad reputation in the world and which was working against his own personal desires and ambitions. He saw in Hus not only the leader but the power without which the stress of conditions would soon pass away. He felt that the removal of Hus from Bohemia would be the ending of the Hussite movement. If, however, he were to attempt to remove him arrogantly, he would bring upon himself the enmity of many of the influential noblemen who were his warm supporters. The Council of Constance seemed to offer the occasion desired. It was called to reform the church. The Hussite movement certainly needed investigation. Hus was its leader and in his anxiety to plead his cause and prove his innocence would undoubtedly come when summoned. So Sigismund correctly reasoned.

With apparent candor but premeditated deceit he sent a summons to Hus to come to Constance, promising, regard-

less of consequence, a safe conduct to and from the Council. Hus as expected felt that this was an opportunity to vindicate before the church his position and to prove in general council that he believed and taught nothing contrary to the accepted faith of the church. In spite of the warning of many who prophesied that he would never return to his native land Hus set out, October 11, 1414, for the Council, before the arrival of the safe conduct. He was accompanied by his proved friends, John of Chlum, Wenzel of Duba, and Henry of Leitembock. The journey made through Bavaria was in the main uneventful, and they arrived at Constance, November 3 of the same year. Hus took up his lodging in a little tavern near the Schnitz Gate kept by a widow named Fida. His enemies were at work even before his arrival, but he was allowed considerable liberty until they accomplished his imprisonment.

The Council of Constance, to which he had come, was the biggest and most brilliant assemblage the Church has ever known. Thousands upon thousands were there, good and bad, noble and prelate, courtier and courtesan, priest and pauper, drawn together from the length and breadth of Christendom. They were gathered to Constance for the purpose of reforming the church under the leadership of the self-seeking Sigismund and the sin-ridden John XXIII. They talked much, debated many questions and condemned to death John Hus, the most godly man present.

A short time after his arrival, on complaint of Stephen Palecz, a former friend, John of Leitomysl, Michael the Pleader, and others, on various pretexts, that he held mass in his apartment and that he had attempted to escape in a hay wagon, Hus was brought, without forewarning and to his great surprise and sorrow, before a commission of the cardinals. He declared that he had come to Constance to make his defense in open meeting after the arrival of Sigismund, under whose safe conduct he was present. His accusers took little heed of this, his former friends gloated over his predicament, and he was soon lodged in confinement in

a Dominican monastery, situated on an island hard by the mainland. There in a damp and dismal cell near the latrines they placed him. He was deprived of books, of papers, of the Word of God. Communication with his friends was only accomplished by stealth and through a well-disposed jailor, and in increasing weakness and pain he was left in loneliness to suffer.

When John XXIII, seeing the Council slipping from his grasp, fled to Schaffhausen, the keys of the prison were delivered over to Sigismund, and he could have liberated him had he so desired. However, he was removed to the castle Gottlieben of the Bishop of Constance, located some distance from the city. There he was confined in an "airy prison" high in the tower. He was removed from all contact with the world, was chained day and night, and although every effort was made to break his strength, his spirit remained undaunted.

A commission with D'Ailly at its head, appointed to examine the charges made against him, visited Hus at the castle Gottlieben but accomplished little; and with the development of other matters of interest to the Council little was done until the many and powerful friends of Hus in Bohemia and the few in Constance by their very importunity and their imposing seals gained for him what the Inquisition very rarely granted—a public hearing.

On June 5 he was again transferred, this time to the Franciscan monastery within the city, for the convenience of his examiners. The hearing extended over three days. On the first day charges were presented before Hus was admitted, and when he was brought before the assembled commissioners he was not allowed to say a word in defense or explanation. The second day, with Sigismund present, the discussion was concerned chiefly with the scholastic controversy of Nominalism and Realism in which D'Ailly endeavored to prove that Hus, as a Realist, must hold to the remanence theory of the eucharist and therefore must be an advocate of the Wyclifite or some other heretical interpreta-

tion of the sacrament. Here Hus showed great skill in meeting his antagonists on their ground although they knew that his interest and heart were far removed from these unfruitful questions. The third day many articles from his books were read, some in the spirit of their context and some perverted. The discussion was mainly concerned with the question of dominion, civil and ecclesiastical, and was for the most part vain. It was clear to all what the end would be. Hus must abjure and recant. "I am prepared to obey the Council and be taught," he said, "but I beseech of you in the name of God, do not lay snares of damnation for me by compelling me to tell a lie and to abjure articles which I never held."

Hus had come to the trial with a promise of safe conduct. Shortly after his arrival he was thrown into prison. He had come to defend himself in public hearing against the charges of heresy. He was not allowed to say a word in self-defense. After a period of sickness, of suffering, of great trial, in which his spirit remained undaunted and his faith was refined as through a fire, he was declared a heretic.

After the public examination in the Franciscan monastery there was a month of weary waiting and then a travesty of a proceeding for his public condemnation held in the cathedral on July 6, preparatory to the execution. All the notables of church and state were there. While mass was read poor Hus was kept without the doors unworthy to meet with the children of God at the table of His Son. At last he was taken into the cathedral and the trial began. A sermon was delivered against heresy by Archbishop Lodi which was followed by the presentation of articles against Hus. It was declared that he had taught that the church was the totality of the predestinated, that civil authority depends on character, and that priests and prelates living in mortal sin are unworthy and incapable of administering the sacraments of God. For holding such dreadful views, which he was given no opportunity of explaining or even of denying he had held, he was condemned a heretic. At

the conclusion of a trial which was from beginning to end spectacular and cowardly, he was deconsecrated, disrobed of his priestly garments, his tonsure destroyed, his body given over to the secular authorities and his soul to the devil.

"We commit thy soul unto the devil," they thundered.

"And I," he cried, "commit it unto the most gracious Lord Jesus Christ."

Then they led him forth, the great mob following out of the cathedral, past the pile of burning books, down by the house of the good Frau Fida, out the Schnitz Gate and on to the so-called Place of the Devil.

A stake had been made fast in the ground and faggots were lying about. Hus knelt, recited several Psalms, prayed to God and arose strengthened. He was then stripped and bound to the pole.

"Turn him to the west," came up from the mob. "He is a heretic. He shall not face the east."

The change was made. The fire lighted, and as the flames arose the heart of Hus lifted itself up in praise to God in song. When the flames blew across his face and he could sing no more, his lips were noticed moving in silent prayer and his countenance bore the rare light of joy which comes alone to those who approach the hour of death in the calm assurance of the everlasting love of God.

The end came and with it the further cruelty and barbarity of his enemies. Finally for fear his followers might endeavor to preserve relics of him and thus keep warm his memory, his ashes were gathered together and thrown into the waters.

Thus he perished, a man whose only proved offense even in the eyes of those who condemned him, was that he placed the Bible before the Church, the Lord before the Pope, and the individual conscience before the will of the hierarchy. Thus he perished, John Hus, a man who deserves to live on in the hearts of those who love the Lord, as a dauntless hero, a champion of the Holy word, a martyr to the truth. Thus he perished, a man who was a great patriot

and leader of his people, a heaven-inspired preacher of righteousness and as such one truly zealous for the reform of the church.

He was a man well qualified for patriotic leadership. His was the sort of personality around which men love to group themselves. He was a man pleasing and magnetic with a fervent love of country. He was a man of unquestioned courage and uprightness of character, ready to sacrifice himself in the cause of country, in the service of truth, for the will of God. As a Bohemian patriot his zeal was great for the betterment of his native land in every possible way in which his personality and his talents could be used in her service. He sought to develop foreign ties which would be to her advantage. He sought to disseminate knowledge and raise her intellectual status. He sought to build her up morally and to anchor that morality in the Word of God.

While connected with the University he sought to free her from the dominance of the Germans and to make her truly a place for the education and upbuilding of his people. He was recognized as the leader in this endeavor and after the withdrawal of the Germans he was immediately elected rector on the reorganized plans laid down by Wenzel.

Recognizing that one of the prime requisites for true nationalism is a unity of language, he endeavored in every possible way to make the Bohemian tongue truly the language of the country. He endeavored to purify it from foreign accretions, to cleanse it from stilted formalism, to enrich and strengthen it by building it upon the foundation of the popular spoken tongue. He wrote in it. He composed hymns in it. He preached in it. He sought most of all to make the translation of the Scriptures in the Bohemian language as perfect as possible. To the formation and development of the Bohemian language he bears the same relation that Dante does to the Italian, that Wyclif does to the English, and that Luther does to the German.

Hus sought not only to instill and encourage a love of

country but he sought to found the patriotism of his people in worthy moral living. He sought not only to arouse a Bohemian pride but to make the Bohemians better people. This was the great passion with him. He sought to restore the simplicity, the sincerity, the spiritual fervor of the apostolic church. He sought to make the shepherds of Christ's sheep true patterns for the flock in earnestness, in righteousness, in godliness. He sought to free the Bible and give it to the people. He sought to free the conscience and make religion truly a matter of the heart. He sought, and this was his great endeavor, to build his people up as true followers of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in such a work, in a day of church decadence and degeneracy, he was most assuredly zealous for the reform of the church and the cleansing of her from the many evils within her doors, which had grown strong and now ruled every phase of her life.

As a reformer the field for Hus had been ploughed and watered. No matter how low the church in its life at any period may have fallen, there have always been voices raised in protest, messengers of God sent to lead her back. The Bohemian Church was no exception. His condemnation of clerical immorality was not the first that his generation had heard. The theories as to church and authority which he propounded were not for him discoveries. The Waldenses, Conrad Waldhauser, Milicz, Stitny, Janov and others, before his coming, had preached better living and general reform, and although they had lacked the boldness of Hus they had accomplished good work for the faith. Marsiglio of Padua many years before had taught daring things concerning the church and the state which seem to have been the source not only for the views of Hus but also for those of his English precursor. John Wyclif, himself the path-breaker for the Bohemians, went far beyond Hus in his condemnation of the evils in the Church. Wyclif was indeed a man born out of time, for he varies but little from the later reformers. Hus follows him but a short distance, yet he was moving ever nearer and his development in so far as it had proceeded bears a striking resemblance to that of Wyclif.

Wyclif of England and Hus of Bohemia are two men closely associated in the minds of the historian. Both have their beginnings clouded in obscurity. Both appear first of all as leaders in patriotic movements. Both are prominent in the development of their languages. Both had the first seat of their activity in their respective universities. Both were forceful preachers of righteousness. Both gave form to the restless craving for liberty in religious thought. Both were reformers attacking simony and clerical immorality and seeking to rebuild the church on the foundation of Holy Writ. They differ in that Wyclif, though preceding and influencing Hus, goes far beyond him in the condemnation of errors which had crept into the Roman Church in matters both of faith and of practice. With his fundamental doctrine, the Scripture the seat of authority and the Spirit the revealer of its meaning to the individual heart, Wyclif swept the decks clean for action, condemning pilgrimages, processions, auricular confession, judiciary absolution, image and saint worship, transubstantiation, celibacy, clerical immorality, monastic orders, salvation by works, and the temporal and spiritual claims of an arrogant and decadent papacy.

Hus, indeed, spoke clearly and forcibly against the immorality of the clergy and their worldliness and greed, but he claimed from the beginning to the end that he varied not from the accepted faith of the church, and that if he had taught anything that was contrary to the church and it were revealed to him, he would renounce the same. Wyclif in a day of schism, when the church was weak and he was well supported, died at a good old age a natural death. Hus in a later day, though varying little, when a Council was bold, died at the stake for his faith, died because he would not abjure that which he had not taught, because he would not mislead his followers, because he would not be false to the voice of conscience.

Hus is to be reckoned as one of the Mediaeval Reformers in that his attack was made not so much against doctrines which were false as against practices which were

contrary to the true spirit of Christianity. It is the immorality of the clergy, their lack of piety, their worldliness and greed, their concern with things temporal rather than things spiritual that he condemns in bitterest terms. These are matters which he lamented most of all, and in his endeavor to restore the purity of the early church he stands on the ground that was occupied by those who had preceded him, men such as St. Gregory VII, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and St. Francis of Assisi, whom the church had been pleased to canonize.

He is also to be reckoned with the precursors of the Protestant Reformation in that his doctrinal teaching was at times out of accord with the reformers of the mediaeval church and at one with those who prepared for and were themselves a part of the later and more successful attempt to cleanse and reform the church of God. In his doctrine concerning the church, in which he declared that she was the community of the predestinated, he was presenting a conception of the church that was certainly not acceptable to the hierarchy, and he was on the ground of Wyclif. In his declaration that the seat of authority was the Word of God, he stood on bed rock. This was the foundation stone upon which Wyclif erected his system which had its climax in the translation of the Scriptures, the condemnation of all superstition, and the sending forth of the poor priests. If Hus had been given more time, who knows to what heights he might have attained?

Hus declared that he was true to the faith of the Church and that he was not responsible for all that Wyclif had said. He was, indeed, in a certain sense orthodox to the church of his day in that he was ready to submit to her will, and he certainly did not go as far as Wyclif. He said he was ready to recant anything which was proved to him to be false. This matter of proving doctrines was but a source of further irritation for his examiners. Why should it be necessary for the Church of Rome to prove what was its faith to this the meanest of its ministers? When it declared that such and

such were its teachings he should accept them without question. When it declared that he taught certain things which were contrary to its doctrines, he should abjure and recant without discussion. These were things which Hus could not do.

He was also charged with teaching a Wyclifite interpretation of the sacraments, and gross doctrines concerning the Trinity. He declared that he was innocent of these charges, and innocent he was. What difference did it make whether he held them or not? All that was required was the abjuring and recanting. But this he would not do. He would not abjure that which was not shown to him to be false nor would he recant doctrines which he was charged with holding and which he had not taught. For this spirit which the church called obstinate, and Sigismund ridiculous, but which the true Christian can find paralleled in the life of the Master, he suffered at the stake.

Hus was not original. He was not a man of great genius. He was not a man of profound thought. He was not, as Wyclif, a Protestant born out of time. He was a path-breaker in that he gave Wyclif to his people, in that he sought to restore the fervent love of God and His Word to the Church of Bohemia, and in that he started a movement for reform which though persecuted, divided, perverted, and practically destroyed realized itself eventually in the later freedom.

The full light had not come to him. He was too far down the valley, but he was climbing ever upward and the vision was becoming more and more beautiful. They plucked him off in his young manhood. Who knows what the years might have revealed? But it was God's will. He died for the truth and the truth makes free. He moved the people to righteous living and his power in service was great. A wonderful vision was the light of his soul, and he was never disobedient unto it. Whence came his great power? Whence his wonderful vision? Were not the vision and the power from the Word of God; the source of Truth and Life, the

fountain from which he drank and gave to the thirsting sheep?

Nothing reveals the man Hus more than the letter which he wrote two days after the trial in the Franciscan monastery, when the conviction was definitely established that death awaited him at the hands of the Council and that life was a matter of days, perhaps hours. It is in his letters that we come to know Hus best and this is one of the most precious. Here we see him the great good man that he was, so gentle, so tender, so forgetful of self, so great in courage, so truly filled with the Holy Spirit, so abounding in the love of God. And here we may well leave him.

“To the Bohemian nation,

Master John Hus in good hope a servant of God, hopes that the Lord God will grant to all true Bohemians that love and will love the Lord God to live and die in his grace and reside forever in celestial joy. Amen.

Faithful in God, men and women, rich and poor! I beg and entreat you to love the Lord God, praise his word, gladly hear it and live according to it. Cling I beg you to the divine truth which I have preached to you according to God's law. I also beg that if anyone has heard either in my sermons, or privately anything contrary to God's truth, or if I have written anything such—which I trust God is not the case—he should not retain it. . . . I beg you to love, praise, and honor those priests who lead a moral life, those in particular who work for the Word of God. I beg of you to beware of crafty people, particularly of unworthy priests of whom our Saviour has said that they are clothed like sheep, but are inwardly greedy wolves.

I beg the nobles to treat the poor people kindly and rule them justly. I beg the burghers to conduct their business honestly. I beg the artisans to perform their duties conscientiously and joyfully. I beg the servants to serve their mistresses and masters faithfully. I beg the teachers to live honestly, to instruct their pupils carefully, to love God above all. . . . I beg the students and other scholars to obey and

follow their masters in everything that is good and to study for the sake of the praise of God for their own salvation and that of others.

I write this letter to you in prison and in fetters, expecting to-morrow the sentence of death, full of hope in God, resolved not to recede from his divine truth, nor to recant the errors which false witnesses have invented and attributed to me. How God has acted toward me, how he has been with me during all my troubles—that you will only know when by the grace of God we shall meet again in heaven. Of Master Jerome, my beloved comrade, I hear nothing except that he is in prison, as I am, expecting death and that because of his faith, which he bravely expounded to the Bohemians. It was these Bohemians who are our bitterest enemies who delivered us up for imprisonment to our other enemies. I beg you to pray to God for these men. . . . I also beg you to love one another, not to allow good men to be oppressed, and to grant to all that which is due them.

Written on Monday, the night before the feast of St. Vitus, after the feast of good angels.”

REMSEN DU BOIS BIRD.

Princeton.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series. Vol. XIV.

Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirty-fifth Session, 1913-1914. 8vo, pp. 438. Published by Williams and Norgate, 4 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1914. Ten shillings and sixpence, net.

This goodly volume contains the following elaborate papers:

I.—"Appearance and Reality." By G. Dawes Hicks.

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Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL THEOLOGY

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and LOUIS H. GRAY, M.A., Ph.D., Sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York. *Volume VII: Hymns—Liberty.* New York: Charles Scrib-

ner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1915. Royal 8vo, pp. xx, 911.

This volume of the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* is interesting, perhaps, above its fellows to the student of Christian Theology. It opens with a comprehensive article on "Hymns" and closes with a sketchy one on "Christian Liberty"; while in its midst is buried a considerable article on the central theme of Christianity—"Jesus Christ",—flanked by what seems, on a cursory view at any rate, to be an unusual proportion of articles on specifically Christian themes.

The article on "Hymns" is one of those composite ones which form a specialty of this *Encyclopaedia*. It extends to fifty-eight pages and consists of sixteen parts, each dealing with the hymns of a particular people, or cult, or period. Naturally these parts vary somewhat in value. Among non-Christian hymns, the Vedic hymns seem to be most adequately treated. Among Christian hymns, the sections on Greek hymns by Dr. A. Baumstark and on Syriac hymns by Bishop A. J. Maclean deserve to be singled out for especial praise: they not only cover their ground but illuminate their subjects. The section on Modern Christian hymns is too skimpy to be very useful. That on Latin hymns by Fr. Guido M. Dreves is more adequate. It is unfortunate that its Roman Catholic author should have thought it necessary to go out of his way to describe John Hus (in this, the year of the world-wide celebration of his martyrdom too) as that "unfortunate fanatic" (p. 24a). It is "a common fault of American hymns", Mr. T. G. Crippen tells us in his sketch of Modern hymnology, that they show "a too great tendency towards sentimentalism; and many of them seem to owe their popularity to the light jingling tunes to which they are wedded" (p. 37a). One wonders whether this judgment is founded upon the total serious output of American hymn-writers, or upon the widespread use (and usefulness) of the popular collections of "Gospel Songs". There is a little fragment on "Cumanic and other early vernacular hymns" (p. 37b), of merely bibliographical value, tucked away in an odd corner where it cannot hope to be consulted by any one in search of such things but only to be lighted upon by accident.

The article on "Christian Liberty" with which the volume closes is chiefly notable for its complete ignoring of the fact that the term "Christian Liberty" has a history and a definite significance fixed by this history. For all that we find here Luther might have never written his epoch-making tract, *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* or Calvin the famous nineteenth chapter of the Third Book of his *Institutes*. Mr. R. M. Pope, the author of the article, prefers to go his own way in assigning a meaning to the term "Christian Liberty", and in determining the limits of Christian liberty and defending its rights within the definition which he assigns it: and it does not seem to us a good way. Incidentally we may observe that when it is said (p. 910b) that "Christ's general attitude towards heterodoxy was that of tolerance"—much depends on what is meant, indeed, by "tolerance"—the remark is in the sense in which it is made quite beside the mark; as much

beside the mark as when it is said shortly afterwards that to Christ, "faith" was not assent to an intellectual proposition or formula, but the spirit of receptivity in relation to Himself and His teaching." Faith with our Lord, was neither the one nor the other of these things; but an humble entrusting of oneself to the God of mercy and grace. And as for "heterodoxy", Jesus really "tolerated" nothing but the pure truth,—He that was Himself the Truth.

Most Christian readers will go at once, however, on turning over the pages of this volume, to the important central article on "Jesus Christ", which is written by President W. Douglas Mackenzie of the Hartford Seminary Foundation. Nor in point of ability or comprehensiveness of treatment will the article disappoint them. It is written moreover with a notable independence and freshness of judgment which raises it at numerous points out of the ruts in which most recent writing on Jesus Christ runs. On the critical and historical sides it is especially strong and it contains many illuminating passages and numerous fine sayings are scattered through it. There is, for example, a notable vindication of the central place which Jesus gave His own Person in the worship of His followers. "The matter before us is one of fact. It would seem that, according to the earliest tradition, Jesus did, without formality of claim"—we enter a caveat upon this clause—"but constantly, on all sides of His self-expression, in word and act, draw to Himself the faith and obedience of His disciples, and present Himself to them as the standard of moral worth—in fact became to them the object of a religious regard. The effort to prove that this worship of Christ arose only after His death and is reflected into the story of His ministry has been prolonged, painstaking, and futile" (p. 515b). "The real question is whether we have proof that Jesus became to His disciples a 'religious object' during His earthly life, and whether their experience in that matter was the effect of His conscious will, as He by teaching, miracle, example, and direct moulding of their life formed them into the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingship of God to be realized" (p. 521b, cf. 523b). There is also an excellent treatment of the matter of the sinlessness of Jesus (pp. 509f.). When turning to speak of the Christology of the early church a beginning is well taken in a fruitful insistence upon the immanent logic of history (p. 533), and on that basis the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the early church is successfully defended, against, for example, the Ritschlian attempt to make it out only a disaster which the church suffered at the hands of intruding Greek philosophizing (p. 534). It is tellingly asked in this connection what would have happened to the church if the modern "Liberal" conception of Christ had become the ruling one in the early centuries (p. 534b). Good use is made again of this "logic of a 'circle'" at a later point in criticism of the development of the modern "Liberal" and "Post-Liberal" theories of the Person of Christ (p. 547). Such a remark as the following is an oasis of refreshing good sense in the

midst of the arid waste of nonsense which stretches around us on the subject of the Two Natures: "A protest should be entered against the frequent yet absurd suggestion that the 'two-nature hypothesis' first arose at or just before Chalcedon. The very idea of an incarnation involves that of two natures somehow made into one life. The idea dates back to the New Testament, to the combination of 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man', of 'existing in the form of God' and 'found in fashion as a man'. And the entire course of Christological speculation presupposed this hypothesis from the beginning" (p. 538a). Despite these admirable features, however, the article is eminently unsatisfactory as a whole. The constructive element in it falls far behind the critical and historical; and its ultimate conclusion, we regret to say, is lame in the extreme.

That the hand which handles critical matters so firmly trembles when positive construction is attempted, the reader is not long in becoming aware. He is soon startled, for instance, by the fumbling touch with which the predictive element in Jesus' teaching is dealt with (p. 512). Jesus' eschatological sayings were not thoroughly understood by His disciples, and were accordingly very naturally confused in their reports of them (pp. 512, 518). Jesus' own prophetic vision was incomplete (*do.*). And, in any case, predictions of future events, dependent for their fulfilment on the acts of men, necessarily contain elements of uncertainty (p. 512). An attempt is made to limit these elements of uncertainty to "form and date". But this is obviously nugatory. If the form and time of the fulfilment of such predictions are necessarily uncertain because the human action on which they depend is incalculable, we cannot escape the conclusion that the fact of their fulfilment, which equally hinges on the acts of man, lies under the same uncertainty. If Jesus could not know the time of His second coming because its occurrence rests on the acts of man which are uncertain, He could not know that it would ever occur. We would better believe in predestined events, not indeed unrelated to man's conduct, but not conditioned on man's indeterminate conduct,—if we wish to believe in any certain events at all in the sphere of human history. An event cannot be certain to occur the occurrence of which is contingent on other events which are intrinsically uncertain. As we read, thus, we gradually acquire an attitude of mind which prepares us for the unsatisfactoriness of the Positive Statement with which the article ends (pp. 548-550). We have read this Positive Statement with what care we might, but remain in very considerable uncertainty of exactly what view it commends to us of our Lord's Person. That a superhuman element in our Lord's Person is contended for is clear; but not what this superhuman element is, or what its relations are to God on the one hand or to man on the other. Language is sometimes used which might lead us to suspect that only a kind of super-man was presented to us in Christ. "This is a new type of personality which has arisen within the processes of human life. It is human, yet more

than human, somewhat as man is truly animal and more than animal, yet not a 'monster'". But it seems clear that it is not conceived of as a product of merely earthly forces coöperating towards the production of a new type. It is a visitant from another sphere. But so, we are reminded, may every man that comes into the world also be. And this other sphere, we are also punctually reminded, cannot "without careful discrimination" be identified with God. Confusion is increased by the repeated paradox that whatever is "spiritual" or "personal" is by reason of that very fact human, so that, at bottom, God (who is "self-conscious will") and man (who is "conscious will") are the same—although, the paradox, on every occasion of its announcement, is, of course, at once contradicted. In Jesus Christ, we are told (p. 587a) "we have a unique type of personality. It is at once human because it is conscious will, and yet more than human because it has invaded the course of human life from a range of conscious being and life above the human." There is something "more than human" in Him, we are told again: "But the 'more than human' is human. And this must be possible if God and man are spiritual, conscious beings" (p. 549a). Nevertheless we are immediately told that "the idea of the identity of original type between the divine and human natures must not make us imagine that the gulf between the Creator and the creation is abolished, or bridged, or even lessened" (p. 550b). It is all very puzzling. Perhaps we shall find our way best by abiding strictly by the somewhat precise statement: "The self-conscious being, the pre-existent Christ, the Son of God, entered as an individual, vital, and mental organism into the process of physical, organic history in the womb of His earthly mother, and grew up among men as a new type of human personality" (p. 550a). The announcement of this position unqualifiedly in this place seems to intimate that, of the two alternative forms of statement presented a little afterward (p. 550a, bottom), this one represents President Mackenzie's preference. In that case his view would seem to be a form of Kenoticism not essentially different from that of W. F. Gess, which had nevertheless been described at an earlier point (p. 545) without obvious intimation of fundamental sympathy with it: even the Arianizing implications of Gess are present in it, although entering it after another fashion. The alternative view suggested, but apparently not preferred, is presented as a fuller working out of the view advocated by the present Bishop of Zanzibar in his *The One Christ*. It seems to be essentially Kenoticism of the Ebrardian type; although, of course, in Dr. Mackenzie's case it would be burdened with his apparent unwillingness quite to identify "the Son of God" who is supposed to have become incarnate after this fashion, with God.

If Dr. Mackenzie is thus to be read as on the whole commending a Kenotic view of the Person of Christ, the corrective of his reasoning may be found in the companion article by Friedrich Loofs on "Kenosis". This article begins with a most discouraging statement of the extent of our possible knowledge of Paul's meaning in Phil.

ii. 5ff, but then proceeds to give a very careful account of the theories of Kenosis while have been held during the history of the church, and ends in the expression of a definite and a very definitely wrong opinion of what Paul did mean in Phil. ii. 5ff. In the meantime, however, it pronounces afresh the modern Kenotic theories of the incarnation pure mythology and gives solid reasons for this opinion.

Two further pendants to the article "Jesus Christ" are provided by short articles on "Jesus Christ in Judaism" and "Jesus Christ in Zoroastrianism." The former, although from a Christian hand is so defective as almost to appear pro-Jewish: from its opening words one might imagine that whatever hatred Jews may have shown towards Christians has originated solely in the persecutions of Jews by Christians—that Jews were persecutors of Christians at the first seems to have fallen out of mind. The latter gives some brief account of Zoroastrian polemics against Christianity.

The excellent article on "Josephus" by the late Benedict Niese, is interpolated by Louis H. Gray with an account—not altogether complete—of recent defences of the genuineness of the famous notice of Christ in *Antt.* xviii. 63f. Dr. Gray expresses himself as agreeing with Burkitt, Harnack and Barnes (who are the writers whose arguments he reports upon) in pronouncing for the genuineness of the passage. The history of opinion on this matter is very instructive. The passage is found in all the MSS., but it has become almost an axiom of criticism that it is an interpolation. The insufficiency of the grounds on which this judgment rests became apparent, so soon as the critics needed the passage enough to counterbalance their desire to eliminate so apparently striking a testimony to the supernaturalness of Christ's apparition. Thus the action of their critical judgment was released from the pressure of prejudice sufficiently to function somewhat normally.

We may mention in passing that the article on "Liberal Judaism" by I. Abrahams reads much like a manifesto. There are no articles on "Liberal Christianity" or "Liberal Protestantism." This seems a pity. For it tends to the identification out of hand of Liberal Christianity and Liberal Protestantism with Christianity and Protestantism, whereas, of course, "Liberal Christianity" is no more "Christianity" and "Liberal Protestantism" is no more "Protestantism" than "Liberal Judaism" is "Judaism." The way it works may be seen in a flagrant example in the treatment of the topic "Inspiration." Two articles are given to "Christian Inspiration." The one is headed "Protestant Doctrine"; the other "Roman Catholic Doctrine." There is no essential difference, however, between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic doctrines of Inspiration. This is one of the points in the doctrine of Holy Scripture on which all the great historical branches of the church are agreed. There is an immense difference, however, between the "Liberal Protestant" and the Roman Catholic doctrines of Inspiration; and what is given

here under the caption of the "Protestant Doctrine" is not in the least the Protestant doctrine but the "Liberal Protestant" doctrine. There is no question what the Protestant doctrine of Inspiration is. It is embodied in the great Confession of the Protestant churches; it is expounded by their accredited dogmaticians; it is set forth in the histories of Protestant doctrine. One may read it in his Schmid, or in his Heppe; in his Otto Ritschl; or, if he chooses, in his Haering or in his Wendt, under the name of "the Old Protestant doctrine". But he will not read it in Mr. James Strahan's article on the "Protestant Doctrine of Inspiration." That article, too, like Mr. Abrahams' on "Liberal Judaism" is a manifesto; a manifesto for the Liberal Protestant doctrine of Inspiration (or of no-Inspiration); it gives the doctrine not of the Protestant Churches, but, as itself says, of "Protestant scholars of the present day, imbued with the scientific spirit." The result is that the Protestant doctrine gets no statement and no hearing at all in this *Encyclopaedia*. This *Encyclopaedia* itself becomes thus a manifesto for Liberal Protestantism; and thereby its historical character is lost. There is a sense in which orthodox Protestantism receives less consideration in this *Encyclopaedia* than any other system of religious thought.

When we turn to the composite article "Images and Idols" and look down the list of sub-topics, we come to this one: "Christian." But if we expect to find here a thorough and candid treatment of the place "Images and Idols" have taken in the history of Christianity, we shall be disappointed. No article on the subject is provided. We are merely told: "See Iconoclasm, Images and Idols (General and Primitive), Worship (Christian)." The article on "Christian Worship" is not yet before us; we shall have to wait to see what we shall see in it. The other references are sadly inadequate. Count Goblet D'Alviella's article, "Images and Idols (General and Primitive)," has in it no doubt a number of allusions to Christian use of these objects. He classifies Images into three types: "purely representative images," "magical images," and "idols", *i.e.*, "conscious and animated images," or somewhat glorified fetishes. Christian images he naturally speaks of most distinctly in the first class,—in which Christian images hold a prominent place: "No religion can rival Christianity in the multiplicity of its images." It is incidentally plain enough, however, that magical images and "idols" proper have had a part to play in the history of Christian worship. It is a pity that a full and candid account of the part they have played in it has not been given; at least as full and as candid an account of it as has been given of the part they have played among the Buddhists, say, or among the Greeks and Romans. The lack of such an account is not supplied by the article on "Iconoclasm." This is by a Roman Catholic writer and is written very distinctly from the Image-worshipping point of view. A number of other articles on Roman Catholic topics have also been assigned

to Roman Catholic writers, not with the best results. Among them is the article on "Jesuits," which is a pure apology. We wish it could have been written by a George Tyrrell! That on "Immaculate Conception" by Joseph Turmel is more frank. That on the "Inquisition"—that is, the Inquisition of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries against the Cathari and the Waldenses, the later history being reserved for a later article—also makes a manifest effort to be fair. Abuses due to the fault of individuals are discriminated from the institution itself; the faults inherent in the inquisitorial procedure (as distinguished from the accusational), however, are not glossed. The political and social side of the heresies prevalent during the periods surveyed is emphasized, and the forwardness of the civil power in punishing them is insisted upon, but the implication of the church in the death penalty is not wholly denied. On the whole the Inquisition is pronounced a good thing, marking an advance in dealing with heretics and making for social progress. The clear article on "Invincible Ignorance" is by a Protestant writer.

✓ The penultimate article in the volume is a bright discussion of "Libertarianism and Necessitarianism" by Professor Donald Mackenzie of Aberdeen. It abounds in illuminating statements, as when T. H. Green is said to have "seen clearly that states of consciousness would never account for consciousness of states", or as when the fundamental fact which raises all the pother about freedom is summed up in the declaration that "we find new individuals appearing who were never there before, a fact which no bare singularism can ever explain". Professor Mackenzie sees no outcome without the postulation of a truly creative power for the will; but so far as we can see he discovers no ground for such a postulation beyond the extreme desirability that a new and better world should be somehow created. "Surely", he exclaims, "the real question is: Can the tree itself be made good? not, Can grapes grow on thorns?" He certainly is on solid ground when he adds: "If any libertarian holds that good fruit can come from a bad tree without changing the tree itself first, then libertarianism is a lingering chimera." But as certainly he has lost his footing on the rock when he contends that libertarians must, in the nature of the case, therefore be able to point to a "possibility of changing the bad character itself". True enough, "for Christianity, at any rate, the possibility of new creatures and a new world is basal". But it is equally basal for Christianity that this is a possibility for God (with whom "all things are possible") and not for man himself. It is therefore that Christianity is a religion of Salvation. It is a faulty exegesis which reads our Lord as exhorting us ourselves to make the tree good that the fruit may be good: and the Kantian doctrine that every "ought" implies a "can" is but an *obiter dictum*, which Kant himself confessed had to be taken on faith and could not be rationally justified. Creation is not such an easy thing that we can lightly assume that it lies in our daily, nay momentarily, power, because

without it we cannot escape from our evil selves—except by an act of God. It were better to abide in the *obiter dictum* of a greater than Kant: “Ye must be born again.” //

We have, naturally, touched in this notice only upon a few out of the multitude of articles which fill this rich and bulky volume, and that merely at random, as we have chanced to turn them up. Perhaps enough has been said, however, to serve as a sample of its contents.
Princeton. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Bible: Its Origin, its Significance, and its Abiding Worth. By ARTHUR S. PEAKE, M.A., D.D., Rylands Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1913. 8vo. Pages xxxvi, 517. \$2.00 net.

In laying this book aside, we are not altogether satisfied what it would have us understand when we speak of the Bible as the Word of God. It is something like our idea of a river. Usually we mean a depression in the earth's surface, with more or less water in it that has a source somewhere, exists for some purpose, and is making its way to some ocean. But how much water, or whether it is all really water, and what is the nature of its source and the character of its channel, and where the ocean is to which it flows,—if we go too much in detail into these things we might discover either that the river is not a river at all, or that it is the kind of a river that must not be studied too closely. Yet we call it a river because, well, just because it has a fluid in it which we know to be bona fide H₂O, and while it is not much, what there is of it is real water, and it is going in the right direction, so what does it matter? Do not demand too much of it, and don't forget that there are some rivers, *e.g.*, the Rio Grande and the Los Angeles, which sometimes in the year do not have any water. If you think that water is essential to a river, you are “in error of mortal mind”.

We should not want it inferred from the above analogy that Professor Peake stands for a superficial study of the Bible. Far from it. The point of the analogy is just how much of the Bible we actually possess as a result of its study. He believes that the Bible has irretrievably lost the place it once had in Christendom (p. vii), and his aim is to restore it to an ever higher because truer and, as he thinks, more defensible place in our Christian affections (p. III. Cf. p. 190). This can only be done, according to Professor Peake, by accepting in the main the chief results of the more liberal criticism, by breaking forever with what he terms “an atomistic view of the Bible” (p. 468). This involves sweeping denials. Verbal inspiration is, of course, to be “heartily repudiated” (p. 483. Cf. pp. 102, 310-311, 380, 397-399). There are proved errors in the Bible (pp. 83-87, 126-127). The Old

Testament has internal inconsistencies in it (p. 342), while we cannot claim for the book as a whole consistency in teaching (p. 226). The Epistle of James is "a relatively insignificant book" (p. 353). The Bible is not a revelation, but the record of a revelation (p. ix). All of which being true, "it is one of the serious difficulties of Protestantism that it has constantly found an infallible seat of authority in Scripture" (p. 466. Cf. Chap. 22, esp. pp. 447, 461). In a word, we simply do not have an infallible Bible, and to allege that the original autographs were inerrant is baseless, for "Of what use is it to predicate infallibility of documents which no longer exist"? (p. 398. Cf. p. xvii). The presupposition which underlies this reasoning is that the purified text of Scripture is not the original text. But if all our Mss., Versions, and Citations do not furnish us the text of the original documents, then where is our Bible? Have then all the colossal achievements of textual criticism been nothing more than an *ignis fatuus*, a *Love's Labor Lost*? What we have in the Bible of Professor Peake's studies is not so much the infallible truth of God as a sort of moral mixture, which, after a severe testing, turns out to be only a few scattered filtrations of presumably essential truth. Recurring to our figure of the river, if we supposed that in our Bible we had a real river, beautiful and overflowing with the pure water of Divinity, we awake to find that what we really have is scarcely a river at all, but at best only something like a river-bed with a minimum of water flowing through it, a *Bächlein*, but not a *Strom* or *Fluss*. In such a Bible there is so much of unguided humanity that the divinity of it is reduced to a minimum and is often scarcely discernible at all.

There is, however, another side to Professor Peake's picture. The rigorous radicalism with which he approaches the Old Testament is for some reason largely absent when he comes to the New Testament. Practically all of this is held intact, though the Synoptists have irreconcilable discrepancies, and Mark is not always trustworthy (pp. xxvii, 307-311). He is not in unqualified agreement with those who would deny or minimize the essential historicity of the Bible. He is "constrained to believe" that at least *some* of the patriarchs are historical figures (p. 302). But the old historical accuracy once claimed for the Bible must be given up (p. 310). Strange as it may seem, this argument, which might even do away with Jesus Himself, is not pressed when we come to Him. His reply to Pfleiderer's theory is that we *must* have the historic Jesus (pp. 338f. Cf. p. 320, and Chap. XVI *passim*). And why? For no other reason, we may add, than that Jesus is demonstrably historical.

Professor Peake insists that the study of facts shall precede the elaboration of theories, and that the New Testament must not be read with a scheme of theology in the head (pp. 29, 419). But, it is legitimate to ask, does he always come to the Bible with a mind absolutely purified of all presupposition? We wish that we might say as much for him, did his own study allow us. But it does not. He has

a theory of inspiration, one of revelation, one of criticism, another of authority: theories which intrude themselves into his argument more than the author seems to imagine. Chapter X, on "The Conservative Reply to the Old Testament Critics", is almost a marvel of frugality and presupposition. There we are told that opposition to the radical view does not come as a rule from "acknowledged experts in the field of Biblical scholarship" but largely from "dogmatic theologians" (p. 154); and where there are eminent Hebraists who espouse the conservative side, we are bidden to remember that *these* may be dominated by extraneous and theological considerations! (p. 155). The student is warned from trusting statements on Old Testament criticism given by defenders of the traditional position (pp. 158-159). Even if all this could be proved, it would not constitute first-class evidence that Professor Peake were himself absolutely unbiased.

To conclude, there is here a most readable compilation of not always ideally-connected essays on the Bible in many of what have come to be regarded its more debatable features. The author could scarcely defend himself against the charge of being tainted with subjectivism. Indeed, he lays great stress on experience and emotion, which latter he thinks is the essential core of religion (p. 422. Cf. pp. 462, 481). But he is too wise to stake all on experience. He resolutely refuses to make common cause with those who decry reason and reduce our faith to an ungrounded emotionalism (pp. 464, 472. Cf. p. 285 and Ch. 21 *ad lib.*). Having a religion, we must have a theology.

At the beginning there is a table of contents which gives an exhaustive synopsis of each chapter. Professor Peake's style is captivating. The reader is borne along through material severely technical at times but always presented with such literary charm that one is never wearied. The most permanent feature about the book is not its argument but its style.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

The Miracles of Jesus. A Study of the Evidence, being the Davies Lecture for the year 1913. By E. O. DAVIES, B.Sc., Author of "Theological Encyclopaedia", "Prolegomena to Systematic Theology", etc. London, New York, Toronto. Hodder and Stoughton: 1913. 8vo, pp. xi, 240.

We have in this treatise an admirable application of the scientific method to the study of the evidence for the miracles of Jesus.

"In Book I the alleged miracles are studied simply as extraordinary events which, judging by the face value of the narratives recording them, do not happen in the course of nature as known to us. The evidence for the alleged events is examined, and an attempt is made to judge it in the light of analogy. In Book II the term miracle is used with the implication that the extraordinary acts attributed to Jesus were 'acts for which the immanent causal nexus could not account (even if our knowledge were adequate)'. The following

aspects of miracle, regarded in this sense, are dealt with in succession: Physical Impossibility and Possibility, Moral Impossibility and Possibility, and Antecedent Probability. Then the view of Hume "that no amount of evidence can substantiate a miracle is examined. In conclusion, the evidence as determined in Book I, for the extraordinary acts attributed to Jesus is reconsidered in the light of the results reached in Book II respecting miracles as there regarded" with the result that "if the miracles attributed to Jesus in the Gospels are believed to be 'events which cannot be explained from the totality of intramundane factors', then, on the assumption that the fundamental postulate of Christian Theism is valid, and that Jesus was a direct personal representative of God on earth, the evidence in support of those miracles is sufficient to justify the belief that they happened, speaking generally, as recorded."

On the argument thus outlined by the author himself the following remarks are in order:

1. Mr. Davies has had the advantage of the criticism of eminent scholars, such as Bosanquet, and, as he says, he has benefited much from such criticism.

2. His discussion is based on wide and accurate reading and is fully up to date. Indeed, it would almost seem to have been called forth by the Rev. J. M. Thompson's "Miracles in the New Testament"; and, in the judgment of the reviewer, it is a sufficient answer to that considerably talked of and elusive book, as well as to the better known position of Harnack.

3. Mr. Davies' work has the somewhat rare merit of so conceiving and describing the miracle as at once to force to the front the real question. This is not whether the miracle is marvelous, nor whether it is beyond the power of nature as we know it; but it is whether it is beyond what we should find to be the power of nature, were our knowledge of nature complete and perfect. This is the issue. Only as thus understood can the miracle attest the intervention and so the reality of the Supernatural.

On the whole, we can scarcely speak too highly of Mr. Davies' work. He confines himself rigorously—sometimes we think almost too rigorously—to his prescribed task; but he accomplishes that task. To read his book and still deny that the miracles of Christ were both real and supernatural occurrences, one must be governed by considerations other than those of evidence.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Further Evolution of Man. A Study from Observed Phenomena. By W. HALL CALVERT, M.D. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London, Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo; pp. 324.

This treatise is both negative and positive. The Darwinian theory of evolution by means of natural selection it would refute and it would have us look to socialism for the spiritual perfection of man.

On its negative side it is largely a representation of a work published in Edinburgh in 1908 by George Paulin and entitled "No Struggle for Existence; No Natural Selection." With Paulin, our author claims, that "there is no such thing as every individual of every species fighting continually with its neighbor in order to secure sufficient food by which to maintain life"; that the elimination necessary to prevent this struggle takes place long before the individual reaches maturity or can propagate his kind, being effected ultimately by the cannibalism of the carnivorous male; that in the case of man, where such a check would not apply, even the Malthusian doctrine, which Darwin adopted, is not true; that the means of subsistence increase more rapidly than the population; that the principle of heredity has been much overworked, the truth being that "a man inherits only the characteristics and instincts of the genus homo, plus a very few attributes of form and feature"; and that environment is so omnipotent that though emigrants of every race are pouring into the United States, the result is already a race which is visibly approximating the type of feature and form of the aboriginal red Indians. Having thus cleared the way, Dr. Calvert proceeds to show how man will, indeed, must develop as his environment becomes more and more nearly perfect. This development will be characteristically and increasingly spiritual. Competition having been eliminated and Christian ethics being in the air, it will follow, that the units of passion will be dissolved; that the "gold standard will be non-existent and private wealth and property a thing of the past"; that "all the means of production, distribution and exchange will be nationalized"; that every one will have some work and much leisure; that senseless and harmful fads like woman suffrage will disappear; and that the wisdom of the state will solve every emerging problem.

On the details of this scheme, whether in its negative or positive aspect, the reviewer does not care to comment. It is sufficient to say that a scheme which explicitly denies "original sin", as does this (p. 296), and which seems to postulate in Christian ethics an inherent power of self-propagation, runs directly counter to "observed facts" and is, therefore, condemned by the author's own and constantly reiterated boast.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Truth of Christianity. Being an Examination of the More Important Arguments For and Against Believing in that Religion. Compiled from Various Sources by LT-C. W. H. TURTON, D.S.O., Late Royal Engineers. Eighth edition—thirtieth thousand. (Carefully revised throughout.) New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. viii, 636.

We are very glad to welcome another and improved edition of what continues to impress us as "much the best of our handbooks of Christian Evidences". A full and careful review of it will be found in

The Presbyterian and Reformed Review, the immediate predecessor of THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Oct. 1900, p. 690.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Sporen van Animisme in het Oude Testament? Door Dr. G. Ch. Aalders, Denaar des Woords by de Geref. Kerk van Ermelo. Kampen: J. H. Kok. 1914. Pp. 62.

In putting the question whether traces of animism are discoverable in the Old Testament the author takes animism in the most general possible sense as denoting "the primitive belief that spirit or spirits exist and exert influence in nature." This is wide enough to include Lippert's, Stade's and Schwally's theory of ancestor-worship, Robertson Smith's theory of totemism, Piepenbring's theory of fetishism, and Eerdman's theory of a diffused soul-matter entering into or attaching itself to individual objects. In the subsequent discussion, however, a more restricted definition is brought into play, as on page 20, where it is argued against Stade, that the identification of soul and breath or soul and blood of itself affords no proof of the existence of animism, because characteristic of animism is the belief of a special influence of souls and spirits, which is either to be feared or sought. The author insists upon it that the method employed in determining the question at issue should be wholly direct and *à posteriori*. He rejects the procedure of postulating animism in Israel on the basis of phenomena which, with a greater or lesser degree or similarity, occur in other religions and there bear animistic significance. He further denies, as disproven by modern discoveries, the assumption that Israel's original stage of culture was so low as to allow of no other than an animistic form of religion. Nor can such a conclusion be based on the general postulate that all peoples must of necessity have passed through an animistic period, because not a few recognized authorities in the field of comparative religion question the accuracy of this view. Dismissing all these *à priori* considerations, the author confines himself to the clean-cut issue, whether any Old Testament phenomena demand an animistic explanation. The argument is not directed towards the end of positively explaining the facts in a more satisfactory manner than the advocates of animism succeed in doing; it contents itself with rendering the verdict "not proven". In view of the inveterate habit of the advocates of animism of representing their theory as scientifically established and no longer partaking of the vicissitudes of an hypothesis this method has its merit. It is very important to keep alive in the mind of Old Testament scientists the distinction between facts and the evaluation of facts and the injustice of accusing conservative scholars of blindness to the facts, when they only refuse to accept certain constructions more or less plausible or implausible evolved out of the facts.

It is reassuring to learn that not even as excrescences in the popular religion, irrespective of the legitimate faith of Israel, can any animistic beliefs or practices with certainty be pointed out. Of course, even if this could be done, as the author observes, nothing would have been gained thereby in support of the thesis that these were survivals of an older common faith, and that animism was the original primitive religion of Israel. One feels, however, that all through the argument would have gained in force if it had been worked out more fully on the positive side and in each case, so far as possible, a conservative explanation of the phenomena within the frame of revealed religion provided. This is done only at isolated points, as *e.g.* where the author accepts Frey's understanding of the mourning-customs as forms of *Verdehmüthigung*, only differing from Frey in not calling them cases of *Selbstdemüthigung*, because they are also imposed on others. There is a certain inconsistency in this, that on page 27 an objection is made to Eerdman's animistic interpretation of the mourning-customs as defensive measures, on the ground that it does not explain why certain mourning-customs were prohibited and others allowed, and yet later on the *Verdehmüthigungs*-theory is favored without any corresponding attempt to give a reason for the prohibition in some, the allowance in other cases. Incompleteness in the induction also occasionally appears, as when the prohibition of the eating of blood is represented as entirely due to the sacrificial use made of the blood on the basis of Lev. xvii. 11 and Gen. ix. 4 is left out of account. While, on account of its negative purport and limited scope. Dr. Aalders' work will not take the place of the more exhaustive and positive contributions of Frey and Grüneisen, it can render excellent service as a first introduction to the study of the animistic controversy, all the more so since in the notes the literature is given with great fulness.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Codex B and its Allies. A Study and an Indictment. By H. C. HOSKIER, Author of "Concerning the Genesis of the Versions of the New Testament"; "Concerning the Date of the Bohairic Version"; and Editor of "Collations of "The Morgan Gospels", and of the Greek Cursives 157 and 604 (700). London: Bernard Quaritch. 1914. Two vols., large 8vo; pp. xvi, 407 and 417. Indexes.

It is a great pity that there must be such a thing as division of labor. Everybody ought to know everything and do everything. Division of tasks, differentiation of functions, utilization of special aptitudes, may be necessary to the accomplishment of anything. But it has its difficulties and dangers. No doubt nothing worthy could be done, were it not distributed to many hands according to the particular capacity of each: but then nothing so done can be as well done as if one hand could have had all the capacities and itself done it all. Division of labor is a concession to human weakness; and it is apt to call human weaknesses into activity. Each laborer

on a common task is apt to magnify his particular portion of the task and to minify the tasks of others. We well remember that, when in our young days we haunted the country-side, gun on shoulder, we cherished a hearty contempt for "closet-naturalists," and shared the opinion lately expressed by an Exalted Personage that the "field naturalist" is "it." In few branches of Biblical science is this differentiation of function more marked, or its accompanying tendency to fail somewhat in mutual appreciation more apt to manifest itself among the workers, than in Textual Criticism.

The "diplomatists" and the "critics," those who gather the material and those who utilize it in forming the text, stand well apart; and though they cannot do without one another and nothing is accomplished except by the combined labors of all, they not seldom fail fully to appreciate one another's accomplishments. He who handles the manuscripts distrusts him who handles the various readings, and is inclined to suppose that his own intimate knowledge of the documents and their ways fits him alone to pronounce on their affinities, and on the history, and original form, of the text they embody. He who busies himself with the text of the author is tempted to dispise him whose occupation is rather with the texts of the scribes, and to wave him off from what he considers his own preserves as a matter too high for him.

Mr. Hoskier has made notable contributions to our exact knowledge of documents of importance in the history of the text of the New Testament. Dr. Alexander Souter thinks that that is enough for Mr. Hoskier to have done; and bids him content himself with it and keep to his own field. "We cannot afford," he says, "to do without his valuable coöperation in New Testament textual criticism, but would suggest that he confine his energies to the collection and accurate preservation of material, and leave theorising to others, at least meantime." Not unnaturally, Mr. Hoskier is disinclined to follow this advice. He knows the documents as few living men know them, and he thinks his knowledge of the documents prepares him to pronounce on their relative values, especially as he is prepared to spare no pains in ascertaining their affinities and history through the medium of minute comparisons. Hence these large and elaborately worked-out volumes.

In the conclusions to which each severally tends with respect to the general history of the text of the New Testament and its original form, we find ourselves of Dr. Souter's rather than of Mr. Hoskier's opinion. We do not think that the main lines of Dr. Hort's construction of the history of the text, or the general form of the text as he has reconstructed it in the light of its history, will require serious modification as the result of Mr. Hoskier's very instructive investigations into the character of codices Vaticanus and Sinaiticus. Meanwhile we are free to marvel over the minuteness and searchingness of his inquisition into the character and affinities of these

manuscripts, and to profit, in our own way, from his results, set forth with such fullness and acuteness in these rich volumes.

Mr. Hoskier describes his work as "a study and an indictment": a study and an indictment of "codex B and its allies." He is nerved to his task by the conviction that "it is high time that the bubble of Codex B should be pricked." The bubble which he wishes to be pricked is the opinion that B and its allies present what in its main features may be called a "neutral" text, a text, that is, which preserves a line of, so far, uncorrupted descent from the autographs. On the contrary, he contends, they present "a doctored text," a text, "plainly, indubitably doctored," that is, a revised text which owes its peculiar features to Egyptian "corrections." Thus he would turn the tables on Dr. Hort. Dr. Hort rejected the "Syrian" text on the ground that it was a deliberate revision of the texts earlier current, the elements of which are in our hands apart from it. Mr. Hoskier wishes to reject the text of B and its allies on the ground that it is rather it that is the deliberate revision, and the so-called "Syrian" text underlies it; "that the maligned *textus receptus* served in large measure as the base which B tampered with and changed." "My thesis is then that it was B⁸ and their forerunners with *Origen* who revised the 'Antioch' text. And yet, although there is an older base than either of these groups, the 'Antioch' text is purer in many respects, if not 'better', and is nearer the original base than much of that in vogue in Egypt."

"The Church at large," continues Mr. Hoskier, "recognized all this until the year 1881—when Hortism (in other words Alexandrianism) was allowed free play—and has not since retraced the path to sound tradition." What he desires is to call back the church to the "path of sounder tradition," which runs, in his view, through the "Antioch" rather than the "Alexandria" transmission. As will be perceived, Mr. Hoskier's contentions are essentially those of Dean Burgon and he may not improperly be looked upon as the continuer—on different lines no doubt, but on fundamentally the same assumptions—of Dean Burgon's work. It is Dean Burgon's indictment of Codex Vaticanus which Mr. Hoskier takes up. And he pronounces Dean Burgon's indictment of that Codex "as a false witness," "abundantly proved," and his general position "absolutely unshaken."

The material which Mr. Hoskier lays before us in these two closely-packed volumes is very extensive and very detailed. It calls out our admiration by the diligence with which it has been collected, the skill with which it has been presented, and the acuteness of the management of the argument founded on it, or rather transfused through it. The bulk of it is so great that it will require some time for it to be fully assimilated and finally estimated in its bearing and ultimate meaning. We have ourselves, of course, been able to go over it as yet only cursorily, though we hope not wholly carelessly. We are bound to confess that on this first cursory survey of it we have

been immensely instructed indeed, but not convinced. We are willing enough to believe that the so-called "Neutral" text is Egyptian in its provenience. But we are unwilling to believe that it rests on Origen rather than Origen on it; or that it rests on the Syrian text rather than the Syrian text, in part, on it. We should be helped in our estimate of Dr. Hoskier's argument if he had told us plainly somewhere or other what he thinks of and is prepared to do with the "Western" text. That it is "profoundly ancient and important" everybody understands. Does it contain the whole valuable base of the "Syrian" text? Is there an element common to the so-called "Syrian" and Mr. Hoskier's "Egyptian" text, not found in the "Western" documents, which is original? Is there an element in the "Western" documents not found in either the "Syrian" or the "Egyptian" text which is original? We have not been able on a cursory reading of the book to make out clearly the broad answers which Mr. Hoskier would give to such questions. Where is that "base" which Mr. Hoskier recognizes as older than either the "Antioch" or the "Alexandria" groups to be found?

We have not been able to persuade ourselves, under Mr. Hoskier's guidance, that the Gospel of Mark was written originally in Latin as well as in Greek and that our Greek text has been affected by a Greek translation of the original Latin,—anymore than we were able to persuade ourselves, under Blass' guidance, that it was written originally in Aramaic and was circulated in two Greek translations from it. Here is a place where it is worth while to look at Mark itself and not at its scribes. It is clear enough that Mark is an original Greek book.

In one thing we feel in very complete accord with Mr. Hoskier. We refer to his attitude towards what is now commonly spoken of as "Modernism." We agree with him that what Mr. Robinson Smith, for instance has to say of the Gospels and what Dean Inge for instance has said of Paul in the writings cited is "unfortunate."

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Die Apostelgeschichte. Von der 5. Auflage neu bearbeitet von D. HANS HINRICH WENDT, o. Professor in Jena. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913. Pp. iv 370. Mk. 8 geb. ca. 9.40. (Kritisch-exegetische Kommentar über das Neue Testament begründet von Heinr. Aug. Wihl. Meyer. Dritte Abteilung—9 Auflage.)

Since 1899, there have been many important developments in the study of Acts; the present edition of Wendt's well-known work is therefore to be greeted with satisfaction. Wendt has in general made abundant use of the recent literature though the total ignoring of the most elaborate and perhaps the most valuable of recent commentaries—that of Knowling in the *Expositor's Greek Testament*—constitutes a very serious defect.

The commentary of Wendt is characterized especially by an admirable clearness; the author is at all times in full mastery of his material;

it is very seldom that so learned a work is at the same time so refreshingly easy to use. The method of the commentary is entirely different from that of Meyer; unlike the founder of the undertaking of which the present work forms a part, Wendt is rather sparing in his citation of diverging exegetical opinions, though such citations appear when they are really necessary, and though the author's own view is defended against serious objections. The book is thus kept within reasonable bounds. Yet conciseness never degenerates into obscurity, and the treatment of exegetical difficulties, though brief, is seldom inadequate. In method and in form, this commentary provides an admirable model.

With regard to historical questions, the commentator is pretty clearly naturalistic in his point of view; the miraculous elements in the narrative of Acts are regarded as legendary. Both historical criticism and literary criticism, however, are applied, on the whole, as moderately as is to be expected on the basis of naturalistic presuppositions. The return of Harnack to traditional views as to authorship and date, finds, it is true, no favor with Wendt; the Book of Acts, according to our commentator, was written about A.D. 100 by a man of the post-apostolic age; the post-apostolic point of view is thought to be revealed by important misconceptions on the part of the author with regard to the early history of the Church. On the other hand, however, Wendt rejects altogether the Tübingen conception of the purpose of the book; the chief purpose he believes to be simply historical—the purpose of narrating the facts—though this purpose was supplemented by a disturbing endeavor to make history subservient to edification. The supposed historical defects of the book are thus attributed, not, as the Tübingen scholars believed, to intentional misrepresentation, but to the necessary limitations of an author who lived at a time when the unedifying conflicts of the apostolic age had been largely smoothed away from the memory of the Church; the author presented the facts honestly as he saw them, but he saw them under the presuppositions of his own time.

The treatment of the knotty problem of sources affords abundant scope for Wendt's gift of lucid exposition; with wise elimination of minutiae, the chief generic views are briefly characterized and the author's own solution is clearly presented. Wendt believes that only one source can be clearly distinguished in the Book of Acts, though other sources may well have been used. This source, according to Wendt, embraces the so-called "we-sections" of the book; it was written by a companion of Paul and in all probability by Luke. It is by no means to be limited, however, to the we-sections themselves; these sections are indissolubly connected with their context; the Lucan source embraces not merely the bulk of the narrative from Chapter xiii on, but also the account of Stephen which lies at the base of Chapters vi and vii, and the account of the founding of the Antioch church in xi. 19ff. Of course this Lucan source is

not thought to have been reproduced exactly by the author of the book; on the contrary Wendt thinks it was not only made to conform to the author's own style, but was also supplemented and expanded at many points.

The means by which the Lucan source can be separated from the rest of the book is, according to Wendt, to be found not in any linguistic criteria—for the author has impressed his own style upon the whole—nor chiefly in the higher degree of historical probability which is to be detected in the work of the eye-witness as compared with the other portions of the narrative, but rather in the roughnesses caused by the joining of the source to narratives really contradictory to it. It may be said at this point that such a method of analysis has very uncertain results. The really important difficulty, however, that faces any separation of a Lucan source from elements added by the final author is simply the presence of the first person plural in the narrative; and it cannot be said that Wendt has overcome the difficulty. Why did the final author permit the first person plural of the source to remain? He might conceivably have done so if he had been a mere compiler, if he had reproduced the source in a purely mechanical way. But as a matter of fact he was not a mere compiler; Wendt is in substantial agreement with Harnack as to the literary unity of the book. Why did so skillful a writer remove every peculiarity of the source except the one which most needed removal (compare Harnack, *Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte*, p. 11); why did a writer of the post-apostolic age leave in his work the nonsense of a first person plural in a narrative of events with which he was not personally connected? The only light which Wendt seems to be able to shed upon this question is that the first person plural had impressed itself firmly upon the author's memory and that perhaps he purposely retained this feature of the source just in order to show that he was using the narrative of an eye-witness. This latter suggestion is surely very unsatisfactory; a clumsier way for a post-apostolic writer to call attention to an apostolic source could scarcely be imagined; if the author had any definite purpose in retaining the "we", it could only be that of designing himself (falsely) as an eye-witness, and that he had this purpose Wendt is very properly unable to believe. The truth is, the only natural explanation of the first person plural in the Book of Acts is the old explanation that the author was himself a companion of Paul. The author introduces himself in Acts i. 1 in a thoroughly personal way; Theophilus knew exactly who he was; when therefore in Acts xvi. 10 he suddenly drops into the use of the first person, there could be no reasonable doubt as to what he meant—he meant simply that at Troas he himself had joined the Pauline company and was therefore an eye-witness of the events that followed. The use of the "we" is the most natural thing in the world if the author of the "we-sections" was also the author

of the whole book; on any other hypothesis it presents a literary problem which neither Wendt nor anyone else has succeeded in solving.

With regard to the much discussed question of the Apostolic Council Wendt arrives at very conservative results. The author is thought to have elaborated, in accordance with his own ideas, the information which he had received, but that information itself is rated high; the apostolic decree (Acts xv. 28, 29), in particular, Wendt believes to have been adopted at the time where it is placed by the author of Acts, and essentially in the form in which it appears in the \aleph B text. The error of the author is practically reduced to the assignment by him of a wider scope to the decree than it really had. Wendt has here performed a useful service in the defence of the Book of Acts; and those who accept the Lucan authorship will not find much difficulty in removing the objection that Wendt still allows to stand; it may easily be shown that the author of Acts by no means necessarily implies the imposition of the decree by Paul generally upon Gentile converts. In defending the essential historicity of the decree, an opponent of the Lucan authorship of the book has here refuted admirably what has been regarded as a decisive argument against the traditional view.

Space would fail us to give even any fair sample of the contribution made by this notable commentary to the interpretation of the Book of Acts; every page of the work is worthy of the most careful attention; the author deserves the gratitude of every earnest student. Such gratitude, however, should not be allowed to obscure the momentous issues involved. There are only two really distinct views about the origin of Christianity. The one makes Christianity a product of the creative activity of the transcendent God, an entrance into the world of a new saving power, unlike the ordinary activities of God's providence; the other makes it a product of such forces—call them divine or not as you please—as were already here. The one is the view of the New Testament; the other is the view of modern naturalism. There is no real middle ground; the choice must be made. And Wendt, it is to be feared, has chosen; his confidence in the Lucan history concerns details; the essential message of the Book of Acts is apparently by him rejected.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

Kritische Analyse der Apostelgeschichte. Von JULIUS WELLHAUSEN. Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Neue Folge. Band xv. Nro. 2. Berlin. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 1914. pp. 56.

The literary unity of Acts is well established. The author certainly made use of sources of information other than his own experience, and some of these may have been written sources; but it is difficult to determine the character and extent of the written sources by the

ordinary criteria of literary criticism since the linguistic phenomena—lexical and grammatical—afford no evidence sufficient for their identification. Harnack has recently pointed this out (*Die Apostelgeschichte*, 1908, pp. 131ff). Consequently Harnack has recourse in his analysis of the first half of Acts to considerations indicative of the local and personal origin of the traditions embodied in the narrative. A critical analysis of the book may however raise directly the problem of the historical value of its contents. This Wellhausen does, subjecting each section (incident or speech) to a critical examination, frequently commenting on the variants of the Western text and expressing his opinion about the character, relation and value of the several elements of the narrative. The analysis is keen—at times too keen; blunt affirmation startles; difficulties in the text are uncovered; the records of different events are resolved into an underlying identity; defects even of intelligence are attributed to the author without reckoning with the possibility that something—let us say, “common sense”—may have been expected of the readers. The analysis is not disturbed by any thought of Lucan authorship; it suggests a different origin for narratives within the “We-Sections” and proceeds upon the purely theoretical view, and in explicit opposition to the premise of the author of Acts, that prophecy is vaticinium post eventum.

Some of the more striking features of the “Critical Analysis” concern the Seven, the Apostolic Council, the journey of Paul after his visit to Europe, and the chronology of Paul’s life. Wellhausen calls attention to the fact that the Seven appointed to administer the charitable funds of the Church were all Hellenists. The subsequent activity however of the only two whose work is described was evangelistic; and from this it is inferred that their appointment constituted the establishment not of the deaconate but of another group occupying among the Hellenists the place that the Apostles held among the Hebrews and that like the Apostles their function was not limited to the ministerium mensae but extended also and chiefly to the ministerium verbi. But this plainly presses the facts beyond their natural implications.

In regard to the Apostolic Council Wellhausen follows D, Iren, it etc. in omitting *πνικτόν* from the decree as an addition explanatory of *αἷμα* but retains the ceremonial interpretation—basing it on *αἷμα* which refers not to murder (which fell under the penal law of the State) but to the eating of flesh not properly slaughtered (Gen. ix. 4). The journey of Paul to Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 1f) is identified with the famine visit (Acts xi. 27f) which is the same as the visit described in Acts xv. Both Gal. i. 21 and Acts xv. 23, 41 imply the existence of churches in Syria and Cilicia but not in Pisidia and Lycaonia. The presence of Peter and John moreover shows that the Council must have preceded the death of Herod Agrippa in 44 by whose persecution the Apostles were scattered from Jerusalem. It thus appears that chapter xv has been transposed from its proper place

before chapters xiii and xiv. Of this the following explanation is proposed. The narrative of the Council could not be introduced until a successful work of Paul and Barnabas among the Gentiles had been recorded. But Acts gives no account of the mission in Syria and Cilicia. It was necessary therefore for the narrative of the mission in Lycaonia to precede the narrative of the Council and be presented as the common work of Paul and Barnabas. The obvious chronological objection to this view is met in the usual way by reckoning the fourteen years of Gal. ii. 1 from Paul's conversion. The hypothesis however takes no account of the consideration that the address of the decree may have been limited intentionally—as the question with which the decree dealt arose in Antioch, concerned Antioch chiefly and, in view of the reason for the adoption of its recommendations as given by James (xv. 20), probably was intended for regions in which the Jewish population was large and which were in close proximity to Palestine. The general description by Paul in Gal. i. 21 of the place of his sojourn between his first visit to Jerusalem after his conversion and the visit to the Council is difficult of explanation only on the South Galatian hypothesis of the address of the Epistle.

When Paul left Corinth Acts narrates a journey by way of Ephesus to Syria, mentioning Caesarea and Antioch and probably implying a visit to Jerusalem. The journey is described briefly—according to Wellhausen “in telegram style.” This journey beyond Ephesus is rejected as a duplication of the later journey in xx. 3f as xv. 1f was of xi. 27f. The details upon which this judgment is based are interesting. In xviii. 18 Priscilla is introduced before Aquila to make possible the reference of *κευράμενος* to the latter (but cf. xviii. 26) and is unnatural. Paul leaves his companions behind in Ephesus; but he himself remains also in Ephesus—a faulty antithesis (—was ist das für ein schiefer Gegensatz). The antithesis is faulty however only on Wellhausen's rejection of the journey to Syria (for which therefore the fault here alleged can not constitute a reason. And finally the record indicates no purpose for the journey; but this is an argument from silence to which importance seems to be attached in proportion to the light esteem in which the positive statement of fact is held.

It will have appeared that Wellhausen—in dependence chiefly on Schwartz (“Zur Chronologie des Paulus”, *Nachrichten v. d. kg. Gessellschaft d. Wissenschaften z. Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1907, pp. 263ff)—adopts a very early chronology of the life of Paul. He recognizes that the date of the proconsulship of Gallio has been fixed by the Delphi inscription [not definitely, as it seems to me, but within the limits of two years; cf. this *Review*, 1911 (ix), pp. 293ff, 1913 (xi), pp. 124f] as falling in the year 51-52 (choosing the earlier alternative with Deissmann, Lietzmann and others). The inference drawn from this however is turned chiefly—and of course rightly—

against dating the Council in 52. The considerations really determinative for his view of the Pauline chronology are however the dating of the accession of Festus in 55 and the Council in 44. From the latter it follows that Paul's conversion occurred in 31—reckoning inclusively 14 years before the Council; from the former that Paul arrived in Rome in the beginning of 56 and died there, as Wellhausen holds, in 58. The dating of the Council in 44 and the conversion in 31, is opposed by strong evidence not only in Acts but in Galatians where *ἔπειτα* in ii.1 implies temporal sequence in relation to the preceeding *ἔπειτα* in i.18 and 21, the succession of *ἔπειτα*—three times between the conversion and the Council—making it extremely unlikely that the 14 years of ii.1 is to be counted from the conversion. The date of the accession of Festus is based on the interpretation of xxiv. 27, *διετίας δὲ πληρωθείσης ἔλαβεν διάδοχον ὁ Φῆλιξ Πόρκιον Φῆστον*, as having reference not to the duration of Paul's imprisonment but to the length of the administration of Felix as procurator of the whole province,—a longer administration in Palestine being admitted as required by the statements of both Josephus and Tacitus but limited to Samaria and regarded as contemporary with the administration of Cumanus in Galilee (and Judea—so Josephus, *Ant.* xx. 6. 1-3; *B. J.* ii. 12. 3-7) in accordance with the statement of Tacitus (*Ann.* xii. 54). The interpretation of xxiv. 27 however is not natural; and Schürer has shown (*Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*,⁴ i. p. 570, n. 14) that the statement of Josephus in this matter is more reliable than that of Tacitus. Wellhausen's attempt to maintain the statement of Tacitus (*Israelitische u. jüdische Geschichte*⁷, 1914, p. 340, n. 1) is not satisfactory.

The "Critical Analysis" abounds in pointed statements. One of these, casually added in a footnote, effectively meets a brilliant but unsound hypothesis that has had some influence. Referring to the agitation of the disciples caused by the fact that the one whom they believed to be the Christ had met His death on Golgotha, Wellhausen says (p. 6): "Only because while on earth He had already been regarded as the Messiah did Jesus rise as the heavenly Messiah; the Rabbi of Nazareth could never by death have become the Messiah. Wrede makes the gospel of the resurrection and with it the origin of Christianity impossible". And this is true and accords with the evidence when the witness of the same evidence to the consciousness of Jesus—His claim and resurrection—is accepted. This and this alone sets forth the only adequate cause of the gospel of the resurrection and of the Christian faith and Church.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Kommentar über den Ersten Brief Petri. Von D. G. STÖCKHARDT, Professor am Concordia-Seminar zu St. Louis St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1912. Pp. 230.

This commentary shares in those qualities which were noted in the

work of the same author on the Epistle to the Romans (see PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, vol. viii (1910), pp. 490f.); Dr. Stöckhardt has given us a helpful commentary of a rather old-fashioned kind. A sensible view is maintained with regard to the Petrine authorship and Roman provenience of the epistle, but the treatment of these historical questions will hardly seem adequate to the modern student. The commentary itself is rich in references to older writers, especially to Luther; and Dr. Stöckhardt's own exposition is full and plain.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The History and Literature of the Early Church. By JAMES ORR, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, United Free Church, Glasgow. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton [No Date.] Pp. ix, 180. \$1.00 net.

Dr. Orr's book is a revision of the volume he contributed in 1901 to a series of "Christian Study Manuals" and is intended to serve the purpose of a concise outline of its subjects and to meet the needs of students in College or elsewhere who may be engaged in the study of early Church History. In explanation of its contents Dr. Orr says: "The book is based on the extended lectures in Early Church History given by the author when Professor of Church History in Edinburgh. Although, therefore, necessarily highly condensed, it is believed that few points of importance in the History and Literature of the first three centuries have been overlooked, while the practical experience of teaching has enabled the author to throw into due prominence and perspective those aspects of the subject which are of chief moment." The book fulfils its object fairly well. Its point of view is sound; its judgments sensible. Its chief defects are formal; the style at times is rugged and unfinished, the references to the literature of the subject—the sources, translations, critical or general discussions—are meager, and the suggestions for further study might have been omitted.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica. Geschriften uit den tyd der Hervorming in de Nederlanden. Door DR. S. CRAMER EN DR. F. PYPER. Tiende Deel. De Geschriften van Dirk Philipsz, bewerkt door Dr. F. Pyper. 'S Gravenhage. Martinus Nyhoff 1914.

This is the final volume of a remarkable collection of rare publications dating from the early reformatory period of Dutch ecclesiastical history. The task of editing this volume was originally assigned to Dr. S. Cramer of the City University of Amsterdam and of the Mennonite Seminary in that city. Alas! he passed away January 30, 1913, at a ripe age, without being permitted even to lay the foundations

for the work contemplated. Then it fell to the lot of Dr. F. Pyper to assume the duty; rather a delicate one, as he confesses in the introduction, inasmuch as he does not belong to the Mennonite Church, which considers these ancient documents with almost idolatrous reverence. But no one can read after Dr. Pyper in the various introductions found in this volume, without being convinced that he has not only succeeded in being absolutely objective; but that he has penetrated into the very marrow of the matter, by a rare historical insight, which enabled him to transfer himself into the period, wherein these documents were written, and that he has thus studied men and events as seen from that angle of view.

Who was Dirk Philipsz? In a former volume of this work we have met with the name of Obbe Philipsz, who was Dirk's brother, but the latter far excelled him in ability and abiding influence. The age of the Reformation naturally was an age of apologetics; and especially the Anabaptists, with their inborn radicalism, were continually called upon to defend their position. Thus the "Enchyridion" of Dirk Philipsz, as a collection of apologetical and doctrinal writings, occupies among the literature of the Anabaptists a foremost rank, and is to the Mennonites what the "Locī Communes" were to the Lutherans, Beza's "Confession" to the Huguenots and the "Leken Wechwyser" to the Dutch Reformed. It is only after the publication of the B. R. N. that we have access to some of the sources, needed for sketching the life of Dirk Philipsz. There is no certainty as to the date of his birth, presumably it was in the year 1504. He was apparently the son of a priest at Leeuwarden in Vriesland. It is evident from numerous instances of similar births that, prior to the council of Trent, celibacy, especially in the North of Europe, was a dead letter. He may have been a Franciscan monk in early life, anyhow he was well educated and his writings indicate great erudition. Besides the inevitable Latin, he was apparently acquainted with Hebrew and Greek. Moreover he was able to read and write French and German (Intr. 6). He shows familiarity with Luther's writings and has a singularly clear and trenchant style, far beyond that of most of his literary cotemporaries. Nearly all his books were written in his native tongue, the Low Dutch of the period. Popular as a speaker, with an indomitable will and an attractive personality, he stood side by side with Menno Simons as the father of the reformed Anabaptist sect, called Mennonites, a man of the hour and a maker of destiny in Northern Europe. He joined the Anabaptists in the fatal year 1533, the year of the Münster tragedy. But extravagance and revolution were unknown words in his vocabulary and apparently he took no part in the rebellious activities of the Anabaptists in Vriesland in 1535 (Int. 89). His whole life made for peace and order and consistent Christian living. It is evident from his tract—"De Geestelycke Restitution" that he detested the vagaries of the Münster faction, the millennial kingdom, polygamy, etc. In

1537 he became a great factor in the affairs of the Mennonites and gained a position of leadership, which he maintained to the end. For several years he was hunted by the Inquisition and lived in obscurity, and when the clouds lifted a little we find him at work in East-Frisia, Mecklenburg and Prussia, but he never forgot his fatherland and was always deeply interested in what happened there. He bitterly opposed the liberal and hypocritical tendencies of the followers of Sebastian Franck, whom he publicly attacked in some open letters in 1541; all extremes being evidently repugnant to one of his frank and open temperament. Equally decided was the stand he took in opposition to Adam Pastor, apparently one of his own disciples and sent out into the ministry by him, with whom we have become acquainted through his own published writings in the B. R. N. Vol. V. 361-516. On various points of faith and church-order Adam Pastor evidently was not completely weaned from the old Catholic views, but he was manifestly at variance with many accepted Anabaptist views and was a bitter opponent of the doctrine of the incarnation and a decided Anti-Trinitarian. It would be interesting to trace the connection between these, far from uncommon, departures from the common Christian faith among the early Anabaptists and the astonishing growth of the Socinians, toward the close of the century, largely covering the same territory where the former had greatly flourished. Dirk Philipsz bitterly opposed Adam Pastor and finally excommunicated him (Int. 21), on which account some friction arose between him and Menno Simons.

The Anabaptists were as strict in their opposition to intermarriage between their own members and outsiders as ever the Roman Catholic Church has been, and they compelled people so situated to separate from the other party even to the point of excommunication. On this point Dirk Philipsz fully endorsed the position of his communion. This very question occasioned the final schism between the "Fine" and "Coarse" Anabaptists, otherwise called "Waterlandians" and "Flemingians," in 1555, the foundation of which was the refusal of one Swaantje Rutgers', the wife of an excommunicated Anabaptist, to separate from him. A part of the church at Embden now demanded the excommunication of the woman as well as of the man, whilst another faction opposed such a radical course. The course followed, in the line of Church discipline, by the strict party among the Anabaptists was almost identical with that of the extremists among the early schismatics, in regard to the question of the "Lapsi." Even after repentance, those guilty of great and scandalous sins were to remain outcasts from the Church. The theology of Dirk Philipsz as regards the incarnation of Christ reminds one forcibly of the "docetic Christ" of Gnosticism; that on discipline, of the Donatists of North Africa, since even communication with the excommunicated is strongly deprecated (Ench. 258, Intr. 38). A little later I will refer to the evident influence of these views expressed by Dirk Philipsz

on the formation of the Liturgical Forms of the Dutch Reformed Church. Let me say right here that this doctrine of the complete ostracising of the excommunicated is found first in the Enchyridion and then in the Dutch Form of Excommunication. Speaking of the ban, as it applies to notorious sinners, Philipsz recommends first excommunication then complete separation from the sinner, on the part of the church. Precisely the same line is followed in the Dutch Form. The excommunicated person is to "be accounted as a heathen man and a publican" and the church is exhorted "to keep no company with him." The only hope Dirk Philipsz holds out to them is final restoration and ecclesiastical reconciliation, when after long repentance their lives are open books, in which men can read a true conversion.

Through these and other causes two mutually hostile factions arose in the Anabaptist communion and in 1565 a split had become inevitable. The final conflict was that between the Anabaptists of the cities of Harlingen, Franeker, Leeuwarden and Dokkum, all situated in Frisia. These had formed a secret coalition for a common defense against the Flemings. Meanwhile Dirk Philipsz, who had borne the lion's share of the efforts to prevent an open rupture, was beginning to feel the burden of old age. As early as 1562 he was described as "an old man", and in his writings of that period he himself spoke of writing "with great difficulty and bodily illness". Six years later he died after a busy and stormy life near the city of Embden, having been tracked by the Inquisition the greater part of his life and having come nevertheless to a peaceful and honored end.

The Enchyridion of Dirk Philipsz is a collection of writings which cover many years and a great variety of subjects. Written in a clear and simple style, they touch the fundamental points of Christian doctrine and they evidently formed the mainstay, theologically speaking, of the Dutch Anabaptists in their second historical period. Philipsz treats of "The confession of our faith, of baptism, of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, of the true knowledge of Jesus Christ, of the exposition of the tabernacle of Moses, of regeneration, of spiritual restitution, and of the Church of God". The remaining 250 pages of the volume before me are filled with varia, mostly referring to the disturbed inner life of the Anabaptist communion, of which the narrative of the events leading to the schism, the tracts on "the marriage of Christians" and on the attitude of husbands and wives to excommunicated partners would seem to be the most important.

In his theology Philipsz is absolutely trinitarian, although he holds the most singular views in regard to the human nature of Christ. These are broadly stated in his "Bekentnisse onses Gheloofs" (Ench. 61) and are more fully developed in his tract on the incarnation (Ench. 135, 153). Christ is a true man, but his humanity is in no wise connected with the body of Mary. As God created a body for Adam, so He created one for Christ. Or as other Anabaptist writers expressed it—He passed through Mary as light passes through glass.

For the rest both his theology and soteriology seem to be in accord with accepted Catholic orthodoxy. In his extended treatise on baptism, no reference whatever is made to the rite of baptism. Not even by implication does he refer to immersion, the very idea never seems to have occurred to him. I have searched in all the Anabaptist writings, reprinted in the "Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica", in vain for any reference to it. Neither here nor in Adam Pastor's works, nor in the accounts of the Inquisitorial proceedings against Anabaptist prisoners is there a trace of it.

A matter of great interest, especially to those acquainted with the Liturgy of the Dutch Reformed Church, is the familiar sound of many phrases found in the writings of Dirk Philipsz, which seem to be re-echoed in the Dutch Forms, especially those referring to the sacraments. Is it through John a Lasco, who labored in these regions, specially under the influence of Anabaptist efforts at reform, and who must have been familiar with many of the works of Philipsz, that this echo has come down to us? The Enchyridion was published in 1564, but of its separate writings many had appeared earlier, those on the sacraments *e.g.* twenty years before this date. One thing is evident—whoever wrote these Forms must have had read the Enchyridion. Thus we read in the Dutch Form: "En alhoewel onze jonge kinderen deze dingen niet verstaan, zoo zal men ze nogthans daarom van den doop niet uitsluiten". Here I read:—"Nademaal nu de jonge kinderen van alles wat de doop beteechent ende daer by behoort niet en weten noch verstaen noch en hebben, daerom so en coemt haer ooc de doop niet toe", (Ench. 73). The one evidently is an echo of or a rejoinder to the other.

Again Dirk Philipsz sees in the deluge a type or symbol of baptism (Ench. 78, 79), and in the prayer of the Dutch Form of baptism we find this identical typical use made of the deluge, in practically the same terms. Or take the Form of communion:—

Says Philipsz, "Soo en sien wy principael niet op de wtwendighe teecken en maer op Jesus Christus selven" (Ench. 103). Of the believer it is said, "die wordt ghespyst metten hemelschen manna, ja die eet dat vleesch en drinckt dat bloet Jesu, maer geestelyck met den mond der sielen en niet vleeschelyck met dem mond dss lyfs" (Ench. 114). And the Dutch Form has it, "Opdat wy dan met het waarachtige hemelsch brood Christus gespyzigt mogen worden zoo laat ons met onze harten niet aan het uiterlyke brood en den wyn blyven hangen maar dezelve opwärts verheffen, waar Christus Jezus is, enz".

Again Philipsz says, "Want alle geloovigen worden door eenen Gheest tot een lyf gedoopt" (Ench. 121). "Ooc dat sy met malcander vereenicht syn als leden eens lichaems, als een broot wt vele coornen en een wyn wt veel besyen" (Ench. 132). The Dutch form reads, "Daarbeneven dat wy ook door dien Geest onder elkander als leden van een lichaam in waarachtige broederlyke liefde verbonden worden, gelyk de heilige apostel spreekt-' een brood is het zoo zyn wy velen

een lichaam dewyl wy allen een brood deelachtig zyn." "Want gelyk uit vele graankorrels een meel gemalen en een brood gebakken wordt, en uit vele bezien saamgeperst zynde een wyn en drank vliet en zich onder een vermengt enz."

It is almost startling to read the final sentences of Philipsz's tract on communion and to compare them with the Dutch Form. Here, "Een iegelyk spreke in zyn hart aldus- Loof den Heere myne Ziel", etc. There, "Spreect metten Propheet-Loeft den Heere myn siele ende alle wat etc." (Ench, 132). The closing prayer of the Form appears startlingly like an adaptation of the closing words of the treatise before me (Ench. 133). It is impossible for me, with the two documents before me, to conceive that the similarity between them is a mere accident.

In his discussion of the sacraments Dirk Philipsz unconsciously advances a strong argument against a legend, which has been current in Baptist circles, viz. that the Anabaptists are the historical continuation of the Waldenses or rather of the "Old Evangelical" churches, which are said to have been in existence from the days of the Apostles. This theory has been stoutly defended by L. Keller in his "Staupitz und die Anfänge der Reformation". Leipzig, 1888, and in his "Reformation und die ält. Reform. Parteien". 1885. But this position has been clearly met and rejected by Mueller and Kolde. Dirk Philipsz, who was evidently one of the best informed, if not the best informed man among the Anabaptists of his time, ought to have known of such a historic succession, if it existed at all. And the argument *à silentio* is all the stronger since he refers to the Waldenses in his Enchyridion. He admits that there must always have been a core of evangelical believers, even in the darkest days of the Church (Ench. f. 244), also that he and his followers confess themselves one with the true Church of God from the beginning, *i.e.* with the true Christian apostolic and catholic Church (Ench. f. 97). But the only reference to the Waldenses, he makes is in a quotation from Luther—Item hy bekyft die Waldenses die haar kinderen doopen en toch niet geloouen dat sy een eigen geloof hebben, ende also Gods naem ydel noemen ende voeren". (Ench. f. 82). On the fundamental point of baptism the Waldenses were therefore at variance with the Anabaptists.

In his discussion of the call to the ministry, Philipsz lays stress both on the immediate and mediate call, the one of God, the other of the Church. He presents a high ideal and expects much from the ministry, he demands irreproachableness in life and doctrine and ability to teach. The times point at bitter experiences and crossbearing (Ench. 223), but he admonishes to fidelity. As has been said, Dirk Philipsz sides with the strict party in regard to discipline and the ban, all deliberate and unrepented sins call for irrevocable excommunication (Ench. 259). The Church as the bride of Christ must maintain her purity to avoid slander, for only thus the final salvation of the sinner can be attained (1 Cor. v. 5). This strict construction of the doctrine of the ban

is everywhere stoutly maintained by the author (Ench. f 137, 138, 250, 268, 277, etc.). But in this very strictness lay the menace of a coming schism.

It is impossible to discuss in detail the contents of the Enchyridion, which seems to me to be by far the most reliable source of information, as regards the theology and life of the Dutch Anabaptists, inasmuch as Dirk Philipsz is consistently conservative and was evidently considered an authority and as such was looked up to by the greater part of the Anabaptists of his time, exerting a far greater and more abiding influence than such men as Adam Pastor and Sebastian Franck. The contents of the Enchyridion read easily, they have a certain rhythm which appeals to the reader and the prevailing tone is characteristically that of the Old Testament. Its finished style, its lucidity, incisiveness and scripturalness make it fully worth while to the student who wishes to know at first hand what these hounded and hated Anabaptists really stood for.

The balance of this last volume of the B.R.N. consists in the main of controversial tracts written by Dirk Philipsz. First of all comes a reply to the letters of the popular but liberal Anabaptist leader, Sebastian Franck, who apparently, through Coornhert, author of "Wellevenskunst", exerted a considerable influence on the development of the Arminian controversy. Franck appears to have questioned the absolute authority of the Scriptures, he clung to the old Catholic Church with one hand and extended the other to the Anabaptists. He despised the sacraments and laughed at discipline, denied the necessity of a visible Church and made light of the call to the ministry. Ministers, he claimed, had to experience an outward, miraculous, divine call, like the prophets of old, and must substantiate this call by miracles and wonders. Against all these new fangled doctrines of Franck, Philipsz bitterly inveighs in his open letter, and yet his attack is free from the coarseness which characterizes the controversial writings of the leaders of the Reformation, especially of Luther.

The "Sendtbrief aen de Vier Steden" (Franeker, Leeuwarden, Harlingen and Dokkum) affords us a comprehensive and intimate view of the causes, which led to the great schism in the ranks of the Anabaptists, viz. the split between the Flemingians and Waterlandians. It is a weird story of dissent and underhand measures, of ignoble efforts to obtain the upperhand in the struggle between two contending factions, of the abuse of the power of the keys, of vain appeals to the simple unwritten constitution of the Anabaptist communion and of vain hopes, on the part of better minded partisans in the struggle, to use the great and acknowledged influence of Dirk Philipsz to prevent the coming schism.

Hindered from coming himself, Philipsz tried to allay the coming storm, but alas in vain, and thus he wrote the tender, wonderful epistle before us. The heart of the matter lay in the relation between the Church and the ministry and therefore Philipsz added to his epistle

the official declaration regarding the call and office of the ministry, passed at Embden in 1565, and subscribed by all the pastors who adjudicated the case of Leendert Bouwensz, pastor at Embden, a warm friend of Dirk, who had been guilty of repeated and wilful neglect of pastoral duty. This declaration laid stress on the importance of a localized ministry and permitted absence from one's post only with the consent of the church he served.

But all efforts went for naught and the bitter internal strife in the ranks of the Anabaptists, as De Hoop Scheffer has plainly shown, largely influenced the astonishing growth of the Reformed Church in Holland, since 1566.

Dirk Philipsz may have been somewhat dictatorial; old leaders usually exhibit such a tendency; his enemies called him "touchy and hasty"; firm and decided in his opinions he certainly was; but the reading of his writings seems to impress one with a sense of leadership rarely found among his communion, he appears to make for peace and becomes irascible only when age has enfeebled him and when the hope for peace, through his efforts, seems to have completely failed. The brochure "*Cort doch Grondtlich Verhael*", of nearly twenty pages is invaluable as a source for the study of the history of the schism. Dr. Pyper calls it "both a defense and justification" of Dirk Philipsz. What sorrow of heart speaks in every line of it! What bitter pain at the defection of old friends and disciples! Critical investigation and comparison of other documents touching this schism seem to assure us of the trustworthiness of this narrative of Philipsz. He seems to feel that the foundations of the Anabaptist communion are crumbling, his own standing and authority are destroyed and he is now old and ill, whilst his whole life has been an endless fight for the faith as he knew it and preached it.

But the struggle ever grew in bitterness, as the appendix to his "*Cort Verhaal*" proves. The commonest duties, e.g., that of shielding the brethren from persecution, were forgotten and names of brethren, who were attacked, were given in full, to play, as it were, into the hands of the common enemy (Ench. 606).

Then follows the last writing of Philipsz, the little booklet "*Van den Echt der Christenen*". In the vocabulary of the Anabaptists "Christians" are members of their own communion. All the others are lost. Under their strict laws, no matter how much a man loved his wife, if he had married her outside of the communion, the ban was applied. The tract is addressed to those who did not sympathize with this extreme view. Dirk has no patience with mixed marriages, all outsiders are of the world; if believers are "unequally yoked with unbelievers" the believing party must separate from the unbelieving, as had been demanded by Ezra and Nehemiah. The couple must separate; but if the man is the sinner, he is compelled to maintain his former wife. All this applies only to mixed marriages when one had joined the Anabaptist communion before marriage. If marriage was contracted

before the "conversion" of either party, the law did not apply, for in such cases there remained the hope of bringing the other party into the fold. This brochure, coupled with that on the "Ban" gives us a tolerably correct view of the ascetic attitude of life of the Anabaptists. *Separation from the world*—was their motto. But in this very tendency lay the rock on which they were to split asunder. We find the same historic phenomenon in the Manichaean, Catharistic and Puritan movements.

The volume closes with a reprint of a letter of consolation and encouragement, addressed to an Anabaptist woman, awaiting martyrdom at Antwerp, and other correspondence, in reference to the trouble among the Anabaptists; and last of all we find here samples of hymns, written by our author for use in worship, as is evident from the tunes to which they are to be sung.

All in all this tenth volume of the B. R. N. is one of the most interesting and valuable of the entire series. What a pity that Dr. Cramer did not live long enough to see the completion of this monumental work, by which the editors have placed Church historians under a lasting debt of gratitude. Hereafter the thorough study of the early reformatory movements in the Netherlands, especially those covering the Anabaptist period of the Dutch reformation, will be far more practicable than before these volumes were issued. Even the most earnest and painstaking student formerly had to travel from point to point to search out these rare and almost forgotten sources, scattered in different libraries at widely separated points; and even then of necessity his knowledge must remain fragmentary because he could not be expected to reach them all. Now, thanks to the B. R. N., these scattered sources are accessible to all, in a handy compass. And therefore all Church historians will unite in expressing to the editors of this monumental work, Dr. Cramer (deceased) and Dr. Pyper, their liveliest gratitude for this labor of love. Such work is usually a thankless task, the market for it is small, the reward practically nothing. And yet we venture to say that nothing these scholars have done or may do, will ever level up to the importance and value of the difficult task of editing for the scholarly world this treasury of an almost lost and forgotten early Dutch Reformation literature. The students of Church history, the world over, crown them for it with a chaplet of immortelles.

Louisville, Ky.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

A Guide to the Study of Church History. By W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, Ph.D. (Berlin), D.D. Professor of Church History in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1914. \$1.50 net.

We heartily recommend this new and revised edition of Dr. McGlothlin's *Guide* as one of the most satisfying treatises of this kind. The author has admirably succeeded in presenting the outstanding facts and movements in the history of the Church in a concise yet comprehensive and quite readable form.

Throughout the volume references are made to four standard manuals of Church history representing as many confessional viewpoints: Newman (Baptist), Hurst (Methodist), Kurtz (Lutheran), and Alzog (Roman Catholic). These works will serve to introduce the student to the general literature on any phase of the whole subject.

The treatise is clearly outlined and fairly proportioned. Considering the limited compass of the *Guide*, the treatment of the Eastern Church, after its separation from the Western, is exceptionally well managed, and the same is true also of the last division of the book (1789-1914). As is natural the author gives special attention to the Baptists, but this does not defeat his aim to do justice to all denominational interests.

The value of the *Guide* is enhanced by the addition of a good Index and an Appendix containing chronological lists of popes, emperors, kings, etc.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Mysticism and The Creed. By W. F. COBB, D.D. Rector of St. Ethelburga's in the City of London. London: Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. 559.

The occasion of this book, the author says, is to be found in the fact that the works on the Apostles' Creed, such as those of Caspari, Kattenbusch, Harnack, Zahn, Burn, and McGiffert, are for the most part concerned with the form or the history of the Creed, and only secondarily, if at all, with its content or meaning. But Dr. Cobb is not concerned with its historical or literal meaning, *i.e.*, with what the Creed was originally intended to teach, but with its "mystical" or "inner" meaning. And this is described as being its meaning from the point of view which modern thought has caused to be that of the "ordinarily well instructed Christian".

In the times in which the Creed was constructed, the underlying religious philosophy, Dr. Cobb says, was widely different from that which now prevails. Then men believed in miracles, *i.e.*, in events in the external world due to the immediate power of God acting apart from second causes, events which therefore are inexplicable by second causes or so called laws of Nature. Nowadays, he says, all this has changed. Modern thought has taught us the uniformity of Nature and the inviolability of natural law and the impossibility of miracles. A radical, *i.e.*, a common sense man, or, in Dr. Cobb's language, "an elementary soul" for whom "a thing is or is not", would be for casting aside the Creed—nay Christianity itself. Not so, however, the mystic. The latter can see not only the inner meaning and value of the Creed, but he realizes, unless he be a fanatical and extreme mystic, that the Life which constitutes religion in general and the Christian religion in particular, must manifest itself in forms. Indeed it would seem

that Dr. Cobb would show how it must manifest itself in just these historical forms. Hence, while he baldly proclaims that the historical element in Christianity is derived from pagan myths and gnostic speculation, he nevertheless seems to believe in the permanent value of these forms.

By this time it will be evident that what Dr. Cobb gives in this volume is not an interpretation of the Apostles' Creed, but rather a philosophy of religion. When we say this, however, we are not meaning to find fault with him, for it is beyond dispute that a philosophy, *i.e.*, a definite conception of God and His relation to the world, underlies the statements of the Creed taken in their literal and historical sense. The question is what is Dr. Cobb's religious philosophy, and will it allow us to "interpret" the Creed, or will it force us to misinterpret it, and whether this philosophy will leave us with any Christianity in any historically defensible sense.

Dr. Cobb's philosophy is that reality is Life, and that Life, whether it be that of God the "Supreme Spirit", or that of our finite spirits, is self-determined in itself, and that too after a sort of Bergsonian capricious fashion, but that Life submits itself to the "mechanical process when it goes out of itself into objectivity". It is, therefore, only in the inner world that freedom rules, while in the world of external manifestation, both God and man are bound fast by mechanical necessity. It would appear, then, that neither God nor man could be possessed of a life which could be characterized as that of a free spirit, or at least that the sphere in which God and man can be called free agents and really live their true life, is a very limited one.

But this is not the whole of the matter, nor the worst of it. For the only self-conscious subject which we know—whether God or man—is always in duration or time, and hence is subject to the law of absolute necessity. If, therefore, we would penetrate the sphere of Religion, Life, and Freedom, we must seek a sphere where duration and time are no more, and this is just the sphere of the Unconscious which, to become conscious or attain consciousness, must put on the "mantle of time" and evolve in time, subject to the laws of a necessary and mechanical evolution.

In religion, therefore, we have to do with a "life-process" and the outward forms in which it has manifested itself. In a word, we have life and form, freedom and authority, mysticism and history, and the problem is how to reconcile them. This is the problem discussed in the first chapter entitled "Mysticism and Tradition". The extreme mystic lets go of history altogether, but is attempting the impossible since Life unexpressed is unconscious. Life and form are inseparable. The traditionalist, on the other hand, has his true life crushed by a literal adherence to dead forms. But the "practical mystic" realizes that both life and form are necessary, and his position is "that he lives his life and accepts the form that is provided". This sounds rather indefinite. This statement quoted is immediately followed and explained

by the statement that the mystic's duty is "to listen to what the voice of his inner life bids him to do, and then to make full use of the forms that tradition offers him". But this statement is far from clearing up the matter. The mystic is to follow some inner voice as regards his action, but will he then know the inner meaning of credal forms? And of precisely what use will religious truths and credal forms of statement be to him? The answer to these questions does not seem easy to give. Dr. Cobb is, however, ready with an answer. He goes on to say that the mystic must interpret for himself the credal forms which tradition gives him, and in doing this he must seek their inner or mystical meaning. Every vision, every mystical experience, Dr. Cobb says, unless it is to "remain sterile", must find some means by which its energy can be brought to bear on others, that is to say, it must take on a "form". But the form can never yield the inner meaning to one who has not had the mystical experience.

Applying this to the Creed, in the chapter on "Mysticism and the Creed", Dr. Cobb says that the Creed wears a philosophical and a historical form, but that his concern is not with either of these, but with its hidden Life. Its Trinitarian form, when thus approached, constitutes no difficulty, but will be found to express some experience which the mystic has of God. And yet being a mere doctrine or outer form, it must be criticised and brought into harmony with any fuller knowledge of God we may possess in our modern life. And when the mystic comes to the historical portion of the Creed which "tells the life-story of Jesus Christ", he will "see there not so much the story of a particular life, as of a universal and, therefore, a typical life". And the details of this life, the mystic will "construe as forming his own ideal life-story, without troubling himself unduly about the historical side of them". Thus the Virgin Birth of Jesus, His Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension, the mystic will be concerned neither to affirm nor to deny. As historical facts they are indifferent to him. As a religious man and a mystic he will approach them as symbols of events on the pathway of the true life. "Virgin Birth, Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension, are not only moments in the life of one Individual, but are moments in His because they have cosmic significance, and in some degree have always been part of the world-order". But this, Dr. Cobb continues, is not to regard the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth as a myth and the Gospel story as unhistorical, for Life and Event are complementary and not mutually exclusive.

Enough has been said to make it quite clear that for Dr. Cobb the historical facts of Christianity are not after all "complementary to" the Christian life, and an essential part of Christianity, but something completely indifferent, and in no sense an essential part of the Christian religion. The great historical events of Christianity are regarded as mere symbols of religious truths. Thus the Virgin Birth means that God imparts His life to Jesus and to every believer. The Crucifixion in its "essence" symbolizes the inner crucifixion of self to which Jesus

submitted, and which must be repeated in each of His followers. It is not the Cross of Christ which saves the sinner, but the principle of self-sacrifice. Dr. Cobb quotes with approval Scheffler's lines on the "Mystic Catholic", two of which lines illustrate pointedly his own view—

"The Cross on Golgotha will never save thy soul;
The Cross in thine own heart alone can make thee whole."

Similarly the Resurrection of Christ is a symbol of His continued life and power, and of the rising of the believer to a higher life. The Ascension likewise is "not so much a physical happening—though he (the mystic) is not called on to deny this—as the last act in the long drama of the birth, pilgrimage, and home coming of the soul, which out of many tribulations has its life now hid with Christ in God".

If, then, the great facts of Christ's life are only symbols of what goes on in the life of the soul of man, Dr. Cobb is quite logical in regarding the question of their historical reality as a matter of indifference. What possible difference can it make whether or not these symbols actually happened as real historical events in Christ's life, so long as we hold fast the inner truth which they set forth? The story of the Cross of Jesus is as good as the actual occurrence of the Crucifixion if it is only a symbol to teach self-sacrifice, and nothing more. Consequently it is not a matter of importance or interest to follow Dr. Cobb through his entire discussion to find out how much of the historical events of Christianity he really does accept.

On this point he is neither clear nor consistent. He would seem to believe that Jesus really lived and died. The Virgin Birth, while said to be a matter of indifference as a "physical fact", Dr. Cobb would not be unwilling to admit, were it not for the silence of the New Testament on the subject outside the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke which he does not regard as historically trustworthy. This would appear to be a denial of the fact of the Virgin Birth, based upon a supposed lack of evidence, Dr. Cobb apparently having totally forgotten that earlier in the volume he had declared such a miracle to be impossible. The Resurrection of Christ's body is apparently denied, and Dr. Cobb supposes that the body which Jesus assumes is the body of each believer who surrenders his will to Him.

Thus from his lofty mystical position of indifference to the great Christian facts, Dr. Cobb seems to pass over to the denial of them, or at least some of them, and to the reduction of all of them alike to mere symbols of religious truths. And this being so, we repeat that he is right in affirming that their historical reality is a matter of complete indifference.

But we must go on to say—and here Dr. Cobb halts in his logic—that upon this view of the historical facts of Christianity, the existence of Jesus Himself is a matter of indifference. For if God did not enter this sinful world and intervene through His Son for man's salvation, if Christ is not the Saviour of sinners, but only a symbol of religious

truth, His very existence becomes a matter of indifference. In short, upon these principles one can have a Christianity without Christ.

But this leads us finally to remark that what Dr. Cobb has given us is not Christianity at all, but just the truths of bare natural religion construed in his mystical and half pantheizing fashion. He has reduced his Christianity to the level of the natural religious sentiment, and thereby has done away with it altogether. For Christianity is not the product of the natural religious sentiment of man. No more easy way of substituting one's own religious philosophy for Christianity could be conceived than Dr. Cobb's "mystical interpretation" of the Creed. Christianity is an historical religion. Its nature is to be historically determined. From the outset it consisted in the belief in a Divine Saviour from sin; in redemption through atoning blood; in the power of Christ's Resurrection. One can accept or reject it, but one has no right to read his own philosophy into a Christian creed, and then say this is what Christianity really is.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

A Constructive Basis for Theology. By JAMES TEN BROEKE, PH.D.
Professor of Philosophy in McMaster University, Toronto, Canada.
London: MacMillan & Co. 1914. Pp. 400.

The idea of the author is that philosophical thought furnishes a constructive basis for theology, and that contemporary philosophy affords a better basis than does either ancient philosophy, or modern philosophy, broadly speaking.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the origin and development of Christian theology. Its "antecedents" are traced to ancient philosophy, an outline of which is given in the second chapter. Then the meaning of Christianity is discussed, and the Patristic and Mediaeval theology outlined in a historical sketch occupying two chapters. In this period the idea of an external authority, whether ecclesiastical or Biblical, was the controlling factor in theology. Then came the modern revolution in thought, and the erection of the principle of Individualism. This gave rise to a new philosophy, and consequently to a new theology.

Part two traces the history of this modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, and from Kant through the post-Kantian German Idealism and Romanticism, and then, in the three following chapters, it is shown how this issued in a new theology in Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and others. These modern types of theology are all characterized by basing theological knowledge on an internal or subjective authority, emphasizing either the intellect, feeling, or will, as the case may be.

Professor Ten Broeke concludes, however, that none of these systems has become the theology of the present day, and he seeks, in the third part of the volume, to show that in certain phases of contemporary thought is to be found a constructive basis for a new theology, which theology, however, he says he will not attempt to construct, though

he devotes a chapter to briefly outlining its view in regard to certain Christian doctrines.

This volume, it will thus be seen, is to a large extent—*i.e.*, throughout its first two parts—occupied with an outline of the history of philosophy and theology. It will be of more interest, therefore, for us to discuss the author's own point of view on the fundamental questions involved in the third part of the book.

The first question which must be determined is what is the author's idea of the nature and task of theology? He speaks of theology (p. 6) as "the science of God or, as we may more freely say, the science of religious experience". Here at the outset confusion is introduced by the identification of two things which are quite distinct. Any science which deals with religious experience as its object is a branch of psychology or anthropology. To identify this with theology which has God for its object, is only to confuse matters at the outset. When, however, we examine the author's treatment of the subject, we discover that it is the definition of theology as the science of religious experience which he really adopts. In the analysis of a positive religion, he tells us (p. 4), it is important to distinguish between the primary experience of the Founder and the interpretation or dogma or theology which is developed. Theology is thus regarded as the "interpretation" of religious experience. According to this idea, Christian theology is the result of a long process, no part of which is regarded by Dr. Ten Broeke as being pathological or destructive of Christianity. There is to be distinguished, in the case of a positive religion, the experience of the Founder and his teachings or interpretations of his experience; then there are the numerous interpretations of the significance of the Founder's experience and teaching; there next follows the embodiment of these doctrines in the life of the religious community; then comes the religious experience of the individual Christian in response to his environment; and finally the individual's own interpretation of his religious experience in the light of his own knowledge. This last is his theology which is thus a "secondary" product. This derivative or "secondary" character of theology is made still more emphatic from the standpoint of epistemology, when Dr. Ten Broeke affirms that "truth is always for use. Its validity, necessity, and universality, are such only because these formulations are a successful means to satisfy the conduct of life" (pp. 6 and 7).

It is obvious that two questions are here involved. The first is the nature and validity of knowledge, and the second is the relation of theology to Christian experience. This latter is the question involved in the above set of five distinctions, and need not be complicated or involved by this set of distinctions. For it is simply the question of the relation of experience to doctrine.

As regards the first question, the author asserts that the validity of truth consists in a proposition or idea being a successful means to the conduct of life. In a word, truth is that which works. This idea

of knowledge and truth will not stand the test of facts in any sphere of life and experience. To take an example from ordinary life—it may not “work” at all—except in a fatal way against life—for a patient with organic heart disease to know the real nature of his malady. Take, again, but one example of religious truth—the thought of future punishment may work well in helping some people to the better “conduct of life”, and yet it may not work thus at all with others. Can we decide, then, whether the doctrine of future punishment is true or not by asking whether it helps or “works” in the “conduct of life”? Obviously we cannot decide whether or not an idea or proposition is true by any such pragmatic tests. A proposition is not true because it works; it works because it is true. Indeed truth in some cases may not “work” at all. There are undoubted truths which seem to have no “functional relation” whatever to “the conduct of life”—to use the language of the pragmatist.

It is surprising, however, to find Dr. Ten Broeke apparently adopting the position of the pragmatist, because in a later chapter he criticises Pragmatism acutely. If Pragmatism is a false view of truth and knowledge, then theology is not a “secondary product” in the sense that its doctrines are mere aids to religious life, nor can this be the test of their truth and validity.

The second question concerned the relation of experience to theology or doctrine. Theology is said by Dr. Ten Broeke to be a “secondary product” because it is the interpretation of religious experience, and because thought presupposes something to think about. This last statement is obviously true, or, let us say, a truism. Thought does presuppose something to think about, and of course theological thought has an object which is thought of. Its object, however, is not religious experience, but God who is the object of that experience. Moreover the religious experience is determined and conditioned by an idea of God or a theological doctrine. Likewise in the case of Christian experience and Christian theology, the experience is conditioned by the Christian revelation. This revelation is the primary matter, and not the theology which we construct from it. But the revelation itself contains thoughts or truths which condition and determine both Christian theology and Christian experience. In a certain sense the theology itself when formulated conditions the experience. Theology, therefore, seeks the truth about God, that is, ideas which correspond with the nature of God as He really is. The nature of theology is, therefore, determined by the nature of the revelation which God has made of Himself.

The second fundamental question concerns the relation of theology to philosophy. The author argues from the necessity for unity in our own experience and knowledge, that Christian theology must be harmonized with what we believe to be a true philosophy. That this position embodies an important truth should be recognized, though it is a different matter as to the way in which Dr. Ten Broeke carries out this idea. Christian theology has God as its object. Christianity claims

to be the final and supernatural revelation of God. It cannot, therefore, escape attacks from false philosophy, nor refuse the defense of philosophical apologetics. Is there a God? Can He be known? Can He reveal Himself in a supernatural way? These are questions the answers to which are presuppositions of Christian theology. They are the subjects dealt with by philosophical apologetics. It is impossible to keep our theology in one pocket and our philosophy in another. Over against the fashionable scorn of philosophical apologetics, Dr. Ten Broeke's contention is fully justified. But this is not to say that philosophy is to supply the "form" which Christian "principles" are to be made to assume. The author says (p. 367) that we are to find in our Lord's moral and religious consciousness "eternal principles", and that we are to separate them from their "historical form" and to "unify them" with all other principles known by us. This really means that Dr. Ten Broeke adopts the old rationalistic distinction between the kernel and the husk, and amounts to saying that we are to put our Christianity into the moulds of our philosophy. The inevitable result of such a process is that what we get as a result is not the Christianity of the New Testament, but just our own philosophical notions. That this is so is illustrated by the case of T. H. Green and the Cairds whose so called Christianity is really nothing but Hegelianism. Dr. Ten Broeke's method, it must be said, is not precisely that of this Hegelianized theology. He has a chapter in which he first seeks to state certain fundamental Christian truths, and then subsequently to harmonize them with his philosophical views. But one can easily see that his philosophy rather than a careful exegesis of the New Testament, was the determining factor in his statement of these Christian doctrines.

This leads us naturally and necessarily to ask thirdly, what is his view of the nature of Christianity. Dr. Ten Broeke's treatment of this subject is vitiated by a false method of procedure. He says that there are certain truths in common between believers in the historical Christianity of the New Testament and the "liberal school" which distinguishes an "interpretative element" which is the "faith" or "dogmatic" of the first Christian believers. It is these truths which are held in common by these two different views of Christianity which are essential and which are to be related to contemporary thought. But this method can only result in giving us a reduced Christianity, and amounts to a foregone conclusion in favor of the "liberal school". The ideas expressed by the terms Son of Man, Son of God, Messiah, and all the sayings which deal with the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, are all said by the author to belong to the "interpretative or apologetic" element in the New Testament, and not to be essential to Christianity (p. 317); while the essential element is supposed to come from Jesus—that is, "the Kingdom of God and its coming; God the Father and the infinite worth of the human soul; the better righteousness, and the command of love" (p. 55). Of course these truths are common to believers in New Testament Christianity and to the "liberal school", though

the latter neglects the eschatological aspect of Jesus' teaching concerning the Kingdom of God. Indeed most of these ideas are identical with those of natural religion based on a theistic conception of God. The fact that they are common to the New Testament Christianity and to the Christianity of the liberal theology does not by any means render them constitutive of the essence of Christianity. Rather does the fact that they are shared by theistic religious philosophy show that they are not the peculiar marks of Christianity. We have here two essentially and wholly different views of Christianity, and an answer should be sought earnestly to the question which is the true one. Dr. Ten Broeke, on the contrary, assumes that the critical opinions of the "liberal school" of New Testament criticism are true and well founded. He makes no attempt to examine the question for himself. Had he done so he might have found that all these ideas which are said not *really* to come from Jesus, were *actually* taught by our Lord according to the supposed sources of the Synoptic Gospels. It can be denied that these ideas come from Jesus Himself only by a purely subjective method of criticism which presupposes that Jesus could not have had these ideas, and that they must therefore come from some other source. This whole method is purely subjective and without scientific value. Then in addition there is the question of the authority of the Apostles as teachers, and of Christ's relation to them, and as to whether Apostolic Christianity is not essential Christianity. This question Dr. Ten Broeke leaves hanging in the air. These are questions which must be first decided and not assumed, before we can state the meaning of Christianity. To assume that all which distinguishes Christianity from natural religion is unessential, is to reduce Christianity to the level of natural religion, and so to destroy it, for Christianity is not the product of man's religious nature. It is a historical religion, and its nature is to be historically determined in all its fulness. It can never be done by any such process as that which Dr. Ten Broeke has followed.

We have limited ourselves to the discussion of the author's views on these fundamental questions, which are not only fundamental in themselves, but fundamental for the theme of this book. In these matters we are obliged to differ with the author. There are, however, other matters in his book of which it would have been interesting to speak. There is his treatment of special Christian doctrines, and the interpretation given them by what he calls contemporary thought. There is also the historical sketch of contemporary thought, which is clearly and concisely stated, and shows the author's acquaintance with recent philosophical literature. It is, indeed, in its history of philosophical thought that the chief merit of this volume lies. As furnishing a constructive basis for theology, or as giving an idea of what Christianity is, and what Christian theology should be, we cannot regard the volume as a success.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

La Philosophie de la Croix. Par JULES GINDRAUX. Genève: J.-H. Jeheber, Libraire-Éditeur, 28, Rue du Marché. Paris: Libraire Fischbacher, 33 rue de Seine. Fr. 3.50. Pp. viii, 309, with Table des Matières at close.

Following an opening chapter on preliminary questions, the philosophy of Christian redemption is discussed in four subsequent chapters in the light of the pagan religions, the Jewish idea of expiation, the affirmations of Christ and the apostles; and its development is traced in the Christian Church from apostolic times, by way of the Reformation and Schleiermacher, down to the present day.

M. Gindraux begins his philosophy of the Cross with the threefold assumption of a sinless Christ, human sin, and the existence of the God of the Bible (p. 12). For him God's holiness is His attachment to the moral law, to the moral good (pp. vii, 24, 108). There is in God retributive or vindictory justice, and the cross is an homage, a sacrifice to this moral requirement of Deity (pp. 20, 31, 211, 280-282). It is a λύτρον, or ransom, but one paid to Divine justice and not to the devil, as some earlier dogmaticians fancied (pp. 148, 226. Cf. p. 168). This emphasis on the judicial aspect of the cross M. Gindraux is careful to maintain. He looks upon the modern view as an attempt to turn the cross into a "pedagogical instrument" (p. 270. Cf. p. 290), with no justice in it at all. Nevertheless, the cross is an exhibition: he calls it "a pillory" (p. 33), presenting Christ to the eyes of all ages. It is accordingly an appeal (p. 83). But its ultimate *raison d'être*, the author rightly claims, can never be sought in its spectacular influences down the ages, never in what it *exhibits*, but alone in what it *does*.

The Pauline presentation of the atonement is substantially accepted and defended. Paul has given, the author says (p. 210), almost a complete philosophical commentary on the work of the cross. Obedience to God is for Paul the great virtue of the cross (p. 200). It is an ἱλαστήριον, a propitiation, an expiation, and as such it is the historic condition of pardon (pp. 44, 295-296). With Vinet, Christ's whole life of perfect obedience is included in the author's view (p. 38. Cf. pp. 252-256, 262, where Vinet's position is criticized, although M. Gindraux has high admiration for Vinet, thinks he is sincere and possibly orthodox).

The writer holds to the vicarious interpretation of the cross. He reads, however, into the word "substitution" a special meaning which may throw him open to suspicion on the part of an inquisitorial reader. "The word substitution," he says, "has for us a special sense. It designates that voluntary participation of Christ in our sufferings which makes of Him a representative and a protector in whom we can trust. There is nothing cold or mechanical in this notion" (p. 11). "We shall speak of substitution. But the substitution which we believe to be seen in the Bible is not the dry and mechanical replacement of certain theories which pass for evangelical. It is a living union of trust (un rapport vivant de confiance), born of a natural solidarity and of a purposed

solidarity between him who represents and those who are represented, a union inspired by God Himself" (pp. 46-47. Cf. p. 246). Into the anthropological details of this "solidarity" M. Gindraux does not go, and the most he may mean by it is simply, that on the cross Christ truly took *our* place. It was actually *our own* guilt that He bore. "The old word substitute," he concludes, "must be interpreted by the word representative, which our democracy better understands, and which designates the same thing" (p. 297). Christian thinkers, however, as indeed Christians in general, will be loath to let go of the word "substitution", which has done such good service. As a matter of fact, one may be a representative without being a substitute in the stricter meaning of the term, and while the Victim of Calvary was a true representative both of God and man, it is quite as important, if not more so, that our salvation, and therefore our soteriology, be theocratic as that it be democratic.

In his philosophy of the cross M. Gindraux does not ignore the legal side. He very properly expounds Paul's view of Justification as a juridically imputed righteousness (pp. 175-178, 193, 204, 208, 211, 249-250. Cf. pp. 183-185). He does not think that this exhausts the Pauline idea, for justification always issues in personal sanctification (pp. 193, 204). Conscience has no insignificant part in the author's soteriology (pp. 16-17, 85, 262), though its function is viewed as condemnatory rather than corrective.

An Epilogue is added in which several objections are examined. One of these takes up the question of the Father's participation in the atoning agonies of the cross, and has a patripassian coloring. Yet God is said to suffer not *per essentiam*, but only in so far as He condescends, "living by His sympathy in the existence of His creatures" (p. 283). Or, as it is expressed on a later page, it is the cross in which God suffered in the Person of His Son (pp. 19, 296. Cf. pp. 43, 277).

In a single paragraph (p. 307) M. Gindraux sums up his philosophy of the cross with beautiful conciseness. "What then is the cross?" he asks. It is, he replies, the imposing monument of the Divine love and holiness and justice; a monument, too, of the human perfection, charity, patience, and faith of Christ, as well of the cruel wickedness and profound corruption of our race. Yet it is still more. Its efficacy is in this: that it brings pardon and transformation, protecting fallen man from a merited condemnation. There are times when the author lets slip a sentence that is open to a moralistic interpretation, but these are few, so that on the whole this presentation of the philosophy of the cross is well within evangelical limits.

We search in vain for the date of the book's publication: an unfortunate omission. Two misprints occur: "liurement" for "librement" (p. 104, line 1); and "nons" for "nous" (p. 197, line 15).

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

The Bible and Universal Peace. By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, PH.D., Leipzig University, D.D., Dartmouth College. Author of "The Student's Life of Jesus" (1900), "Jesus" (1912), "Interpretation of the Bible" (1908), "The Life of Paul" (1899), "A Short History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age" (1906), "The Book of Acts" (1908), etc. New York and London: Funk & Wagnall's Company. 1914. 8vo; pp. xi, 229.

This is a timely book. Written, as it would seem, without any foresight of the present gigantic European war, it has come out just when all thinking persons are looking for precisely such a discussion. It is no less adequate than timely. Dr. Gilbert writes out of ample knowledge, both Biblical and historical. Its style matches its subject-matter. It would be difficult to find in the whole book an obscure phrase or a halting sentence. Not yet, however, have we touched its highest excellence. This is its judicial spirit. The writer is never carried away by his theme. He has no theory of his own to maintain. His one aim is to set forth the actual relation of the Bible to universal peace, and to do this without exaggeration. He first considers the fact of war in Biblical history. He shows next how Biblical writers regarded this fact, presenting first the ancient Hebrew view of war, that it was "a religious activity", and afterward the Christian teaching, which rendered the old view obsolete. This is succeeded by a study of the elements of peace in those visions of the future which form so fascinating a part of the sacred writings. The influence of the Bible on the sentiment and the institutions of peace is then traced from the beginning of Christian literature in the second century down to the Hague Conference of 1907. The modern appeal to the Bible in support of war is next illustrated in connection with our Civil War and the British Boer War of 1899. The duty and the opportunity of the Church to make the Bible contribute to the movement for universal peace are then dwelt on, and, finally, the relation of Jesus to the Modern Peace Movement is developed with nice discrimination and in strict accord with truth. The position is taken that, while the authority of the Bible has often been invoked for war, it is "the great book of peace"; and that while the modern Peace Movement would reach its goal by the shorter road of "outward enactment", only the influence of the Bible can bring in "the inward and imperishable peace of brotherhood." An excellent "General Index" and an "Index of Scripture References" conclude the volume.

The reviewer regrets to have to say that Dr. Gilbert's discussion is seriously vitiated by his denial of the supernatural inspiration of the Bible and especially by his low view of the Old Testament. He has no use for the latter. Indeed, he thinks that "a drastic revision and expurgation of the Psalms, as of the entire Old Testament, is a clear and pressing Christian duty" (p. 53). But his opinion of the New Testament is not much higher. Thus he rejects even our Lord's teaching of the second advent (p. 88). His idea is

that the worth of this or of that part of the Bible must be determined by its agreement with the spirit of Christ and that the spirit of Christ must be determined—it is hard to say it, but such is the impression made—by his own, as it seems to him, highest consciousness. The result of it all is that the view presented of the Bible's relation to peace has no more authority than Dr. Gilbert himself can give it. His discussion is interesting and enlightening, but that is all.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Individual and the Social Gospel. By SHAILER MATHEWS. Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. Published jointly by The Missionary Education Movement and Laymen's Missionary Movement. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada. 1914. 8vo; p. 84.

This is not a plea to supplant the old gospel of a supernatural salvation for the individual by the new gospel of the salvation of the community through social service. It is an earnest and a strong plea to aid and to supplement the salvation of the individual by Christianizing the social institutions, such as the home, education, and, indeed, the whole social order, through which the individual as well as society, and the individual even more than society, is influenced.

The discussion is sane, and very suggestive. There are some particularly strong and timely passages. Among such are the writer's insistence on page 30 that the "woman movement", in order to maintain its high type of idealism, "needs all the assistance religion can afford"; and his presentation on page 45 of the folly and danger of the modern passion for amusements. We agree with him heartily when he says that "the most ingenious of us have not yet discovered a way by which men can be entertained into salvation".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

God's Paths of Peace. By ERNEST RICHARD. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 109. 75 cents net.

One cannot but admire the optimism of a writer who, in the face of the present European and world-wide catastrophe, beholds the certain evolution of universal and abiding peace. By God's paths the writer refers to nothing religious, much less Christian; but only to those international movements which are resulting in a more or less definite "world organization". Among these movements are included modern facilities for transportation, the international postal system, international conferences and societies, and the general movement toward closer relations between the representatives of different nations. The author argues that as an evolutionary process has resulted in extending the peace of individual families to the peace of entire nations, so a

similar process is resulting in the establishment of "the peace of the world". He seems however to forget that the process must first be begun in the hearts of individual men before we can hope to see the results for which he looks, and that many of the agencies which he mentions are purely selfish in their aim. Until the law of Christ and the desire for service have been more fully established by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, we can hardly expect, in the light of the present war, the definite and far off event of which the writer treats.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Bible as Literature. By IRVING FRANCIS WOOD, PH.D., and ELIHU GRANT, PH.D. New York: The Abingdon Press. Cloth, crown 8vo, pp. 346. \$1.50.

The publication of such a volume as this by the Professor and the Associate Professor of Biblical Literature in Smith College would be a matter of little concern were it not for the fact that it forms one of the *Bible Study Textbook Series*, "specially designed for the use of undergraduate classes in colleges" and "prepared in harmony with the complete course in Bible study outlined by a joint committee representing the Eastern and Western sections of the Association of College Instructors in the Bible, the department of colleges and universities and of teacher training of the Religious Education Association, the Student Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A., and the Sunday School Council". That is to say, this "Introduction to the Literature of the Bible" is intended for the instruction of *all the youth of America*. What then are its teachings? Merely the dogmatic assertion of the commonplaces of destructive biblical criticism under the familiar caption, "accepted by the common consent of modern scholars". The chapters dealing with "The Books of Narrative" are devoted mainly to a statement of the composite character of these books, and to assigning their various portions to the "original sources", "J", "E", "P", "D" and "R". Deuteronomy is shown to be a pious forgery dating from the time of Josiah, but only a portion of the book, or a brief "early edition", is as early as this date. Some "fragments of Hebrew literature antedate David". The earliest writers were the prophets; but the experience of the earlier "prophets" did not differ in essence from "the shaman of Central Asia, beating his drum and working himself into a frenzy; the American Indian Medicine Man; Socrates, with his belief in his demon; the Delphic Oracle, or the Mohammedan dervish"; and even the later prophets had no divine inspiration, only keen political insight and sagacity. Daniel contains no predictions but was written in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes hundreds of years after the imaginary life of the "traditional wise man" whose name it bears, and around whose name this "cycle of stories is gathered".

The composite character of the synoptic Gospels is affirmed; the authorship of the fourth Gospel is denied to John; the authenticity of

the Pastoral Epistles and of 2 Peter is discredited; and the Apocalypse is described as "a compilation, coming from different sources, and edited perhaps in the persecutions under Trajan in (A.D.) 112."

These teachings are not original or new; but are they of the character our young people need? Were they true, they are surely not the form of instruction to be given to those who are only beginning their study of the Bible, and who are in need of encouragement and inspiration and faith. But they are not true; they are mere theories of certain rationalistic interpreters, and it is not right to state them as accredited facts, particularly when nothing is said as to what other scholars teach and what the great church of Christ believes. Whatever simple suggestions the volume contains as to the outline or purpose of some of the books, their value is far outweighed by the statements which, instead of giving anything constructive and helpful, tend only to arouse doubt and unbelief.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Legend of the Christmas Rose. By HENRY E. JACKSON, M.A.
New York: Hodder and Stoughton; George H. Doran Company.
Cloth 12mo, pp. 113. 75 cents net.

Five of the world's great Christmas paintings are treated in these chapters; and their interpretations, and the legends associated with them embody beautiful messages appropriate to Christmas-tide. The first of these paintings, by Alfred Hitchens, gives the title to the volume in which the five interpretations are contained; the legend here portrayed is shown to illustrate the creative power of love. "The Virgin Dream" by Alfred Bramtot, is shown to be a suggestion of "the anticipation of Christmas", the longing of the heart which is satisfied in the "gift of God". The third painting, "The Arrival of the Shepherds" by Henri Lerolle, is interpreted as embodying "the loneliness of Christmas". "The Evening Hymn to the Virgin" by Bouguereau, reminds us of the music of Christmas and its message to the believing heart. The last of the five, "The Arrival at Bethlehem" by Luc-Oliver Merson, brings the familiar but serious message of the possibility of excluding Christ from the Christmas festival, and the need of making room for Him if we are to taste anything of true Christmas joy.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Golden Censer. By FLORENCE L. BARCLAY. New York: George H. Doran Company. 16mo, pp. 61. Decorated boards, 50 cents net.

It might not be thought necessary to consider seriously this little book on intercessory prayer, were it not evident that it was seriously written, and with an earnest desire to set forth the teaching of inspired Scripture; and did it not further seem that its interpretation of Scripture is open to serious question and its influence misleading. The attention of the reader is concentrated upon one point, namely,

that it is contrary to the will of God for one to pray for an unconverted soul, or city, or nation. The argument is based upon the statement of our Lord: "I pray not for the world"; so, it is urged, we are not to pray for the world, nor for anyone in the world, until that one has first accepted Christ. The explanation of this prohibition, and indeed of the words of Christ, is found in the fact of the freedom of the human will, and the unwillingness of God to do violence to this freedom. The writer seems to overlook the fact, to which reference is made in the book itself, that Christ prayed that the unity of the church might be used as a means to the end "that the world may believe". The fallacy of the argument lies just here; the writer fails to realize that every prayer presupposes that God will employ means to accomplish his ends. We are urged "to preach" and not to pray; but can we not pray that the preaching will be of such a character that the hearer will gladly accept the message and freely choose Christ as Lord? Can we not then quite as properly pray even though we make no specific mention of the means which God may use in the answer of our prayer for the salvation of souls? However sincere the writer, we cannot feel that justice has been done to the words of Paul when he expresses his own prayer to God for unbelieving Israel (Rom. x. 1) or to his earnest exhortation "that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men" (1 Tim. ii. 1). Another book, *The Rosary*, by this same author has a circulation of a million copies; it may be hoped that this well-intended volume will be less widely read.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Students and The World-Wide Expansion of Christianity. Addresses delivered before the Seventh International Convention of The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Kansas City, Missouri, December 31, 1913, to January 4, 1914. Edited by Fennell P. Turner, General Secretary, New York, Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. Cloth 8vo; pp. 743.

Among the influences which are making toward the development of the spiritual and religious life of American students, and the directing of this life toward the evangelization of the world, none is comparable in importance to the organization known as *The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*. This opinion, which has frequently been voiced by secretaries of mission boards, and other leaders of the missionary enterprise, is substantiated by the publication of this Report of the Kansas City Convention. The volume is a history of only one student gathering, and so an illustration of only one of the agencies employed by the Student Movement; but it suggests and in part indicates the manifold agencies continuously brought to bear upon the student life of America by the Movement, while it describes in detail the most important convention which has been held under its auspices. These gatherings of students, held every

four years, have become events of deep significance in the religious life, not only of America but of the world. The purpose of these conventions, as stated in the Report, is to bring together carefully selected delegations of students and professors from important institutions of the United States and Canada, and the leaders of the missionary enterprise, both at home and abroad, to consider the great problem of the evangelization of the world and unitedly to resolve to undertake, in His strength, greater things for the Kingdom of Christ.

Six such gatherings had been held in previous years but none equalled the Convention at Kansas City, either in careful preparation, in the number or representative character of the delegates and speakers, in the breadth of scope, or in the permanence of its influence. In many ways and in countless lives, will this influence be extended; but by no one instrument so effectively as by this valuable Report prepared by the efficient General Secretary, Mr. F. P. Turner.

It includes the calls to prayer and articles on prayer sent in advance of the Convention to Student Volunteers, missionaries, and friends of the Student Movement in all parts of the world; and the suggestions for meditation and prayer used by the delegates during the Convention. It shows that these delegates numbered over 5000 and represented some 755 distinct institutions. It contains carefully edited reports of the addresses delivered by 134 different speakers. It contains appendixes which give a list of the Volunteers who have sailed to the foreign field, a carefully selected bibliography of missionary literature, and a statement of the amounts contributed to missions by the several American institutions during the quadrennium 1909-1913. The main portion of the volume is of course devoted to the addresses, of which no detailed mention can be made; suffice it to say that they included almost every phase of the problem of missionary activity, and of the relation of students to the world-wide expansion of Christianity.

The arresting Report of the Executive Committee of the Student Volunteer Movement showed the remarkable growth of the Movement, particularly during the past four years, and emphasized the demands made upon the Movement in the present and in the immediate future. The discussions which followed dwelt upon "The Present World-Situation", "The Forces to be Wielded", "The Preparation Demanded for the Modern Missionary Career", and "The World-Strategy of the Christian Conquest of North America". The great fields and problems presented by Asia, Africa, China, India, Japan, Latin America, and the Turkish Empire, were presented by a succession of qualified speakers. In sectional conferences there were discussions of the relation of theological students to foreign missions, of the Chinese students (who were represented by a strong and enthusiastic delegation) to China's present awakening, and the relation of laymen to missions; and finally there were presented specific calls for service. These various addresses and discussions form a veritable

and invaluable library of missionary information; but they also reflect present conditions and demands and make an impressive appeal for action to this generation of American students. All the material of these addresses is made easily accessible by a carefully prepared index. No one can review the contents of this important volume without being impressed anew with the debt owed by the Church to the Student Volunteer Movement.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Angel in the Sun. By JOHN BALCOM SHAW. Fleming H. Revell Co., \$1 net.

This volume contains sixteen brief papers which treat of important themes in a vigorous and attractive way. The titles given them are striking—Sowing or Storing One's Life, The Parallelogram of Love, The Evil Eye, The Questions of Jesus, The Exclamations of Jesus, Straightening the Curves, Entering the Cloud—and the interest excited by the titles is sustained throughout. The book is an excellent example of the exposition and application of Scripture truth. And on every page the note of faith and hope and courage sounds full and clear.

A few inconsistencies and misapprehensions may be noted. On page 22 Paul is called the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, while on page 71 it is correctly observed that the author is unknown. It is hardly in accord with history to speak of John's "genius of leadership" (p. 52). *Do*st is used for *does* (p. 86). On page 113 an untenable distinction is drawn between *believe in* and *believe on*. The sayings of Jesus, it is said, make a volume of three hundred and seventy-one closely printed pages (p. 118). In view of the fact that the whole of the four Gospels cover only one hundred six and a half pages in minion type, it would be interesting to know from what sources these *sayings* are drawn. Upon what authority is it affirmed that "Jesus is soon coming back to our earth"? page 124. He is always here, and if his return in glory is meant Scripture gives us no warrant to fix the time, which is known to the Father only. Ps. 17:15 is wrongly interpreted (p. 173). The thought is, "I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with beholding thy form" (R.V.).

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

My Daily Meditation for the Circling Year. By JOHN HENRY JOWETT. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25 net.

The book contains a page for every day in the year, in which some passage of Scripture is interpreted and applied. It has all the qualities which we are accustomed to find in Dr. Jowett's writings. Rich in thought, chaste in style, full of the spirit of the Gospel, it provides a choice manual of devotion. The short sentences are packed with truth and charged with emotion. As a striking example may be named *The Three Gardens*, page 53.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Open Door. By HUGH BLACK. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1 net.

The purpose of the book is stated in the opening sentence, "to suggest a certain attitude towards the world and life." Man is endowed with immeasurable capacities, and placed in an infinite universe. The titles of the several chapters suggest the course of thought: The Open Door, The Laws of the Open Door, The Shut Door, The Doorways of Tradition, The Magic Door, The Lure of the Open Door, The Door of Opportunity, The Adventure of the Open Door, The Last Open Door. The book should excite and encourage its readers to seek the larger and richer life that is opened to men through Christ.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Seer's House. By REV. JAMES RUTHERFORD, B.D. T. & T. Clark. 1914.

This is the latest volume in the series entitled *The Scholar as Preacher*. It is interesting and suggestive. Rare skill is shown in drawing out the meaning of the text, and in applying it to present needs. The titles are often striking, and the mode of treatment is textual rather than topical. The sermon on Christ's Word to Simon may be noted as an example of effective analysis. On page 166 Hood's lines: "to know I'm further off from heaven than when I was a boy," are apparently ascribed to Wordsworth.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Illustrative Teachings of Jesus. By REV. GEORGE H. YOUNG, M.A. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.00 net.

This book undertakes "to present for popular use the central truths of Christ's important illustrations." An introductory chapter treats of the salient features of Jesus' teaching, and his illustrations are then classified under two main heads, those drawn from human society and those drawn from nature. It cannot be said that much originality is shown, but the spirit of the Gospel is manifest. Now and then we meet with statements that should not go unchallenged. To say that Christ "did not lay down forbidden or permissible rules of conduct or of worship" (p. 10) is to contradict much of his teaching. That he taught ordinarily rather by principles than by precepts is true, but at times he did lay down rules as sharp and positive as those given by any lawgiver. The representation given of the state of society in the time of Jesus is curiously confused and inconsistent. We are told on page 77 that "it was far from being bad . . . in some of the distant provinces, and especially in Palestine there was a strong deep undercurrent of social justice." Yet on page 71 we read, "In Jesus' time, Jewish society was parading a formal religiosity without, and seething with wickedness within." On page 118, the "practical effect" of the Jewish religion "on society was cruel in the extreme. The first thing necessary was to reform the sources and wellsprings

of society." On page 128, "To secure justice in the courts of Palestine was wellnigh impossible." On page 158, "A spirit of lawlessness was everywhere evident, and life and property were insecure". Palestine is not three hundred miles long (p. 117). Familiar lines of Byron are incorrectly quoted on page 221. Awkwardly worded sentences occur. "The Parable of the Draw-net cannot be dogmatically interpreted other than the lesson Jesus himself states" (p. 26). And what is meant by *syncopated sin* (p. 223)?

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Jesus and His Parables. By GEORGE MURRAY, B.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1914.

Mr. Murray has treated some of the parables in Hastings' Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels. In this volume they are grouped under five heads:—I. Grace in the Individual Life. II. Pharisaism the Foe. III. Fellowship with God the Ideal. IV. The Course of the Kingdom. V. Discipline and Judgment. The classification is not particularly helpful, nor is it consistently carried out. There seems to be no reason, for example, why The Unmerciful Servant should not find a place under Discipline and Judgment, instead of under Grace in the Individual Life. Nor why the Prodigal Son should be included under Pharisaism the Foe. Certainly the elder brother is not the central figure of the story. In the course of the interpretation the principle is maintained that the parables "are older than the setting in which they are found", that "The prefatory remarks and the expository ending are of less authority than the stories themselves" (pp. 8, 9). "Thus the interpretative versions of the Sower, and of the Tares, are held to be of later date" (p. 10). But when it is added that this "does not necessarily imply that Jesus never spoke in private to his followers about the meaning of his tales", the question naturally arises, Why then should we not accept the interpretation of the parable which comes to us with precisely the same historical witness as the parable itself?

These are various assertions to which exception may be taken. On page 19 it is said, "To master truly Groups IV and V, let it be added, we must keep in view that the 'Kingdom of God' was not an entity apart from the state; rather it was its higher reading, a subjective sovereignty." Was that the conception that Jesus entertained of the Kingdom? The suggestion is several times repeated that additions were made to the parables by speakers at the weekly meetings, "improving prosaically upon the moral" (p. 89 note.) Certainly it is a violent assumption that the parable of the Wedding Garment must have taken its present form after the destruction of Jerusalem because the King is represented as sending his armies to destroy the murderers and burn their city.

It must be said on the whole that the book has little of interest or value to contribute to our study of the parables.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Elements of Preaching. By ARTHUR S. HOYT. MacMillan Company. 1914. \$1.50 net.

The Romance of Preaching. By CHARLES SILVESTER HORNE. Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25 net.

Different as these books are in style and method, they are built upon the same truth, that it is the man behind the message that gives it power. The Holy Spirit may use the most weak and imperfect instruments, but it is reasonable and Scriptural to believe that the better the instrument the more fruitful will the service ordinarily be. The Spirit seeks trained and consecrated men through whom He may accomplish His purpose of grace.

The volume of Professor Hoyt is the third that he has prepared upon the same general theme. First came "The Work of Preaching", then "The Preacher". This book, he thinks, "will seem a nearer approach to the secret of effective preaching" (p. vii). Many words are spoken to which not young ministers alone but also those who have been long in the work may well give heed. Dr. Hoyt has drawn upon his own large and rich experience, and his counsels are just and wise.

The other volume, one of the series of the Yale Lectures on Preaching, comes to us as "The Last Message of a Leader of Men". A melancholy interest attaches to it from the sudden death of the author only three days after the course was finished. The place he held in England as preacher, patriot, author, statesman, reformer, was large, but he filled it nobly. The lectures express his own eager, energetic, inspiring personality. They deal rather with preachers than with preaching, rather with the man than with the message, as the titles of the several chapters indicate—"The Servant of the Spirit. The First of the Prophets. The Apostolic Age. The Royalty of the Pulpit: Athanasius and Chrysostom. The Rulers of the Peoples: Savonarola, Calvin and John Knox. The Founders of Freedom: John Robinson and the Pilgrim Fathers. The Passion of Evangelism: Wesley and Whitefield. The Romance of Preaching.

The book belongs to the literature of inspiration. The style is chaste and strong, and the martial note rings out on every page. The purpose is not to teach men how to preach, but rather to kindle the desire and the ambition to preach with power. It is the word of a man who is thoroughly in earnest because he is profoundly convinced of the truth of his message and the greatness of his calling. Some striking passages occur. "The Watchword of the past century was Freedom. . . . The watchword of our new century is Justice" (p. 286). Wise words are spoken upon the place of evangelism in the work of the pastor (pp. 227, 262). "I am one of those who believe that the churches have never been so rich in scholarship, and so competent in criticism. But I am not sure that any human being has been inspired to attempt the heights of love and life because he has been thrilled with the realization of the composite character of the Book of Genesis."

Princeton

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Egypt to Canaan, or Lectures on the Spiritual Meanings of the Exodus.

By A. H. TUTTLE. New York: Eaton and Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham. No date. Pp. 286. \$1.00 net.

In sixteen chapters Dr. Tuttle, the scholarly and eloquent pastor of the Methodist Church at Summit, N. J., traces the progress of the people of Israel from their condition in Egypt to their settlement in Canaan. As the sub-title indicates, the purpose is not so much historical as homiletical, though his way of effecting this purpose is by no means through formal homilies, but through rapid sketches, in which a hint suggests as much as in most writings of this sort suffices for a whole sermon. The effect of this style is that of rapid movement and wealth of material. In fact this author is a very poor illustration of that parsimonious dealing out of the minister's weekly dole, which is recommended in some quarters and practised in more, as the only safe course for the preacher who does not wish to run dry. It is safe to say that a preacher of this type could run his mill for a year with the water that Dr. Tuttle here lavishes with the bounty of Nature, where what seems waste is in fact the generosity of limitless resource. In the spirit of Paul in 1 Cor. x. 11, the writer shows the ways in which the historical and biographical data of Exodus may be viewed as "ensamples", and the record of them as an "admonition" of lasting value for the Church. For example, in the first chapter, Egypt is painted for us as the type of "this present evil world", under the five heads of (1) its teeming industry, (2) its magnificence of art, (3) its intellectual culture, (4) its stimulating pleasure, and (5) its magnificence of religion. Then in a few strokes the effect of all this life of the world upon the spiritual man is depicted,—its enslaving power, from which a heaven-wrought deliverance is needed.

The little volume is to be commended most highly; it deserves a sale commensurate with the usefulness it is sure to develop for its readers.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Twice Born Men. A Clinic in Regeneration, A Foot Note in Narrative to Professor William James's "The Varieties of Religious Experience. By HAROLD BEGBIE, Author of "The Vigil", "Tables of Stone", etc. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo, pp. 280.

We are glad to welcome this neat fifty cent edition of what is spoken of as "the most discussed book of the generation" and of what has proved to be one of the most useful publications of our day.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL LITERATURE

The Later Version of the Wycliffite Epistle to the Romans, compared with the Latin Original: a Study of Wycliffite English. By EMMA CURTIS TUCKER. Yale Studies in English, xlix. New York: Holt and Company. 1914. Pp. xxxvi, 177. \$1.50.

The primary intention and significance of this book is linguistic. But any study of the single word in whatever version of the English Bible must be of concern to those who are interested in the history of literature and style, and in the growth of religious thought and faith among English-speaking people. It is the author's purpose "to make a small beginning in the study of the Wycliffite versions, with a view to discovering the resources and capacities of the English language in the last quarter of the Fourteenth Century." No other texts could be so useful to the study of "resources and capacities" as Biblical English. It is, like all language pertaining to religion, conservative, carefully weighed, and elevated; and it represents in translation an original which defines it by various possible lines of comparison. For the purposes of this first specimen of such study the Epistle to the Romans is chosen "on the ground that its philosophy and logic make larger demands upon the translator" than passages of simple narrative, and it is "less entangling" than the highly figurative Apocalypse.

Miss Tucker presents her comparison in a variety of ways. She prints in parallel the later (Purvey) version of Wyclif ("since it is more truly representative of the English language of its day" than the earlier version), the Vulgate, and, for chapters vi to viii and xii to xiv, a contemporary fragment called, from its editor, the Paues version. Some seventy pages are filled with notes of detailed comparison of single words and expressions with other versions in Old, Middle, and Modern English, but chiefly with the earlier Wyclif version and the Authorized Version. The most interesting part of the work is a pair of indexes of the important words, the one Latin-English, the other English-Latin. In another section of introductory notes the author, by the help of the *Oxford Dictionary* and various concordances, comments interestingly, if somewhat obviously, upon the history of various words and expressions in Wyclif. It is not exact to speak of 'ghost' in the sense of 'spirit' becoming practically obsolete in the fifteenth century." I note some three undeniable instances in Shakespeare and nine in Spenser. We are also told that 'ghostly' in the sense of 'spiritual' is even less common." Shakespeare, however, used it seven times in this sense, and Spenser twice. By which it appears that the quoted statements should at least be qualified.

In Rom. i. 28 we read: "Tradidit illos Deus in reprobum [*ἀδόκιμον*] sensum" (Vulg.); "God bitook hem into a reproveable wit" (Wycl.); "God gave them over to a reprobate mind" (Auth. Vers.). Miss Tucker says: that the "Vulgate here lost the precision

of the Greek . . . the idea of 'failing to stand a test' being omitted". *Reprobus*, however, was used of coins, meaning "false, spurious", thus rendering the Greek about as accurately as a single word could. Cf. Jer. vi. 30: "Argentum reprobum vocate eos, quia Dominus projecit illos"; and Auth. Vers.: "reprobate silver, shall *men* call them, because the Lord hath rejected them". Again, the later English word *reprobate*, says the author, "is used almost entirely in senses derived from Biblical passages." This is to overlook the weight of theological meaning with which it has become charged in discussion of the doctrine of election in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, indeed with especial reference to this very passage.

But these details are aside from the author's real task of comparison, which, to all appearance, has been completely and accurately performed.

Princeton University.

CHARLES G. OSGOOD.

Trees and Men. By WILLIAM VALENTINE KELLEY. New York: Eaton and Mains.

This is an essay in the field of the "obscure and fascinating mystery" of the relation between "tree" and "man", which though it evades analysis, is, nevertheless, not "a fiction of the fancy". The effort is sufficiently sustained by an appeal to artists and poets. The effort to reach the sublime by way of appreciation of the beautiful is not achieved and though largely successful we do not find here the last word on the subject. Our author is sometimes more poetic than the quotations which he makes from the poets. There is much fine phrasing; but it is sometimes overdone, as evidenced by the apparent effort.

The book is delightfully entertaining but does not sufficiently intellectualize. We have a right to expect some attempt at the analysis of the sublime, but find none. The truth is there, but it remains behind the veil, as in the beginning. The most serious criticism to be made is that it is written too largely out of second hand experiences, and shows too plainly the patch-work process. But withal it is an altogether worthy effort and the author is to be congratulated. Furthermore, it serves splendidly as a guide to the literature bearing on the subject.

Princeton.

CHAS. M. CANTRALL.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, January: RALPH B. PERRY, Religious Values; J. M. POWIS SMITH, Religion and War in Israel; GEORGE CROSS, Modern Trend in Soteriology; CLYDE W. VOTAW,

Gospels and Contemporary Biographies; W. C. A. WALLAR, A Preacher's Interest in Nietzsche; SHIRLEY J. CASE, Religion of Lucretius.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, January: SAMUEL G. WILSON, Bahaism an Anti-Christian System; LEWIS M. MILLER, Why Did St. Paul Write Greek?; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, The Two Genealogies of Jesus; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Germany and the Bible; JAMES LINDSAY, Critical Estimate of Nietzsche's Philosophy; HAROLD M. WIENER, Historical Criticism of the Pentateuch, II; ALFRED M. HAGGARD, A Difficult Messianic Prophecy.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: FR. VON HÜGEL, Christianity in Face of War: Its Strength and Difficulty; A. C. HEADLAM, The Ezra Apocalypse; Confirmation and Communion: The Legal Question; ARCHIBALD J. ALLEN, Moral Problems of the War; ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, Women and the War; H. KELLY, Eschatological Interpretations and War.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, March: EDWARD S. TALBOT, Topic of Unity; G. C. BINYON, The Gospel and the Modern Situation; ERICH SCHÄDER, Theocentric Theology: in Peace and in War; W. B. SELBIE, The Churches, the War and the Future; I. I. SOKOLOFF, Byzantium the Preserver of Orthodoxy; S. MICHELET, Present Theological Crisis in the Church of Norway; FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, Ecclesiastical Honesty; CARL STANGE, Natural Law and Belief in Miracle; MAX MEINERTZ, The Fact of the Resurrection; MGR. BATIFFOL, The Catholic Church and War; HENRY T. HODGKIN, The Church and War; C. A. DINSMORE, Newman and Bright.

East & West, London, January: BISHOP MONTGOMERY, The War and Christian Missions; H. L. CLARKE, The War, The Empire, and the Missionary Problem; Attitude of Europeans in India towards the Spread of Christianity; PROFESSOR GRISWOLD, Mass Movement of the Punjab; DR. GILL, Strategic Value of Mass Movements in India; T. I. TAMBYAH, The Gate Beautiful; BISHOP NELIGAN, Samuel Marsden—a centenary Article; F. F. MONK, Evangelistic Work in Indian Mission Colleges; C. A. H. GREEN, Salvation of Buddha and Mohammed; M. A. BULLARD, Christian and Buddhist Ideals; E. H. WHITLEY, The Munda Parha System.

Expositor, London, January: D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Healing on the Sabbath Day; JAMES MOFFATT, Prophets and Kings; RENDEL HARRIS, Once more the Cretans; EMERY BARNES, The Psalter as an Aid to Worship in the Twentieth Century; W. A. CURTIS, Christianity and the Life of the Nation; J. G. JAMES, Was Jesus Really Tempted? JOHN BAILLIE, Belief as an Element in Religion. *The Same*, February: EMERY BARNES, The Prophet of the God of Love; EUGENE DE FAYE, Gnostic Sketches; A. VAN HOONACKER, Connexion of Death with Sin according to Genesis ii, iii; E. C. SELWYN, St. Luke and the Eclipse; JOHN A. HUTTON, Julian the Apostate: A Parallel; WILLIAM WATSON, The New Heaven and the New Earth; ALEXANDER SOUTER, Pelagius' Doctrine in Relation to his Early Life.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, January: H. R. MACKINTOSH, The Name of Jesus; WILLIAM M. RAMSAY, The Old Testament in the Roman Phrygia. *The Same*, February: A. E. GARVIE, In Praise of Faith; J. A. SELBIE, The new Edition of Davidson's 'Grammar'; J. AGAR BEET, Another Solution of Revelation xx-xxii; MARGARET D. GIBSON, Arabic Christian Literature.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, January: JAMES L. BARTON, The Modern Missionary; J. P. JONES, Protestant Missionary Propaganda in India; HOWARD N. BROWN, Immortality; AURELIO PALMIERI, The Russian Doukhobors and Their Religious Teachings; JOHN P. PETERS, Excavations in Persia; BENJAMIN W. BACON, After Six Days: A New Clue for Gospel Critics.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, January: ABBE NOËL, The Soul of Belgium; PROFESSOR VINOGRADOFF, The Slavophile Creed; HEADMASTER OF ETON, What Next?; Narrative of a Professor in Louvain; PROFESSOR SULLY, Göttingen in the Sixties; PROFESSOR STRONG, The Jews through Roman Spectacles; PROFESSOR MOFFATT, Meredith and his Fighting Men; EDWARD WILLMORE, "Why we are Fighting." A Reply; F. S. MARVIN, Unity of Civilization; L. T. MORE, Scientific Claims of Eugenics; D. NOEL PATON, A Physiologist's View of Life and Mind; GEORGE HAW, Religious Revival in the Labour Movement: D. A. WILSON, Germans, Tartars, and a Chinese Patriot.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, January: RAMDAS KHAN, Can Germany be a World Power?; Some Effects of Recent Currency Legislation in India; E. J. DILLON, "Just for a Scrap of Paper"; N. GUPTA, The Message of Hinduism; E. M. WHITE, Bergson an Education.

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, January: BERTRAND RUSSELL, Ethics of War; ARTHUR PONSONBY, International Morality; H. A. OVERSTREET, The Changing Conception of Property; ALBERT KOCOUREK, Law and Other Sciences; J. H. TUFTS, Why Should Law and Philosophy Get Together; JOHN E. BOODIN, Social Immortality; JOSEPH D. MILLER, Difficulties of Democracy; W. M. SALTER, Nietzsche's Moral Aim.

Interpreter, London, January: J. W. DIGGLE, Biblical Criticism; EVELYN UNDERHILL, The Mystic and the Corporate Life; E. G. KING, Psalm cxxx; L. W. GRENSTED, Immortality in the Old Testament; T. F. ROYDS, Prayer and Spiritual Law; J. E. SYMES, The Second Epistle of Peter: A Plea for Reconsideration; GEORGE SMITH, Value of Familiarity with the Ipsissima Verba of the Bible as a Method of Interpretation; A. C. BOUQUET, Why is the Book of Enoch so Important?; ARTHUR DAKIN, Influence of Bible on St. Francis of Assisi; The Kingdom of God and War.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, January: MGR. O'RIORDAN, The Legacy of Christ; HUGH POPE, Where are we in Pentateuchal Criticism?; DAVID BARRY, Special Knowledge and the Just Price; J. MACRORY, "The Son of Man."

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, January: CHARLES SINGER, Allegorical Representation of the Synagogue in a Twelfth Century MS. of Hildegard of Bingen; MAYER SULZBERGER, Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide, ii-iii; B. HALPER, A Volume of the Book of Precepts by Hefes B. Yasliah; ISRAEL DAVIDSON, Some Remarks on the Poems ascribed to Joseph Ben Abraham Hakohen.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, January: A SPAGNOLO AND C. H. TURNER, An Ancient Homiliary; H. ST. J. THACKERAY, Song of Hannah and Other Lessons and Psalms for the Jewish New Year's Day; F. J. BADCOCK, Council of Constantinople and the Nicene Creed; A. C. CLARK, Primitive Text of the Gospels and Acts, a rejoinder; B. T. D. SMITH, Apollos and the Twelve Disciples at Ephesus; H. G. EVELYN-WHITE, The Second Oxyrhynchus Saying; J. MEARNs, The Anthologia Graeca Carminum Christianorum.

London Quarterly Review, London, January: W. M. CROOK, The War: Its Origin and Causes; J. W. LIGHTLEY, The Recently-Discovered Zadokite Fragments; J. HOPE MOULTON, Christianity and Defensive War; G. A. JOHNSTON, Renaissance of Scholasticism; E. E. KELLETT, John Dryden: His Poetry and His Prose; DORA M. JONES, Nietzsche, Germany, and the War; W. ARTHUR TATCHELL, The Medical College Movement in China; SAINT NIHAL SINGH, India's Part in the War.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, January: E. T. HORN, The Christian and Society; H. OFFERMANN, Canon of New Testament; T. E. SCHMAUK, Greek Mysteries and the New Testament; F. W. STELHORN, Pauline Conception of the Righteousness of God; B. B. WARFIELD, Are they Few that be Saved?; P. W. H. FREDERICK, Kingdom of God according to St. Paul; A. G. VOIGT, Christology from the Johannine Point of View; H. D. BAUSLIN, Excesses of the Puritans; J. A. SINGMASTER, Reconciliation of God; E. F. KRAUSS, Efficiency in Theological Training; J. FRY, The Preachers of the Old Testament and their Preaching; C. E. LINDBERG, Leadership of the Educated and the Good; C. M. JACOBS, Genesis of Luther's Doctrine of the Church.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, January: J. A. SINGMASTER, The European War; HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, Present Status of Old Testament Criticism; S. ERNEST SMITH, Religion and Ethics in the Sermon; D. FRANK GARLAND, Vital Needs of the Age; STANLEY BILLHEIMER, Contribution of the Lutheran Church to the Present Age; T. C. LONGAKER, Call and Training of Religious Workers; L. W. RUPP, Staging the English Miracle Play; H. D. HOOVER, College Training for Missions.

Methodist Review, New York, March-April: JAMES R. DAY, Restore our Episcopacy; R. J. COOKE, Some Thoughts on the Present Crisis in Europe; S. P. CADMAN, Council of Constance; J. M. WALDEN, Thomas A. Morris—Last of the Pioneer Bishops; CHARLES G. SHAW, Dogmatic Character of German Culture; C. B. DALTON, Ethical Import

of the Incarnation; C. F. REISNER, Church Members from the Sunday School; F. O. BECK, The Church in Europe at the Opening of the War; H. E. WING, Hear Ye the Lord's Controversy; J. R. T. LATHROP, Paul the Mystic.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, January: GROSS ALEXANDER, The War: A Time of Reckoning and of Readjustment; WILLIAM A. BROWN, God in History: from the Point of View of the Present War; BISHOP E. E. HOSS, Bishop William McKendree; WILLIAM BRADFIELD, Local Preachers in the British Wesleyan Church; P. T. FORSYTH, Regeneration, Creation, and Miracle, II; E. Y. MULLINS, Germany of To-Day; LI TIEN LU, The Confucianistic Reaction in China; A. T. ROBERTSON, The Value of the Greek Testament to the Minister; JOHN R. MOTT, Consecration; MABEL HEAD, Enfranchisement of Women; THOMAS CARTER, Unwritten Sayings of Our Lord; ROY L. SMITH, Loyola, The Jesuits, and the Counter-Reformation.

Monist, Chicago, January: RICHARD GARBE, St. Thomas in India; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Sensation and Imagination; K. C. ANDERSON, Orthodox and Liberal Christianity, A Via Media; THORNDIKE, Some Medieval Conceptions of Magic.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, January: R. LEIGHTON GERHART, The Cross; RICHARD C. SCHIEDT, Germany and the Formative Forces of the Great War; CHARLES E. MEYERS, Rationalistic Element in American Literature Previous to 1860; FREDERICK A. RUPLEY, Modern Life and Pastoral Work; LEONARD L. LEH, Comparative Study of Ancient and Medieval Missions; RAY H. DOTTERER, A Review of "The Problem of Christianity"; HENRY GEKELER, Can We Know God?; THEODORE F. HERMAN, The Church and the Social Order.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: JOHN CLIFFORD, The European War as a Conflict of Ideas; E. Y. MULLINS, Nietzsche and his Doctrine; GIOVANNI LUZZI, An Estimate of the Life and Work of Pius X; EDWARD B. POLLARD, What Shall we Think of Creeds?; B. H. DEMENT, Principles and Methods of the Master Teacher; GEO. B. EAGER, The Anti-Alcohol Movement and the European War; H. L. WINBURN, Apostolic Ideal of Christian Unity and Union; B. F. RILEY, Humanity and Materialism; CHARLES H. NASH, The Holy Spirit Testifies with the Christian's Spirit that he is a Child of God.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, January: A. F. SCHAUFFLER, The Teacher's Eleven Helpers; J. F. CANNON, The Faith Once for all Delivered to the Saints; J. B. GREEN, The Value of the Church to the Community; A. A. LITTLE, The Country Church; E. D. BROWN, the Country Pastor; WILLIS THOMPSON, Church Work with Country Organizations; WARREN H. STUART, A Caesarea-Philippi in China.

Yale Review, New Haven, January: NORMAN ANGELL, America and the European War; ARTHUR T. HADLEY, The Political Teachings of Treitschke; P. VINOGRADOFF, The Russian Problem; THOMAS R. LOUNSBURY, Southey as Poet and Historian; KENNETH RAND, Credo; FLORENCE V. KEYS, Academic Superstition and Democracy.

Bilychnis, Roma, Dicembre: L. PASCHETTO, Confessioni, I; ROMOLO MURRI, La religione nell' insegnamento pubblico in Italia; PAOLO ORANO, Neutralità Filosofica; MARIO ROSSI, L'opera di Giovanni Weiss; SALVATORE MINOCCHI, I miti babilonesi e le origini della gnosi; GIOSUE SALATIELLO, L'umanesimo di Caterina da Siena; NICOLÒ FANCELLO, Guardando la morte; SILVIO PONS, Il panislamismo e il panturchismo nell' attuale momento politico. *The Same*, Gennaio: MARIO FALCHI, Confessioni, II; GIOVANNI PIOLI, Riccardo Cobden, l'Italia e Pio IX; G. E. MEILLE, Un vescovo socialista-F. S. Spalding; ANTONINO DE STEFANO, Saggio sull' eresia medievale nei secoli XX e XIII-II contenuto sociale delle eresie popolari; ARTURO PASCAL, Antonio Carraciolo, vescovo di Troyes.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: ALBERTO COLUNGA, La profecía de Jeremias y los años de la cautividad; SABINO LOZANO, El discurso sobre el método de la Filosofía católica; RAYMOND MARTIN, La doctrina sobre el pecado original de la "Summa contra gentiles"; J. G. ARINTERO, Cuestiones místicas.

Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift, Heusden, Januari: S. GREYDANUS, 'n Betere Methode?; A. G. HONIG, Eenige verschijnselen in de tegenwoordige Islamietische wereld en hunne beteekenis voor de missie. *The Same*, Februari: RIDDERBOS, Maatschappelijke toestanden onder Israel in de volheid des tijds; G. CH. AALDERS, Nog iets over de Silo-profetie; Nieuwere homiletische Literatuur. *The Same*, Maart. D. J. VAN KATWIJK, De Verdelgingsoorlogen der Israëlieten tegen de Kanaänieten; J. G. UBBINK, Waarneming, Autoriteit, Heilige Schrift.

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, Januar: Das Bekenntnis Hiobs; Pius X. *The Same*, Februar: Das antike Weltbild und die moderne Apologetik; Das Bekenntnis Hiobs.

Theologisch Tijdschrift, Leiden, 48e Jaargang, afl. vi: F. M. TH. BÖHL, Die Juden im Urteil der griechischen und römischen Schriftsteller, II; JAN TEN HOVE, Animisme; D. PLOOY, Varia; H. WINDISCH, Der Untergang Jerusalems (Anno 70) im Urtheil der Christen und Juden.

Welt des Islams, Berlin, Dezember: ARTUR SCHEFFLER, Die Dardanellenfrage; F. SCHIFF, Zur Assanierung Jerusalems; DIEDRICH WESTERMANN, Die Verbreitung des Islams in Togo und Kamerun.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, xxxix, 1: KARL SIX, P. Denis Mesland, ein junger Freund Descartes' aus dem Jesuitorden; ALBERT SCHMITT, Probabilismus und supplierte Jurisdiktion; AUGUSTIN ARNDT, Die Sekten der russischen Kirche, III; URBAN HOLZMEISTER, Unbeachtete patristische Agrapha, II.

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